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More themes and continuities i : involvement and detachment in the 
sociology of welfare practice 
, ... to those who are regularly without such 
power, and whose awareness is confined to their 
everyday milieux, (the sociologist) reveals by his 
work the meaning of structural trends and 
decisions for these milieux, the ways in which 
personal troubles are connected with public 
issues ... ' (C Wright Mills, 1975: 205) 
'The problems confronting those who study one 
or the other aspects of human groups is how to 
keep their two roles as participant and as enquirer 
clearly and consistently apart and, as a 
professional group, to establish in their work the 
undisputed dominance of the latter'. (Elias, 1956, 
cited in Webb, 1991b: 240) 
Context and content: an introduction 
This particular prologue is both an introductory essay - a preliminary discourse 
- to that which follows, as well as something of an editorial overview. It 
furnishes - with a measure of abstraction - the generality that lies within the 
selection of material that has been assembled here. It also identifies for the 
reader, through brief summary, the main points that might be found contained 
within each of the contributions. 
The collection is organised temporally, reflecting when projects were worked 
on, when they were written up and when they were eventually accepted for 
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publication, the assumption here being that the reader will thereby be able to 
discern some kind of developmental progression or sequencing, an orderliness 
that points to the fruitful accumulation of intellectual capital over the years. 
The engagement with how best to understand (and sometimes promote, 
sometimes chide) welfare practice may indeed have - we might hope - a 
sufficiently strong set of 'domain assumptions' for the same narrative to be 
tracked across a period that opens in 1979 with the neo-liberal triumphalism of 
Hayekian economics, and ends two decades later with an administration 
intellectually indebted to the sociologically-derived third way 
communitarianism of Etzioni and Giddens. This introduction articulates (and 
even sustains) that narrative, despite a certain 'post-modem' caution towards 
an epistemology that seems to be content with authors retrospectively 
rendering their own works for the purposes of a plausible tale. In any event, it 
goes without saying that however well the authorial duty to set context and 
summarise content has been discharged, the reader too will still have ample 
scope to make their own, personal, interpretation of what follows in the body 
of this collection - the 'text' as nowadays we are all so knowingly aware, no 
longer exists as the product of the writer's intent. 
These reservations aside, embedded within this collection is an approach 
which alternates - or perhaps more accurately, equivocates - between 
subjecting social work and welfare practices to the explanatory, and affirming 
the normative; between on the one hand a detached pursuit as to how best 
comprehend the 'actual' nature of the enterprise, and on the other hand (and, it 
is true, less frequently) offering some proposals for new practice possibilities. 
As ought to become clear (and it will do so through a separate, later, section in 
this prolegomena) these two ambitions - creating explanatorily adequate 
accounts of the fluid and ideologically susceptible nature of social work, and 
intervening normatively in the direction that it might take - could be seen to 
reflect the aspirations of the social work academy (or at least one particular 
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branch of the social work academy) at one particular period. The specifics here 
are with Leicester University's School of Social Work, which gave between 
1973 and 1985 the more specifically biographical pre-conditions - or 
permissions - for both involvement and detachment, looking as it did to the 
scholastic conventions of the academy as well as to social work as an activity 
with the moral purpose of service to vulnerable and socially excluded citizens. 
Sociologist know thyself- The Sociology of the Sociology of Welfare Practices 
Within the project given by sociology to social work is its contribution to a 
'theory for practice' based on the connections between biography and history -
what elsewhere has been called 'client-centred sociology' (Webb and Evans, 
1978), resonating importantly not with some new radical departure in social 
work, but listening for and amplifying those 'traditional' social work 
affirmations of commitment to the person-in-situation, or the psycho-social 
(Webb, 1981; 1985). 
The analytical framework that sees welfare practice as a product of the 
complex interplay between historically 'laid down' structures and the actions 
of individual welfare workers is one that bears in on the present enterprise, 
folding back reflexively in on itself in order to generate a situated account of 
the sociology of social work. This has its own 'socio-genesis', emerging from 
its own specificities of time and place, with its own history and biography: 
consistency with the obligations of important equality principles, this is a case 
of the even distribution of sauce between goose and gander. 
Ideas, as we are often reminded in these times of high modernity, are socially 
located. Perhaps we may choose to see what passes for a legitimate 
contribution to knowledge as framed within the taken-for-granted intellectual 
conventions of what Thomas Kuhn (1962) called 'normal science'. Others 
may make a more political, Gramscian, reading of this, seeing an articulation 
and interdependence between the domains of 'authenticated' ideas (as well as 
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other cultural expressions) and the material interests of dominant social 
groups. As a marker of this, the entry of 'paradigm' and 'hegemony' into 
everyday vocabulary -less perhaps in the service bay at the local Ford dealers, 
but certainly wider than the circle of Hampstead literati - points to a resonance 
between the intellectual mood of deconstructivism and a wider cultural 
trajectory of popular scepticism towards the certainty of received ideas. 
This selection is no exception to the setting of its creation within a particular 
time and place. But equally, since it is time and place that both frames and 
shapes the form taken by our identity, then it is unremarkable that however 
much we may work to objectively situate the products of our intellectual 
labour within its social context, in almost all respects it will be experienced as 
deeply personal, and with having some biographical significance. To 
paraphrase the classic aphorism of W I Thomas, just because something we do 
is socially located, it does not make this any the less real for us. In what was 
both passionate advocacy for his discipline, as well as a set of worries about 
the intellectual compromises to which it (like, in truth, any subject) is 
vulnerable, Alvin Gouldner (1971) talked about the way in which sociology 
can address matters that are personally real to us, things that we experience 
simply by being members of this or that society or a group within it. This 
'insiderist' motivation is, of course, something that has more recently lent so 
much energy to feminist and black scholarship, though the impact that a 
consequential 'standpoint' epistemology may have for explanatory adequacy is 
prompted by this departure from the hoped-for guarantees that 'objectivity' 
might give to scientific endeavour. ii In fact the connection between social 
experience and the selecting of the intellectually interesting has always has a 
strong presence within sociology. For example, there can be little doubt that it 
was this sense of wanting to understand the times through which they were 
living that led Durkheim to address the ramifications of the division of labour, 
or Max Weber to the role of bureaucracy in legitimating the authority of an 
emergent modernity. Doubtless too the natural scientist may approach this or 
that research topic as a result of experiencing its everyday form - the cell 
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biochemist whose research interest is prompted by witnessing lymphoma in a 
loved one, or the neuroscientist having seen in their family the human 
consequences of Alzheimer's disease. 
It is only towards the end of this collection (Webb, 1998) that there is an 
acknowledgement - an admission even - that what animates the academic 
undertaking is often the investigator's need to lay some sort of ghost, or at the 
very least to make a connection between what is personally real - the lived 
experiences of everyday life - and what is lent to our understanding of that 
experience by scholastic endeavour or insight. That particular stepping back 
from the usual distancing conventions of academic formality was prompted by 
research into the aftermath of head injury, and the realisation that with so 
many speed-obsessed young men vulnerable to this particular symptom of 
modernity, I could have easily been a parent-respondent had not good fortune 
smiled on the road-going experiences of our son. 
This is sociology - here judged in terms of the object of its enquiry - in a state 
of considerable moral engagement, singular in its choice of research and (in 
this case) blending the psychodynamic with the social structural in order to 
'get close' to the circumstances in which the head injured and their carers find 
themselves. What was produced is a piece of academic knowledge that was 
initiated by some deeply personal concerns, leading to the (in retrospect 
surprisingly demonstrative) declaration that '(t)here but for the grace of God' 
might never feature in the catalogue of reasons for 'doing sociology', but for 
good or ill this happens to be the sentiment which lies behind what follows'. 
(Webb, 1998: 542) 
Because confessing to this personal motivation comes late in the pages of this 
compilation, the reader might be left with the impression that matters earlier in 
time were not so influenced. This is far from the case, even if there is an 
absence of comparable openness. There is an inevitable intersection between 
biography, the everyday contingencies that bear on this, and the broader 
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historical and social forces that shape - and sometimes may go so far as to 
determine - the direction taken by anyone academic's (and in this case, my) 
intellectual labour. 
The time ... the place 
The intellectual and moral pre-conditions for this collection were laid down at 
Leicester University's School of Social Work, which had been formally 
inaugurated in 1970. Its foundation Director, Derek Jehu, established the 
protective shell of reputation, a commitment to evidentially secure research, 
exemplary professional training, and a curriculum that sought self-consciously, 
if sometimes painfully, to integrate social science and social work knowledge 
against the ultimate test of practice relevance. The engagement of specialist 
social scientists, who were not necessarily experienced or qualified social 
workers, might have run counter to one professional ising tendency within 
social work. This however, was offset by the expectation that there would be 
no shirking by these recruits of involvement in the everyday tasks of 
professional social work education, such as the arrangement of placements, the 
visiting of students during their practice training, the management of 
admissions and an involvement in practice teacher training events. Coupled 
with an assumption that research, writing and publication was to be undertaken 
by all staff irrespective of their disciplinary origins, the organisational 
preconditions for a rapprochement between sociology and social work were 
being laid down. So it was that the materiality of engagement with social 
work education, the inescapable fact that it is through knowledge they see as 
relevant that social workers acquire the explanatory tools for the narratives 
they construct about their clients, and the puritanical sentiment that it would be 
unseemly to bite the hand that fed, all made for a receptivity to the idea that 
somehow sociology should - and could - playa more engaged role than were it 
more organisationally marginalized than at Leicester. 
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A secure reputation for professional training as well as academic strength both 
within the University of Leicester itself and in the firmament of the national 
social work academy lent an institutional confidence to the School one in , 
which risks could be taken with what emerged under its auspices. With a 
more or less explicit commitment to professional knowledge as being 
constituted not solely from within social work itself, but of necessity drawing 
eclectically from other quarters, the School fostered a tolerant and catholic 
orientation to what it was willing to support and endorse. A consistent - and 
often definitive - output of research and innovative texts on the articulation of 
practice theories (see for example, Jehu et al, 1972; Monger, 1972; Haines, 
1975; Curnock and Hardiker, 1979) meant there was a demonstrably 
'powerful' - and self-assured - social work core to the intellectual life of the 
School. Those social scientists of us slightly beyond the perimeter of all this 
(though certainly, and generously, not beyond its pale), posed no threat with 
our occasionally outrageous flourishes. 
Wider developments within the paradigmatic base of social work were 
occurring at the same time - the middle of the nineteen seventies - and these 
were to advance the case for sociology having a legitimate and active place 
within the theoretical and practice base of the profession, and professional 
training. 'Integrated', or 'unitary' methods (Goldstein, 1973) or systems 
theory (Pincus and Minahan, 1973), presented a multi-dimensional modelling 
of the social work task, in which targets for intervention reached well beyond 
what was then regarded as the conventional focus on individual clients. 
Borrowing liberally from ecology, organisational analysis and structural-
functional sociology, this approach offered the prospect of taking welfare 
practice ahead of what was seen as the moral and political bankruptcy of 
psychodynamics, whilst simultaneously keeping it within the parameters of 
agency function, something it did by its emphasis on middle range technical 
resolutions to system malfunctions. iii Nevertheless - and allowing for the fact 
the politics of the new approach were hardly revolutionary - systems thinking 
and integrated methods opened out a space for those sociologists who were 
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looking for engagement with social work that was neither hopelessly 
destructive, nor no more than a subservient adjunct to 'social influences on 
behaviour'. The new paradigm took social work's original, tentative, 
acknowledgement of 'the social' into a far more emphatic phase, and offered 
the prospect of insinuating sociology into the epistemic core of social work, 
taking either a 'radical', Marxist, tum in which change and change agency 
suggested one thing only (Leonard, 1975), or a more humanist direction of the 
resolutely 'client-centred', which if it owed anything to politics it was ethical 
socialism and the sociological expression of this in the thinking of C Wright 
Mills (Webb and Evans, 1977; 1978; Webb, 1981; Webb, 1985). 
Sociology: putting 'the social' in Social Work 
In Britain at least, the relationship between sociology and social work has 
often been a difficult one. Historically they have been institutionally close, 
often sharing moral and organisational origins within Fabian reformism. The 
university social science departments renowned for their administrative, 
empirical sociology in the early and middle decades of the last century - like 
LSE and Liverpool - were also the places where social workers were trained in 
the application of carefully acquired knowledge about social problems and 
personal pathologies. So long as social problems were seen as being resolved 
through technical or administrative device, then the presumption of social 
work as the practical application of social science knowledge was sustainable. 
But once social problems become attributable to forces beyond the capacity of 
mere individuals to influence, then the scope for academics to chide social 
work (and social workers) for a combination of hubris and naivete became 
almost irresistible. Taken with the paradigmatic shifts in sociology that were 
associated with the disruptions to the post-war intellectual consensus in Britain 
during the late 1960s, the preconditions for an unhappy separation were all 
there. In short, the legacy of this 'new sociology' - whatever its intellectual 
enhancements and achievements might have been to itself - was for social 
work to stand as an exemplification of the yawning gap between the good 
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intentions of social actors and the 'real' consequences of their actions. Though 
dismissive of the seductive pull of positivism and scientism that had hitherto 
characterised sociology, this new wave variant - which was composed of 
Marxist realism and labelling theory determinism - constituted an iron cage of 
conceptual faith, in which the a prioris of standpoint drove analysis beyond 
consideration of complexity, fluidity or ambiguity. If there has always been 
the two sociologies of structure and agency lurking within the discipline - and 
the thematic continuity of this is clearly traceable from Weber to Giddens -
then there was a moment in the subject's recent history (somewhere around the 
early nineteen seventies), when the causal uncertainty arising from the 
transactional dynamic between the two domains was overwhelmed -
temporarily, as it happens - by the conceptual priority given to the determinist 
synchrony of structuralism. 
Despite this emergence of gloomy functionalism, sociology remained on the 
curriculum for social work education, its place assured by the legacy of an 
earlier confidence that sociology would provide 'really useful' guidance in the 
pursuit of professional goals. The subject was still part of the profession's 
'knowledge base'; sociologists (like me) continued to be employed to teach 
would-be social workers. But the thesis that personal problems were 
attributable to social malaise had a considerable impact on a profession still 
attached to the reformist sentiment of 'doing good' - but which was not 
insulated from the unsettling cultural eruptions of the nineteen sixties. In 
short, the critique of the individualising of social problems was to end up 
slighting the entire moral basis of social work. 
Ironically, the sociological commentary on social work and its illusions -
activated by the materialist and realist project of high structuralism - opened 
up the welfare enterprise to a phase of what in retrospect is quite remarkable 
idealistic (and analytical) naiVete. The injunction for social work to become 
aligned with those oppositional forces working against the state, jettisoned the 
very materialism upon which the analysis has been originally built. So whilst 
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this collection certainly looks on occasions to identify the humanising 
possibilities of what Mispelblom - in an surprisingly overlooked paper (1985) 
- refers to as 'low key' radical practices immanent within social work, it does 
not abandon an attachment to identifying the structural stipulation behind the 
charter that 'defines not only the framework of rights and duties which 
constitute agencies sanction, but also a set of roles they must play and 
judgements they must make' (Harris and Webb, 1987:97). Thus it is that 
central to the thesis embedded in this collection is the very limited autonomy 
state social work has from the interests which also exert dominance over the 
administrative and legislative apparatus of that state. The origins of welfare 
work and its continuing presence have to be seen as inevitably articulated with 
those structures. It is this that sets the limit on social work being able to step 
outside a certain 'logic of place', and which needs to be remembered before 
enthusiastic, but na'ive, idealists seek to propel it off into active opposition to 
the very state within which its charter is set. 
This collection refers to - and is very much part of - originating moves to take 
sociology out of a parasitical dependence on social work, and to set down a 
new agenda for how the two discourses might engage in a more constructive 
intellectual and pedagogic relationship. Early work undertaken with Evans 
(Webb and Evans, 1977; 1978), as well as the contribution to the social work 
theory text edited by Hardiker and Barker (1981), identified some of the 
elements for a rapprochement, including the idea for a 'client centred 
sociology'. This maintains that the narratives which social workers construct 
must perforce be about individuals, and the remedying of these individual 
problems or misfortunes is the source of the social work mandate. But for the 
narrative to move beyond a mere tale, for it to become 'true' understanding 
with demonstrable empathy, the full nature of the impact on individuals of 
social arrangements, the limitations and exclusions that these engender must 
be considered for anything which is to encompass a social work assessment. 
In some respects this is the practical application of what in The Sociological 
Imagination C Wright Mills said is at the core of sociology itself, which is 
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explaining and uncovering the connection between individual biography and 
the shaping, often constraining forces of his tory.i v 
This is sociology for social work. It is a perspective and commitment that 
looks to important resonances between two domains, in which some sort of 
reconciliation could be effected. Sociology for social work constitutes a 
strategy for recasting social work's relationship with this particular social 
SCIence. It is an engagement with how sociology might offer theories for 
practice. The impetus here - as the earlier allusions in this prologue to the 
exercise of 'proper' empathy suggest - is informed by the imperative that 
insofar as social work has any transformative role, this is around its radical 
humanism - its attempt to account with proper fidelity the nature of what 
Florence Hollis, once called 'the person in situation' (see Webb, 1981a). 
Matters of method, methodology and commitment 
When the subject of our interest is social work - its role within society, its 
relationship to the state, the manner by which those who practice social work 
discharge their duties - then there is a particular difficulty in deciding where 
the commitment to analytical detachment ends and a normative allegiance to 
something which Paul Halmos once referred to as 'altruism under social 
auspices' begins. Now of course it is not necessarily the case that the second 
of these concerns - the value driven - need to long detain the sociologist, 
whose inclination may be with exploring the configuration between welfare 
work and other social institutions (the state for example, or with the wider 
cultural trajectories known as modernism or post-modernism, or with the 
sedimentation of gender or race in institutional form), or with simply 
accounting for the ways in which social workers deal with the practicalities of 
reconciling their agencies mandate with personal or professional ideologies. 
The demeanour of detachment that lies behind these fields of enquiry, can, as 
it happens, all be found in this collection - for example, on the gendered 
nature of youth justice (Webb, 1984); on the articulation between welfare 
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practice and the state (Harris and Webb, 1987); on the restructuring of social 
work around a modernist agenda (Webb, 1992), and on the practices of 
probation officers making decisions with wider juridical and welfare frames of 
reference (Hardiker and Webb, 1979). 
But - and this is an elementary point in the matter of scholarly enquiry - there 
is always a danger that we might find our personal commitments interfering 
with the 'internal' conduct of enquiry, leading us to select data or draw 
inferences to which we have a personal attachment. Although this is not a 
tendency to which those of us engaged in the social sciences are alone subject -
after all, the history of science is replete with examples where experiments are 
rigged or data used selectively to support this or that position - there is a 
particular vulnerability when the gaze of the social investigator turns to 
matters which he or she might see as marked by injustice, social exclusion or 
personal misfortune. We may still, of course, want to put the results of our 
investigations to the betterment of humanity, this motivation reflecting the 
sense of duty that accompanies the power arising from the holding of 
specialized and arcane knowledge, but the bearing this commitment has on the 
conduct of the scientific enquiry itself is at best problematic and at worst 
corrupting. It is the possibility of this that necessarily animates the stance of 
continuous reflexivity to the enterprise of social investigation. 
Methodological concerns arise in the collection, as they should do, given the 
dependency of what we discover as (social) scientists on the methods we 
employ to secure that knowledge. Drawing on empirical 'data' (however 
problematic these may be as a basis for 'truth') alongside clearly stated 
theoretical or conceptual explanatory anchorages is one way to secure a fix on 
social reality. Alongside this stand explicit theoretical reference points, which 
serve as the explanatory frame within which the subject is set. It is true, this is 
not an especially formal (or deductive) method of 'doing sociology'. It reI ies 
on beginning with some general hunches or conjectures about the issue at hand 
and then using available data to refine and illustrate those hunches. It could be 
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seen as investigative pragmatism, caught as it is between the attractions of 
pure reason, and the positivist inclinations of self-evident truth revealed by 
'the facts'. This strategy is unsurprisingly, not without its problems, that of 
circularity being the most notable. Data can too easily be selected in 
accordance with the a prioris of one's conjectures, or theories are adopted for 
their compatibility with 'findings'. No science though, is exempt from these 
temptations, making the sceptical stance essential; accordingly, we need to ask 
repeatedly whether these data stack up against our reason. Further: can we 
assess the empirical as well as theoretical significance of what it is we are 
collecting? Where do the data come from? Are the data used to merely 
illustrate a theory (which makes for low-level refutation), or do they have a 
stronger part in driving an explanation? What about what counts as 
knowledge; the social location of time and space within which it is generated, 
and the context that makes for its being heard? 
A distinctive theme within this collection is with the generating of empirically 
grounded sources to explain how welfare (and social work specifically) is 
practised - and sometimes how it is experienced by those on the receiving end 
of that practice. The approach here strives towards being 'objective', 
attempting as it does to generate an 'appreciative' and non-judgmental 
understanding of the social work task. On occasions the focus has to be on the 
'social location' of social work as an institution, in order to better grasp the 
defining context within which that work has to take place and what practical 
accomplishments have to be made by those engaged in doing the job. A 
component part of this is a necessary engagement with the academic 
discourses - such as criminology - which make claim to shape the 
representations of those about whose lives social work has to tell a tale. If 
social workers are biographers of a sort, then what they look to include - or 
exclude - as relevant source material is shaped by, even if not determined by, 
ideational reference points such as these, and it is for this reason that there are 
occasional forays into considering the 'knowledge' upon which welfare 
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practices are constituted, such as criminology (Webb, 1991; Harris and Webb, 
1987), and law and psychiatry (Webb and Harris, 1999). 
All this expresses a commitment to detachment, which struggles for some 
form of 'truthful ' (or at least explanatorily adequate) account of this particular 
comer of social life, echoing perhaps something of Max Weber's claim for 
science as a vocation, or 'calling'. Alongside - and sometimes implicated in _ 
such an ambitious goal is the other motif running through this collection, 
namely that of involvement. Here sociology plays its own part in contributing 
to the furtherance of the social work project as a moral endeavour, claiming to 
have some expertise in laying out the connections between personal troubles 
and public issues, or between history and biography - the very domains to 
which social work (or at least a form of it) perforce needs to tum its gaze. 
Matters more particular 
Context and narrative set matters within the broadest of perspectives, 
providing its own kind of assistance to the reader who can thereby place what 
may appear, on the face of it, to be a less that coherent collection within a 
common referential framework. This may be the easier if not just the form 
taken by the work (encompassed as it is within its 'meta-narrative'), but its 
content too is given comparable signposting. Accordingly, what follows 
draws out connections between the particularities of individual contributions 
and the more general themes addressed within the opening pages of this 
prologue. The orderliness of time - and the temporal sequencing of the 
contributions - has been largely set aside here, as some further conceptual 
effort is put into supporting a number of thematic continuities. However, 
consistent with the muted radicalism (of politics, or method, of social work) 
that the astute reader may already have uncovered so far in this prologue, we 
shall start at the beginning, with the first contribution to what follows in the 
body of this collection. 
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The paper (publication IV) with Hardiker (Hardiker and Webb, 1979) 
provides an account - and a situated understanding - of probation officer 
practices. The analysis locates their approach to decision making not just 
within the exigencies of 'doing the job', but also within the structure of 
contemporary juridical-welfare ideology. Reflecting what was earlier said 
about an attachment to the reassuring comfort of some 'facts', the paper is 
empirically driven, employing (for example) tests of statistical significance in 
order to verify ( or refute) initial propositions or conjectures. Alongside this 
are various explicit theoretical reference points (the juridical and welfare 
ideologies within which probation activity is set) serving as the explanatory 
frame - the conceptual anchor - within which the subject is set. 
Other contributions reflect the broad methodology of this paper, namely that 
data and theory are in an inevitably tensile relationship, and that if done 
properly investigations can take an 'appreciative' and non-judgmental stance 
towards social work practice, understanding it as neither marked by wilful 
control of the oppressed nor as simply an arm of the state. Work 
(publication 4) that appeared in Sociology (Webb, 1984), in the co-authored 
work with Harris in the Home Office Research Bulletin (Harris and Webb, 
1983), in the British Journal o/Social Work (Webb and Harris 1984), and in 
the research monograph (publications 6 and 7) Welfare, Power and Juvenile 
Justice (Harris and Webb, 1987) was part of a project investigating certain 
aspects of youth justice. Its substantive focus was on the way in which 
probation officers and social workers enforce what could be seen as a form of 
social control, or censure, requiring of them as it does the imposition of 
certain curtailments on the freedom of young offenders, albeit under the 
auspices of a form of supervisory welfare tutelage. Theoretically - and 
empirically - the work fills out in some detail the modest proposition that the 
way in which welfare workers operate in their routine practices and everyday 
occupational 'accomplishments' (the exercise of Foucauldian 'micro-power') 
cannot be understood without an analysis of the social, political and 
ideological contexts within which are located their jobs, the expectations 
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made of them through statute, and the welfare organisations which process 
'clients' . Some of the practices identified by this research - and in particular 
the seemingly casual, idiosyncratic and often unplanned nature of \velfare 
work with young offenders - drew the conclusion that the exercise of power 
need not necessarily operate through its overt application, but through the 
inadvertent consequences of uncertainty. 
The reflexive stance towards the act of social research and its products makes 
rightly problematic explanatory certainties, and anyone pretending to 
'construct' knowledge ought to be aware of the materials and design that go in 
to its creation, mindful that 'fabricate' has two usages, one of which means 
'assembly' or 'construction', the other 'invention'. In this collection reflexivity 
is generally secondary to the impatience of dealing with the substantive matter 
at hand, but the paper (publication 3) in the British Journal of Criminology 
(Webb, 1981 b) demonstrates an approach that is explicitly framed within the 
sociology of knowledge. Since it is upon the circumstances facing the 
criminal and the deviant that social welfare has to work, social work has 
therefore to take account of the representations made by criminology of 
waywardness and wickedness. As this contribution shows, just as the 
traditional criminology of correctionalist positivism was socially located (seen 
to be within the state apparatus of ameliorist social engineering), so too was 
'new' criminology, which looked more to understand the expressive variety of 
social deviance than to presume an ambitious restoration of wrongdoers to 
utility. This 'celebratory' tendency within criminology - which leaked across 
to shape thinking about welfare practices - certainly augmented social work's 
inclinations towards non-judgementalism, but with the unanticipated 
consequence of diminishing the resolve to intervene in the 'facticity' of 
deviancy, the integrity and authenticity of which denied intervention. 
This collection has its own methodological heterodoxy, perhaps reflecting 
high modernity'S cultural plurality. One of the more recent papers 
(publication 12) in the compilation uses qualitative data in a way that is more 
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illustrative than generative. (Webb, 1998) Reading and reflecting on the 
transcripts of interviews with head injured people and their carers prompted, 
inductively, the particular interpretation that emerged, and a series of 
conceptual fixes were created to provide some sort of location of what 
otherwise would have been a set of free floating 'data'. As it happens - and 
consistent with the precepts of what were set out in the earlier transactional 
model of client-centred sociology - this piece blends the psychodynamic with 
the structural in order to 'get close' to the circumstances in which the head 
injured and their carers find themselves, and the meanings that they attach to 
social situations of catastrophe and psychological rupture. 
The substantive, and the methods for its uncovering, run through work on the 
form taken by the rhetorics of social work in the 1980s, which saw both 
training and professional practice characterised by an increasingly vigorous 
adherence to anti-discrimination. In the contemporaneous authoritarianism of 
Thatcherism, there was an ironic structural resonance between the two 
domains. The theme embedded within 'Puritans and Paradigms' (Webb, 
1991a) speculates that the 'progressive' moment of the one was made 
possible by the 'doctrinaire permissions' granted by the other (publication 8). 
This argument was 'difficult', since it set the emergence of indisputably good 
intentions within a cultural setting which on the face of it was the very 
antithesis of all that social work held dear. The approach is something of a 
test for the scientist's resolve, a concrete instance of what was earlier 
introduced as the Weberian imperative of the scientific vocation or 'calling'. 
Not surprisingly, given its various juxtapositions and allusions, the paper 
drew some criticism. One particular instance of this (by Lena Dominelli) is 
included in this compilation as Appendix 2, the reply to which (publication 
9), amongst other things, stakes out a claim for the independence of the social 
work academy (Webb, 1991 b). 
The thematic concern with 'welfare practice in action' has some continuity in 
this collection. Even so, publications have not always relied upon what might 
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be seen as the conventionally empirical. The closing overview contribution 
(Webb, 1999) to the Festschrift dedicated to Herschel Prins - a former senior 
colleague at Leicester - considers complexities in managing the mentally 
disordered offender (publication 13). In doing so it seeks to bring together a 
set of synthesising observations about mind, disorder and crime. The 
waywardness of the seriously disturbed presents a series of dilemmas for a 
civilised society, just as it does for welfare workers charged with holding the 
ring between the preventative compulsions of what is sometimes called 
'incapacitation' and the wish that the troubled should not be punished for 
afflictions which are not of their making. Not for the first time, the message 
is that the doing of welfare is often a messy and far from straightforward 
business. This is in large part because the frailties or failings of those in need 
of either care or control (or for that matter both) do not fall conveniently 
within the mandate of this or that welfare profession. 
The social 'framing' of what constitutes social work and the organisational 
and professional boundaries within which it is set, the institutional defining of 
its 'charter' and the role of regulatory bodies (such as what was the Central 
Council for the Education and Training of Social Workers) in assuring that it 
discharges its mandate, are all elements involved in understanding the fluid 
and complicated nature of welfare practice. Aspects of interprofessional 
working between nurses and social workers are particularly important, if only 
because of the demonstrable links between health and welfare in the origins 
of personal problems. An emerging overlap between the professional 
domains associated with delivering services to people having what would 
now be called learning disabilities pointed to the first stages in occupational 
restructuring, with moves to harmonise aspects of training and occupational 
accountabilities (Webb, 1989). The subsequent contribution (publication 10) 
which appeared in the Journal oj interproJessional Care (Webb, 1992) takes 
up some further issues around the likely restructuring of professional social 
work, and in particular the connections between work-flexibility and 
restrictions on professional autonomy that interprofessional working might 
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presage. Underlying this is the argument - more explicitly stated in the later 
1992 contribution to this collection - that social work will be pressed to alter 
its working practices in a way that marks an increasingly regulatory and 
authoritarian intervention of the state in professional training. 
The subordination of social work to the regulatory culture is developed further 
in 'Regulation for Radicals' (Webb, 1996) (publication 11). This was the 
culmination of a series of papers that tries to establish the direction being 
taken by social work as an enterprise operating under the auspices of the state, 
setting as this does limits on the idealistic ambitions of those who saw welfare 
as a bridgehead to wider political transformation. This revisionist approach 
(and the febrile political 'leftist' excitements of the time need to be recalled to 
put this in context) began with the paper in the British Journal of Social Work 
(Webb, 1981a) on the structural resonances between social work orthodoxy 
and what in the late seventies stood as a radical socialist affirmation of social 
work's possibilities (publication 2). This contribution is a careful 
examination of the limits and possibilities of this assumed mutuality. It is an 
articulation of just why this 'programme' was not analytically sustainable. In a 
more normative piece (publication 5), but reflecting this earlier analytical 
work on the synchronic 'structural' regularities in social work, the paper in 
Issues in Social Work Education (Webb, 1985) offers a conceptual bridge -
and some suggestions for the social work curriculum - between the therapeutic 
legacy of traditional social work and 'consciousness-raising', which was one 
of the new methods to which 'progressive' social work was then turning. 
Identifying continuities like this within social work is a way to establish the 
enduring strength of an enterprise that is buffeted by fads, fashions and 
diversions. What are often heralded as paradigmatic departures - for which 
sometimes ambitious claims are made - are shown as little more than 
variations on a theme. This is not to deny that diachronous changes to 
vocabularies and methods in welfare practice have not taken place, but that 
despite this there is a constancy in the meta-narrative within which all these 
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novelties are set. In part this collection both sets out and defends that 
narrative, which revolves around the centrality of the connections between the 
social or 'structural' origins of individuals' troubles and the subjective 
understandings (or meanings, or consciousness) that they have of their 
predicament. Sociology as knowledge and social work as practice are 
inextricably linked, just as they when social work education first entered the 
academy. 
I The careful reader will note the borrowing of parts of this title from an earlier paper (Webb, 1981) 
ii For an instance of the debate between standpoint and objectivist epistemology within social work, see 
Webb (1991) and Dominelli (I 991) in this collection. 
iii The structural connections between post - Seebohm Social Services mega-departments, the grand 
narrative of systems thinking and the technical and social engineering ambitions of fordist high 
modernity ought not to be lost from sight. 
1\ Recognition of this legacy is emerging from what on the face of it is an unlikely quarter. The 
sociology/ social work textbook by Cree (2000) is a case in point, where a broadly feminist perspective 
looks to an accommodation with what in earlier, more excitable times, would be seen as the 
'malestream' heritage ofC Wright Mills. 
v The parenthetic numbering of the publications refers to the ordering shown on the contents page of 
this collection. 
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EXPLAINING DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR: THE 
SOCIAL CONTEXT OF 'ACTION' AND 
'INFRACTION' ACCOUNTS IN THE 
PROBATION SERVICE 
PAULINE HARDIKER AND DAVID WEBB 
Abstract The most familiar sociological image of the probation officer sees him firmly 
committed to some variant of a psycho-pathological view of deviancy in which both 
society and volition are disregarded. It was from this assumption that the research sprang, 
the purpose being to examine the treatment ideologies held by probation officers. But 
from focussed interviews, it was clear that explanations of deviancy offered by the 
probation officers were wider than anticipated, encompassing both determinist and 
voluntarist accounts of behaviour. It is suggested that the structural context of probation 
work - utilitarian justice and casework treatment notions - creates more 'space' for 
offering a greater variety of explanations than has often been appreciated. And, in offering 
these explanations probation officers do not necessarily reinterpret their clients' accounts 
which were somtimes accepted and at other times rejected. 
How the cases were explained appean to depend on the circumstances of the case. The 
more serious the offender's criminal history or his personal or social problems, the more 
likely it .was that the probation officer thought in determinist terms offering an 'action' 
account. But equally, the respondents recognised the sometimes voluntary nature of 
delinquency, though this was generally in less serious cases. 
THE conventional sociological image of the social worker lays great emphasis upon 
the way in which a highly simplified a-social model of personal malfunctioning is 
imposed on a client whose own explanations of his predicament are rarely heeded 
and hardly ever believed. Typically the social worker is regarded as studiously 
playing down his clients' social situation which is sacrificed to the professional 
dictates of a psychodynamic mode of viewing human action; for example, a 
criminal offence or request for financial aid is interpreted as the 'presenting 
symptom of an underlying problem'. 
There is a certain amount of evidence to support this familiar motif, and in some 
instances clients' accounts of their actions probably are reinterpreted to accord with 
the social workers' paradigm of problem definition.
' 
And, indeed, it was from just 
such a perspective that the current research emerged, the initial purpose being to 
~xamine the 'treatment' ideologies held by probation officers towards their clients. 
The assumption was that probation officers would be likely to view deviant behaviour 
as constrained by psychological or social forces, his offence being a 'cry for help'.2 
In fact, probation officers sometimes do think along these lines but the prevalence 
of such an approach appears to be much less extensive and more discriminating than 
we had originally supposed. We, therefore, take as a starting point C~h.e~'s 
observation that 'c,ontrol agents have simply not been won over to the POSltlVlst 
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ideology and in their day-to-day wO.rk ~nd reflections about delinquency use a 
m~ch more common-sen~e model whIch IS hardly deterministic at all'. 3 The very 
wl~e range of eXp'lanatIOns offered by probatlOn officers when reflecting on 
delmquency suggests that they do not employ an all embracing monolithic model 
of ~ev~ancy,;. probati?n ~fficer's. expla~atio~s range from traditional quasi-medical 
notlOns of mner dnves to qUlte radlcal ldeas about contingencies and even an 
occasional hint of political economy. There are, we feel, good structural reasons to 
explain this variety. Broadly these can be seen as (i) the social work context, and 
(ii) the judicial context. 
The Social Work Context 
Probation officers are trained as social workers not as penologists and thus are not 
solely sentencing experts to the court. Certainly, they occupy the role of 
professional advisors and in their social inquiry work it is this advisory function 
which is regarded as the most important component of their job. Thus, Monger in 
his seminal book 'Casework in Probation' comments that 'the principal objectives 
of a probation officer in carrying out a social inquiry report should not be that of 
helping the accused with his personal problems, rather it should be that of assisting 
the court in reaching a decision'. 5 
Individualised justice underpins the very existence of professional advice on 
sentencing, and is intertwined with the revisions to classical justice which were 
necessary, given the manifest inadequacies of the Social Contract premises upon 
which such a system was founded. The universalism of the classical approach in 
which all offenders were judged from the same standpoint 'appeared to contradict 
widely held common-sensical notions of human nature and motivation'.6 Thus, 
these neo-classical revisions make it possible for individual differences between 
offenders to be taken into account - differences which 'might alter or marginally 
affect the exercise of voluntarism '7 ....:. either in mitigation or as a pointer to 
rehabilitative measures. For example, the age, 'mental condition', criminal record 
and personal/social situation of an offender may be thought to indicate that he needs 
'treatment' for his problem (rather than punishment for his offence), since 'these 
considerations (are) held to be important in modifying the ability of the individual 
to exercise his free will'.s Probation rather than a custodial measure may be 
recommended accordingly, and thus the probation service is involved in tempering 
the 'almost exclusive concern with outcomes which is characteristic of classical 
justice'. Hence, a social work service annexed to the administration of justice and 
which has the formal goal of investigating constraints on free will, is the natural 
accompaniment of neo-classicism. And if assessing the 'degree' of responsibility 
serves to soften the full impact of a 'punishment to meet the crime' then it is churlish 
to complain, though we should not assume that individualising justice makes things 
easier for the client. As several writers have pointed out, 'treatment' for individual 
problems can simply be a euphemism for indeterminate (though allegedly humane) 
systems of punishment. to For example, probation officers may recommend longer 
custodial sentenc.es if they believe in the value of institutional 'treatment'. 
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So, o~e. of the demands facing probation officers is to inquire into the 
charactenstlcs of offenders as a means of understanding the behaviour that led them 
to appear before the court. l1 This is predicated on the assumption that 'social 
proble~s' s??uld be explored as a possib~e. cause of delinquency: The probation 
officer s legItlmacy stems from the recogmtIOn that he is able to carry out this task 
and provide mitigating ~viden~e which 'reasonable' lay people (such as the Bench) 
can understand and whIC~ stnke a ch?rd of relevance for them.' The probation 
officer thus catches, amplIfies and artlculates the recognition that utilitarianism 
offends common-sense. His is a quest for factors which make for less rational and 
more determined behaviour. On the other hand, ifhis explorations into the client's 
world fail to reveal 'problems', then a greater degree of freedom can be imputed; 
classical justice will be a more appropriate framework for sentencing, either in the 
form of a straight tariff or a 'reduced' fine, given the offender's economic 
circumstances. 12 
The social work context of Probation may legitimate the search for personal 
problems which are seen to constrain the freedom of the person to act rationally. 
Probation officers employ a repertoire of 'likely problems' in their task of decoding 
the world of the offender. Using an eclectic range of aetiologies,13 they test out 
these possibilities against the individual client. In this way, the probation officer's 
assessment of his client's problem is the practical accomplishment of a theory - it is not 
theory per se devoid of any empirical content. 14 This is one of the reasons why 
'motivational accounts' must be examined in relation to the welfare context in 
which they are used rather than as free-floating ideas inside a probation officer's 
head. 
The Judicial Context 
Like the social work context of probation, the other dimension within which 
they habitually carry out their daily tasks - the judicial context - also contributes to 
a wide range of explanations for deviant behaviour being advanced. It is difficult to 
separate judicial and welfare dimensions, since the latter must be seen as in part a 
response to the former. Certainly, utilitarian law offends both reasonableness and 
common-sense, but its material base is also vulnerable to exposure. Universalist 
assumptions about equality simply do not square with manifest inequality in the 
distribution of property and the opportunities for rewards in society. Thus, a rigid 
adherence to utilitarian justice is in danger of becoming transparently a law 
designed to punish the poor. Legality resting upon more or less shared norms is 
dissolved into a coercive set of 'rules' which are seen as enforced rather than 
emerging from any tacit social contract. IS Consideration for the circumstances of 
individual offenders thus becomes 'necessary'. 
Accordingly, two components of sentencing policy are now fiFmly consolidated 
- if somewhat uneasily - into the parameters of judicial decision making. 16 First is 
the notion of responsibility: the utilitarian axiom that all action is willin~l.y and 
voluntarily entered into, a rational calculus in which consequences are antIcIpated 
and acknowledged. But, secondly, there is the revision to this classical approach 
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brought, about by a .c~nception of circumscribed rationality -(the 'exceptional 
instances of neo-classIcIsm), and more latterly by that of determined behaviour 
~ contained in the ~ositivist 'revolution'). For example, the very young or the 
mentally abnormal offender may be assumed to have less free will than most 
adults, and in this schema, the offender is generally considered to the exclusion of 
his offence. 17 Just as t~e social w.o~k context of ~robation practice equivocates 
between the psychologICal-determmIst model of actlon and one which takes clients 
behaviour as contained in its own integrity, so is this paralleled in the legal 
parameters of determinism versus freedom. Of course, these legal parameters are 
themselves to a certain extent the outcome of the contribution to sentencing made 
by professional advisors, so it would be wrong to see the two contexts as completely 
autonomous. 18 
There seems to be a certain openness to that frame within which probation 
officers think about behavioural explanations for their clients' misdeeds. It is this 
ideological space - greater than has been perhaps appreciated - which partly 
explains why there was not a totally determinist paradigm amongst the probation 
officers who were interviewed. As Taylor et al have noted,19 the positivist ideas of 
determinism have never been absolute, for the degree of determinism lies 
somewhere along a continuum; the equivocal setting in which probation officers 
work may explain this paradox. Just as the classical utilitarian ideas of justice have 
been tempered with 'common sensical' notions of human nature in which full 
accountability for action cannot automatically be assumed, so too have ideas of 
psychodeterminism been held at bay by the core assumptions of classical justice. 
Accordingly, it seems doubtful if that subject of some misconception - the 
psychiatric deluge in social work - could ever have become as fully blown as has 
been suggested.20 If the dominant ideological constituents of western culture are 
utilitarian,21 then it would be surprising if the motivational explanations offered by 
probation officers were totally devoid of the notion 'responsibility'. But this is 
more than a cultural trace: rather their proximity to legal considerations of mens rea 
serves as a constant reminder that there are boundaries to determinist accounts of 
delinquent human behaviour 
The probation officers we interviewed assumed that, sometimes, action could be 
freely and knowingly entered into, and in so doing they discounted the possibility 
of circumscribing forces limiting choice. There were instances where the probation 
officer repudiated the client's own determinist account, endowed him with free 
will and place him at the mercy of the classical dimension of justice. Whilst it is 
true that such a tactic was only followed in specific instances (as when he decided 
there were no obvious 'problems'), it does nevertheless serve to illustrate our theme 
about the welfare and judicial contexts within which probation officers reflect on 
their clients' deviancy. 
METHODS22 
The research was designed to explore probation officers' ideolo~ies of crim~ which 
we saw as being partly operationalised as motivational explanatIOns. We aImed to 
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elicit detailed inform.ation from a fe~ respondents rather than superficial data from 
many. There were elghteen probatlOn officers in the sample, which was stratified 
by .age.ncy,. since it :vas felt that organisati~nal f~ctors might have a bearing upon 
SOCIal mqUIry practlces. One agency was l~ a CIty and the other in the adjacent 
county. Ten officers :v~re selected fr?m the Clty .agency representing an appropriate 
range of age, sex, trammg and expenence; the elght from the county comprised the 
whole team in one area. 
Each probation officer selected the last five social inquiry reports in which he had 
recommended conditional discharge, fine, probation, custody or made no 
recommendation, respectively. There were thus ninety reports (five from eighteen 
probation officers) which were examined and used as the basis of a tape recorded 
interview with the officer concerned. 
This interview was based on a semi-structured schedule, and the probation 
officers were asked to elaborate on the circumstances of the offence, their social 
work views about the case, their aims in making particular recommendations and 
the resulting sentence. For each case, a Likert Scale was completed in order to 
elucidate their treatment ideologies.23 For the purpose of this present paper, they were 
specifically asked the following questions: 
(i) Their views on why the offender committed the offence. 
(ii) The offender's account of this action, and 
(iii) The extent to which there was any discrepancy between the offender's account 
and that of the probation offlcer. 
FINDINGS 
The Range of Explanations Probation Officers Use 
The first question clearly addresses itself to the overall model of deviancy 
employed by the probation officer - for example, 'action' and 'infraction'.24 
Probation officers did sometimes use 'action' explanations, which considered 
offence behaviour as springing from their client's life situation. They did not appear 
to refer to 'pure' biological factors such as constitutional or genetic sources of 
criminality. The nearest they came to such an explanation was to refer to either an 
offender's poor health (hysterectomy or menopause) or low intelligence. 
They did use a variety of psychological explanations in their work. Sometimes this 
was of a psychodynamic kind, when for example a probation officer thought a young 
man charged with trespass and damage was 'acting out what was going on at 
home', the implicit judgement being that what was going on at home was unusual 
because relationships were impaired.25 In other cases, a more behavioural learning 
theory explanation was used, when for example a subnormal youth was charged 
with theft ofladies' underwear and it was thought that this was fetishistic behaviour 
because more acceptable ways of getting sexual release had not been learned. 
Psychological accounts might also consider the offender's personality. For example, 
one probation officer thought that an offender, charged with assault, had 'hit ~he 
bloke because he had a lot of aggression and anger in him which had been brewmg 
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up'. Similarly, the offender's . life cycle might be used as an explanation of the 
offence; a theft by a teenage gIrl was thought to relate to her difficult adolescence 
because she ~'as 'trying to find her own identitr'. It appeared from these examples 
that probatI~n o ffice.rs resorted to. a .vanety of psychological factors _ 
psychodynamIc, behavlOural, personahty, hfe cycle - in their attempts to explain 
their clients' offences. 
Probation officers also appear to have been influenced by some of those 
criminological theories which have cited social, rather than psychological, factors in 
their search for the causes of crime.26 Sometimes they mentioned peer group 
pressures to which an offender was subjected whilst in other cases they related an 
offence such as 'abstracting electricity' to a family's real material poverty. Social 
explanations might be rather more sophisticated. For example, a man was charged 
with embezzlement and the probation officer related this offence to his cultural 
situation of race, marriage and employment, which had pressured him, inevitably, 
into particular offence behaviour. This still contains a positivist germ, since the 
factors once present commit adherents to lines of action, but it is a beginning 
recognition that links and contradictions exist between a sub-culture and the wider 
society which pose a subjective problematic for the person. 
The tendency in these 'action' cases is for the probation officer to have been 
successful in his professional quest for problems.27 This in turn implies that 
'infraction' ones will be presented in other instances. Our original assumption was 
that this would not be the case, and that a more or less blanket application of 
biological, psychological or social notions of determinism would be employed. 
Was there, then, any evidence that the probation officers in our sample thought in 
'infraction' terms at all? That is, did they regard the offence and circumstances as 
having more significance than the offender. We did fmd that opportunity, for 
example, was sometimes seen as important, precipitating the individual over the 
invitational edge. A case in point, such as a railway worker taking axle bearings 
from the local goods yard, is viewed as tempting a reasonable man who knew what 
he was doing: what characterises him is his proximity to the bearings, not his 
character. There was also a recognition by the probation officers that 'everyone's at 
it', which again served to contextualise the offence and not mark the person off 
from non-offenders. Similarly, police practices, labelling and discretion were 
sometimes acknowledged as being relevant to apprehension and prosecution. 
Probation officers are certainly not incapable of providing accounts of actions 
which contextualise their client's deviancy, and in some of these instances the 
probation officers do really seem to be listening to and accepting their client's own 
viewpoint. When they do this, they may get clues too about the origin of a deviant 
act.28 For example, this sometimes emerges as a quite anti-positivist notion of 
delinquency as 'Drift', as in the case of a youth charged with trespass and th.eft, .who 
explained how he had missed the school bus, walked towards town, met hIS fnends 
who had invited him to join them in their activities.· . . . ., 
What the offenders said might also point to why they contInued m theIr cnmmal 
activities. For ex:ample, a youth charged with theft had become unemployed. He 
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lived in a so-called' delinquent area' where his mates introduced him to thieyina 
opportunities, and 'they quickly fo~nd this a p~ofitable enterprise'. Similarly, wha~ 
an, offender ,says n:ay tell ~s somethmg about hIs cultural location; one man charged 
wIth allowmg hIs premIses to be used for drugs had philosophical reasons for 
smoking cannabis even though he was aware of the criminal nature of his activities' 
the probation officer sympathised with him and thought a man of his age ought t~ 
be able to make up his own mind about such things. 
It seems then from these examples that probation officers did sometimes 
'appreciate' the origins of a deviant act, the reasons why people continued their 
criminal activities, and thought that crime related to cultural norms as well as the 
offender's personality. In this sense, they did adopt more than a common-sense 
model and, indeed, sometimes thought fairly abstractly about the nature of the 
crime. But again, it must be emphasised that we think these infraction accounts are 
only invoked when the probation officer decides that problems are not great 
enough to indicate 'need' according to his defmition. 
Probation officers do then employ accounts which recognise that behaviour is 
sometimes determined and sometimes freely and knowingly entered into. These 
explanations must be situated in the judicial and social work contexts of their daily 
work. 
The Status of Offenders' Accounts 
The second and third questions we asked were related to assessing the probation 
officers' views about the status of offenders' own accounts, and we shall outline 
some of the ways in which these accounts were handled. This is obviously 
important since the probation officer may be granted the legitimacy to admit or 
exclude certain vocabularies of motive to everyday folk currency. But their 
reactions are also important since they describe practical ideologies about what 
constitutes a reasonable account. 
(i) Translation 
It has often been assumed that social workers do not typically take the client at his 
word, but interpret his behaviour in terms of their own particular determinist 
paradigm of practice, whether this be psychoanalytic, behaviourist or sociological. 
In our sample, there were indeed cases in which the probation officer re-interpreted 
the offender's explanation for his offence. For example, a man charged with theft 
said that he had done it because he had no money for food; the probation officer 
thought that was only a surface explanation because the' deeper reason was that h.e 
was an inadequate person'. There was also a more sophisticated version of thIS 
'process in a case in which a m~n charged with theft said he had stolen for ~one~; 
the probation officer thought that the 'real' reason was because h~ was WIth .hIs 
friends and wanted a bit of excitement and status recognition from hIS peers -bemg 
articulate the client was rather offended at this quasi-determinist notion of 
'affiliation'.29 Sometimes the real, objective material stress offenders faced was not 
accepted as sufficient explanation of their behaviour; a petty theft for food was 
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thought to be tied up, for example, with a couple's depression and marital probl 
rather than their abject poverty alone. ems 
'Translation' finds ample scope for application in situations where the clients offer 
no acco~n: whatsoever; because of this, 'imposition' is perhaps a more accurate way 
of descnbmg the process where the element of actual negotiation is fairly limited. 
Thus, one middle aged woman charged with shoplifting could offer no explanation 
of her behaviour. The probation officer, nonethless, thought that the offence arose 
from her being confused and under a lot or pressure at home. 
These ~re, of course, the typi~al i.nstances of re-interpretation which bring forth 
the predlCtable (and perhaps Jusnfiable) howls from the more sociologicall y 
minded radicals, always on the lookout for a bit of 'deflection' of social problems 
back into the cul-de-sac of the individual psyche. But, as we have already 
suggested, there are occasions where integrity, far from being repudiated, is 
emphasised, and this too involves translation, though away from positivist 
assumptions of determinism and in the direction of classical voluntarism. 
The following case illustrates this point. A man, charged with breaking and 
entering, told the probation officer that he had been drawn into those offences 
without fully realising what he was doing. His account was thought to be 'rather. 
lame because he is by no means stupid, was fully aware of what he was doing and 
the consequencies, and he had plenty of time to show his disapproval and withdraw 
from the activities which took place over about a year'. In this case, the offender 
appeared to be providing an 'action' account portraying his lack of free will 
whereas the orobation officer refused to see his behaviour in these terms and held 
~ 
him responsible and accountable for his criminal activities. 
This reaction to the offender's account - a repudiation which cancels out a possible 
explanation for a client's behaviour - is clearly brought out in the following two 
examples. Both cases emphasise the primarily legal rather than symptomological 
status of the offence. They echo some of our introductory points concerning the 
responsibility-treatment dimensions of the justice and social work context of the 
probation officers' occupational world. Example one: a teenage girl was charged 
with theft from the shop where she worked. Even though she had quite a few 
problems related to a handicap for which she had to spend periods of time in 
hospital, the probation officer ruled this out as a pressure on her because she thought 
the offence was 'quite a deliberate action of dishonesty'. Example two also 
illustrates this point: an elderly woman was charged with a petty theft from a store, 
and though she had recently experienced a variety of personal and social stresses, it 
was thought the offence was entirely unrelated to these 'pro?lems'. It appe~rs ~he~, 
that probation officers did not simply search for problems m the offender slIfe m 
order to support a pre-existing notion that all offences were a 'cry for help' because 
in some cases they identified stresses but did not connect them causally to a 
particular offence. 
These cases illustrate some of the ways in which translation operates through 
interpretation, imposition and cancellation. As we have stressed this was n?t simply 
in the direction of depicting the client in 'pathological' terms. Sometimes, the 
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opposite was the case, and classical justice was invoked. We nov.; turn to varying 
degrees of acceptance by the probation officer of the offender's account. ' 
(ii) Acceptance 
Sometimes probation officers did believe what the offender said and also found it 
an acceptable e~planation for their behaviour. Some examples follow. A woman 
was charged wIth assault related to a domestic quarrel. The probation officer 
accepted the story and felt some degree of sympathy for the offender. In other 
instances, an offender's account was only partially accepted. Thus, in the case of a 
man charged with unlawful and malicious wounding, the probation officer agreed 
that the offender had acted in self-defence. He added however, that the offence had 
also to be seen in the context of a man who carried a knife as was the custom in his 
delinquent peer group, so that self-defence was not a sufficient explanation for his 
actions. So probation officers did sometimes take the offender at his word even 
though they might also add their own version of the offence. 
Sometimes the very presence of a probation officer provides a legitimate 
opportunity for apparently inarticulate clients to offer some account of their 
actions. Of course, it may well be that the probation officer would still reject this 
explanation, and there is no necessary guarantee that what is revealed in the social 
inquiry stage will be regarded as acceptable by the officer concerned. But it does 
happen. For example, a 'subnormal' man was unable to give an account of himself 
when he was charged in court with theft ofladies' underclothes. He was remanded 
for reports and told the probation officer that the offence happened when he was on 
holiday and went out for a drink with his friends; he drank too much and as he 
went home in a confused state saw the underclothes, took them and wished he 
hadn't. Even though the offender was still embarrassed and nervous during his 
interview, he was able to provide a much more contextualised picture of his offence 
to the probation officer compared with his 'muteness' in court. It appeared (not 
surprisingly) that some offenders were able to give a 'better' account of themselves 
in interviews with probation officers than in the formal court setting. It seems then 
that offenders' accounts were sometimes accepted either totally or partially, 
especially once they could articulate their stories in an interview. 
We have, so far, described a number of ways in which probation officers handle 
the accounts offered to them by clients - although intepretation sometimes took 
place, this was not necessarily so in all cases. But the processes described still need to 
be explained. It seems likely that the idea of , action' emerges when common-sense is 
offended at the underlying rationalist assumptions of utilitarianism. Thus, 'action' 
accounts will be advanced by the probation officer when he identifies factors of a 
biological, psychological or social nature which he regards as being sufficiently 
severe to have 'pushed' the person into delinquency. This d?e~, o~ co~rse, imply a 
yardstick of normalcy, and this may be as much cultural as sClen~ific. In the next 
section, we shall attempt to show that probation officers are lIkely to employ 
'action' explanations in serious rather than trivial cases. 
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The Circumstances in which Different Accounts are Employed 
Probation officers explain offence behaviour in a variety of ways. Were such 
explanations used in a relatively random manner, or did there appear to be 
particular reasons why one account rather than another was proffered? 
(i) The Offender's Criminal History 
There were variations in the relative gravity of the offences committed; some 
were trivial, such as theft of oranges, whilst others involved several hundred 
pounds. It did appear that the more serious the offence, the more likely it was that 
the probation officer would explain it in 'action' terms such as psychological or 
social pressures, whereas 'infraction' accounts were more typically used when the 
offence seemed relatively trivial. Of course, other things being equal, with minor 
offences it is easier to appreciate the invitational edge of rule breaking which is 
expressed in the layman's word 'temptation'. Everyday familiarity with routine 
enticements finds infraction accounts appropriate when the nature of the offence 
behaviour is trivial. The figures in Table I make this clear, and this would seem to 
accord with the classical notion that no reasonable man would undertake action 
which he knew would be met with a severe sentence. Any reasonableness is, 
therefore, suspended and he is seen as determined. 
TABLE I 
Gravity of Offence and Accounts· 
Type of Account 
Offence Rank Action Infraction 
Low II 13 
Medium 26 9 
High 12 2 
49 24 
X 2 = 7·5 df2 p<o.025 
• N = 73 rather than 90 in most of these tables, because in eleven cases both 'action' ~nd 
. infraction' accounts were given and in six cases the probation officers could not proVIde 
an explanation. 
This revision to classical justice once again emerges when the offender's criminal 
record is considered. Constant reappearance before the courts casts doubt ~n the 
efficacy of punishment, and since the individual does n?t seem t? b.e resp.ondmg ~o 
deterrence - which he would do if rational - then hIS free \\,111 IS agam held m 
question. 
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TABLE 2 
Gravity of Criminal History and Accounts'" 
Type of Account 
Tariff Rank Action Infraction 
Low 8 8 
Medium 14 10 
High 15 2 
37 20 
X 2 =7 df2 P<0.050 
'" There are even fewer cases here, because a 'tariff rank' could not be assigned for 
eighteen of the ninety cases. In twelve of these, 'action' explanations were given, whilst 
in four of them 'infraction' accounts were used. In the two remaining cases, both types 
of account were proffered. 
Table 2 shows that the probation officers in our sample were more likely to offer 
action accounts when the offender's criminal history was relatively serious. In these 
instances, behaviour was viewed as determined with 'treatment' as the 
recommendation for disposal. (See Tables 3 and 4). 
TABLE 3 
Probation Officers' Ideolof[ies and Accounts 
Type of Account 
Ideology Action Infraction 
Non-treatment 
Treatment 
TABLE 4 
15 
34 
49 
19 
5 
24 
Probation Officers' Recommendations and Accounts 
Type of Account 
Recommendation Action Infraction 
No recommendation 9 5 
Conditional discharge 7 8 
Fine 5 7 
Probation 14 3 
Custody 14 1 
49 24 
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(ii) The offender's personal and social situation 
So~e offenders ~n the s~mpl~ experienced personal and social stress, such as 
housmg and financIal wornes, hfe cycle crises or broken marriages' as such th ' 
'd 'fi db' h ' e) :-vere 1 entl Ie as emg c aracteris.tic social ~ork problems, and therefore people 
In need of someone whose task IS statutonly defined as to 'advise assist and 
be~riend'. And,. sinc~ pro?lems ar~ seen to interfere with one's capacity 'to function 
ra~IOnally, the .ldennfican,on of dlfficult~es with living was significantly associated 
wIth a probatIOn officer s account whIch laid some emphasis upon determined 
'action' (see Table 5). 
TABLE 5 
Offender Need and Accounts 
Type of Account 
Need Ratzk Action 
------------------------
Low 
High 
6 
43 
49 
X2 =22.0 dfl P<O.OOI 
Infraction 
15 
9 
24 
'Action' accounts, therefore, are associated with a serious criminal history, high 
social need, and in these cases, probation officers typically hold a treatment ideology 
and recommend either probation or custody. 
The circumstances of the cases - seriousness of the criminal history and social 
need - were associated with the type of account employed. There were no 
significant differences between either the probation officers (in terms of their age, 
training or experience) or the two agencies in the range of explanatory models 
deployed. 30 If the officer explained a case in 'action' terms, he was likely to 
recommend either probation or custody, and there v .. 'ere no significant differences 
between probation officers in this respect. 
DISCUSSION 
What seems crucial in shaping the nature of the account provided by the 
probation officer - 'infraction' or 'action' - is the officer's individualised assessment 
of the seriousness of the offence and criminal history and his view of the problems 
facing the client. These are, of course, structurally located, given the role of the probation 
officer in sentencing, but this does not deny the fact that the officer's view of his client 
is the outcome of pitting his theories against the' data' of anyone offender. 'Action' 
or 'infraction' are in this way models of deviant behaviour which are practical 
accomplishments of theory. Whether the offender is seen as determined or freely 
acting does not follow from the personal ideology of the probation officer per se,31 
something neatly parcelled before the client is even seen. We would, therefore, 
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question Bean's32 as:ertion that offenders s~ould choose their probation officer 
carefully~ rather, glven the legal and socIal work parameters which inform 
probation practice, we would say, "choose your offence and social problems". It is 
these which appear to be crucial factors in explaining how probation officers think 
about offenders' a~tions. This takes us ba~k to the manner in which probation 
officers react. to clIent .accounts. We outlmed some of the ways in which this 
happens - re-mterpretatlOn, acceptance, etc. - although this does not appear to be a 
random process dependent on the individual predilections of the officer concerned. 
Rat?er, the crucial,thing in. the ~ype of moti~ational.acc~unt offered is the degree to 
whIch an offender s behavlOur IS assessed as determmed. This, in turn, depends on 
the seriousness of the offender's criminal and personal history. 
Do probation officers, then practice according to some kind of model which 
assumes that criminal behaviour is a 'cry for help' and that the offender is pushed 
into his actions rather than freely engaging in them? That probation officers even 
have to think about free will and determinism at all stems from their structural 
position which straddles social work and judicial organisations. It is not therefore 
surprising that their professional ideas contain a mixture of utilitarian justice and 
casework treatment notions. One means of exploring these complex issues was by 
asking probation officers to give reasons for their clients' behaviour, and to reflect 
on their own and their clients' accounts accordingly. It seems that when probation 
offIcers do think in terms of offences being a 'cry for help' and' determined', they 
are very discriminating in their explanations, which relate to the circumstances of 
the cases they handle more than anything else. 
We have attempted to illustrate the variability of probation officers' explanations 
of criminal behaviour, to describe the decision-making processes at work and the 
particular circumstances in which different motivational explanations are proffered. 
We now think that Cohen's33 view that, 'control agents have simply not been won 
over to the positivist ideology and in their day-to-day work and reflections about 
delinquency use a much more common-sense model which is hardly deterministic 
at all', is over-simplified in several respects. It seems to convey an all or nothing 
picture of determinism which leads one to miss some of the complexities of the 
phenomenon. Further, the opposite of positivism seems to amount to more than 
common-sense, for on many occastions probation officers demonstrated a measure 
of 'appreciation' (in Matza's terms) which was certainly more sophisticated than 
everyday common-sense. Moreover, the circumstances of the case itself appeared to 
have an important bearing on the type of explanation employed. In order to explain 
this variability we referred to the social work and judicial contexts - the structural 
.frame - within which probation officers carry out their daily tasks. . . 
Although we have made considerable reference to formally. Identl~ed 
philosophical or sociological propositions such as voluntarism, determmlsm, actlOn 
and infraction, we are not thereby suggesting that probation officers themselves 
think in such abstract terms. Rather we use these as second-order constructs of the 
'everyday' accounts we elicited in our interviews with the probation. officers. They 
are not. of course.. professional sociologists, even though on occaslOns they may 
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draw fairly obviously on sociological theories of crime and delinquenc\' to 
un~e~s.tand some of the offende~s wit~ wh?I? they work. But generally their daily 
aCtIVI:Ie; 3froc~ed .on the ~asIs of. II?phclt ,(and s?metimes explicit) 'practice 
theorIes, whIch help them In explaInIng the reasons for the deviant behaviour of 
their clients. 
In descr~bing the constit~ent elements of these guidelines for practice - which are 
rarely artIculated by SOCIal workers themselves - we have tried to make the 
connectio~s between .everyday work and the nature of the theoretical repertoire 
upon whICh probatIOn officers are perforce obliged to draw.35 And, in 
docum.enting and describing the kinds of motivational explanation employed by 
probatIOn officers we would hope to have moved beyond blank assertions that 
'social workers are agents of social control'. In attempting to situate this within 
particular social contexts we have offered an interpretation of why they explain 
deviant behaviour in the way they do. 36 
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(See Steven Spitzer (1975), 'Towards a Marxian theory of deviance', Social Problems, 22 
(5) ). 
Thus explaining behaviour in terms of 'action' and recommending 'tre~tment' to me~t 
particular 'needs', may indeed be a euphemism for social coercion. ThIS,. of ~ours~, ~s 
the gist of the 'sociological' critique of social work, though to balance thIS a lIttle, It IS 
perhaps worth considering that there are clients who ar~ 'fundamenta.lly and 
irremediably socially incompetent', for whom 'need' is an unavOIdably app~opnate ~ay 
of describing their circumstances. (See Michael Clarke (1976), 'The lImItS of radIcal 
social work', British Journal o/Social Work, 6 (4) (I). 
This study was part of a programme of research supporte~ by ~ grant from t~e SSR~. 
We should like also to acknowledge the help we have receIved m the preparatIOn of thIS 
EXPLAINING DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR 17 
paper from our colleagues Derek Jehu, Herschel Prins and Martin Herbert. Accepted: 
17·8.77· 
Biographical notes: PAULINE HARDIKER worked as a secretary and community worker before 
gaining a B.A. and M.A. in Sociology at Leicester University. Taught at Stevenage 
College of Further Education from 1967-9, and since then has lectured in Sociology at 
Leicester University School of Social Work. 
DAVID WEBB was born in 1946. Graduated with B.A. and M.A. in Social Science at 
Liverpool University. Subsequently school teacher and research assistant; since 1973 has 
lectured in Sociology at Leicester University School of Social Work. 
'Themes and Continuities in Radical and Traditional Social Work'. British 
Journal of Social Work, Vol. 11, No.2 (1981) pp 143-158. 
Br. J. Social Wk. (1981) 11, 143-158 
Themes and Continuities in Radical 
and Traditional Social Work 
DAVID WEBB 
David Webb is lecturer in sociology and social work tutor at Leicester University School of 
Social Work. 
SUMMARY 
Traditional and radical social work are amongst the principal combatants in the 
paradigm-crisis that is alleged to characterise contemporary social work. In considering the 
way in which these two theoretical stances approach one of social" work's central 
problems-the relationships between the person and society-it is argued that what is 
revealed is as much overlap as disagreement. This is in part through the subdued radicalism of 
a traditional approach which struggles to comprehend the effects of society on clients' lives, 
and in part because radicalism is incorporated into prevailing ways of thinking through 
having to answer the same questions as social work orthodoxy. It is because of this that 
Marxist social work is shown to be inevitably compromised, though this is not to deny the 
important contribution of radicalism in providing more satisfactory answers to crucial social 
work problems. 
This paper attempts to examine traditional social work theory and its 
radical and Marxist alternatives. My intention has been a critical yet 
sympathetic appraisal of each, pointing not only to major rifts but also to 
significant overlaps which suggest a continuity in commitment and concern 
within which both might be united. I am, in fact, sceptical that radicalism 
represents the paradigmatic departure with orthodoxy that it is often 
alleged to be, and it is along these lines that I later criticise Corrigan and 
Leonard's attempt to articulate an identifiably Marxist social work; This is 
not to deny, though, radicalism's conceptual advance in theorising one of 
the core problems for social work, namely the connection between personal 
troubles and public issues, and I refer to this thoughout the paper. 
The following brief discussion of how traditional and radical themes 
might be defined serves to outline the ideal-typical properties of each, 
rather than provide an all-encompassing discussion. For heurisitic pur-
poses it necessarily glosses over the very real differences that exist within 
each of the two fonns. 
Contrary to a good deal of received wisdom, traditional social work is 
not irrevocably intra-psychic, swamped in a psychiatric deluge. It is 
marked by a consis1ent history of referring to factors external to the 
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individual-the situation or environment-and invites consideration of 
how these affect an individual's functioning. Nevertheless, it is the 
vagueness with which the environment is regarded and the failure to specify 
the social situation in terms of political and economic structures which a 
number of critics regard as the major defining feature, and at the same time 
inherent inadequacy, of traditional theorising. 
Galper sees this conceptual shortcoming as far more important than the 
supposed weakness of the practice methods of traditionalism. Although it 
is a convention to regard the conservatism of social work as attributable to 
casework and individualised treatment, traditionalism is more than its 
methods. For example, the apparently progressive method of community 
work is no guarantee of radicalism, for as Galper and others 1 have argued, 
the community sociopathy of the inadequate locality shares too many 
questionable properties with the reactionary ideas of the psychologically 
deficient individual which it is intended to replace. 
If traditionalism is not defined by its methods but more correctly in terms 
of how it conceptualises the relationship ~etween the person and society, it 
is important to recognise that it does this under circumstances of ambiguity 
and uncertainty. In particular, there is an indecisiveness towards social 
criticism-that characteristic equivocation of reformist liberal thought. 
This is clearly demonstrated in the psycho-social writing of Florence HoIIis 
and it is for this reason that I have used here work as a paradigm case, 
typifying a genre which has attempted to move beyond crude psychological 
reductionism. 2 In its-albeit vague-acknowledgement of the situation, 
her psycho-social approach represents a critical instance of traditionalism 
confronting its own contradictions, and in so doing revealing a train of 
thought which is, somewhat paradoxically, capable of being both conser-
vative and radical. 
As with traditionalism, radical social work possesses no clearly articu-
lated and unitary paradigm, except that of being opposed to the 
conservatising impetus of orthodoxy. For the radical, traditional social 
work both in its preference for individualised casework and its failure to 
specify the structural origins of personal problems, has been fully, if 
unwittingly, incorporated into the state apparatus of social control. Hence 
notions of mental health are covert ideologies of adjustment to capitalism 
that are merely the scientifically presented equivalent of the Charity 
Organisation Society'S pursuit of moral rectitude. Radical social work on 
the other hand, is the elimination of any form (casework) or content 
(sexism, racism) of practice which serves to endorse ruling class hegemony, 
and to this end it looks to the establishment of counter-systems that resist 
the dehumanisation of the capitalist social formation (Bailey and Brake3). 
A distinction within radicalism requires some brief mention if only 
because of.a tendency to use radical and Marxist interchangeably, when in 
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fact they represent rather different projects. Whereas Marxist social work is 
certainly radical, the reverse is not necessarily the case. Radical social work 
emerged from that cluster of sociological ideals associated with pheno-
menology, labelling theory and the new criminology. With its emphases on 
subjectivity and voluntarism, it lends weight to a critique which regards 
social work as engaged in the imposition of unwarranted moral and 
behavioural standards in a monolithic and totalitarian fashion which 
overrides the pluralism of a society marked by diversity rather than 
consensus.4 Radical social work often suggests that practitioners should 
stop doing-that is to say, it advocates non-intervention-rather than 
offering a more positive or programmatic framework for action. Politi-
cally, radicalism leans towards libertarian socialism; philosophically it is 
idealist. 
Marxist social work is anxious to proclaim its difference to the 
generically radical label applied to it; indeed in their advocacy of a Marxist 
social work practice Paul Corrigan and Peter Leonard seek to demonstrate 
the superiority of Marxism over the inadequacies of a theoretically 
unsound radicalism rather than against something hopelessly reactionary. 
How then do they theorise about the fonn that a Marxist social work would 
take? It is difficult to establish this from a textual inspection of their book, 
and the nearest I could find is unsatisfyingly vague, and reveals that 
recurring tendency to see Marxist social work not so much to do with 
practice per se (the title of the book notwithstanding) but with practice 
somehow made Marxist through the specific context of a Marxistframe. 
Thus they write that '[A] Marxist analysis should put social work practice 
in a much wider context of practice in that society. This context provides 
the basis for the most important aspect of Marxist theory for social 
workers, its capacity to relate the small scale practice to a much wider 
analysis' (Corrigan and Leonard5). This disjuncture between the theory of 
the one (Marxism) and the practice of the other (social work) runs 
throughout their project despite strenuous attempts at effecting the link; as 
I later argue, it is an elision which is less a question of oversight or 
intellectual shortcoming than it is of logic. 
COMPARING THEORIES: A NOTE ON METHOD6 
It is most important to emphasise that the focus in this discussion is with 
social work theory, and is not concerned with the fonn that either 
traditional or radical social work may take in practice, which is another, 
more empirical question. The charge might of course be that the analysis of 
ideas says little about social reality, and that an examination of how social 
work is done would be preferable to looking at the rhetoric of what is said. 
But a consideration of theory may in fact tell us a good deal about the 
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relationship between social work as ideology and the society of which it is a 
part, since in so doing there is the advantage of being able to discount the 
effect of practitioners in contamina ting the essential quali ties of social work 
theory. Most critiques of traditional social work, for example, assume an 
equivalence between what practitioners do and the conservative theories 
they are allegedly employing, whereas the relationship may be rather more 
tenuous. Going back to theory therefore provides us with the laboratory 
conditions in which ideas can be assessed as ideas rather than indirectly 
through how they appear in practice. 
We require then some way of understanding this theory-'a theory of 
social work theory' which enables us to think about the circumstances 
which led a writer to think in this or that way, neglect one possible idea and 
develop another. Circumstances are important because ideas do not just 
emerge according to the internal dynamics of intellectual discourse but 
within the context of a certain social, economic and political climate.7 For 
example, I hope to show that in the case of traditional social work, a 
consideration of these contexts in tenns of contradictions and uncertainties 
can give us a rather different picture of that knowledge than if we were 
merely to read the surface of the text or accept the conventional wisdoms 
about traditionalism's irredeemably conservative nature. 
In methodological tenns an examination of theory must offer more than 
comparative quotations, for although these are necessary for illustrative 
purposes-and indeed I employ them for just this-on their own they stand 
for little and can lead to the charge of spurious selectivity. After all, given 
that most theories contain ambiguities and contradictions, other phrases 
could probably be cited to entirely refute what was allegedly revealed by the 
initial selection. Rather, we require a method which works though a 
theorist's writings and substantive propositions to reveal the assumptions 
upon which their work is founded. We need, in other words, to go beyond 
the text and place the theory in some sort of social, cultural or professional 
setting. This is not to suggest that the content of theories in social work 
reflects in some crude way the interests of dominant classes; rather it is 
helpful to think in terms of the manner in which ideas developed within 
social work resonate with the social and economic circumstances within 
which they were, and still are, operating.8 
Since the person-society connection is the substantive focus of this 
discussion I also need to explain why this review of traditional and radical 
social work theory revolves around the way in which the two approaches 
deal with this relationship. For Siporin9 the manner in which this might be 
accomplished should be the central debate in social work. He argues that an 
unresolved dualism between the person and society can no longer be 
maintained, pointing out that it is a fallacy to regard personality and social 
structure ~s somehow mutually exclusive concepts or targets for interven-
RADICAL AND TRADITIONAL SOCIAL WORK 147 
tion. Rather, both must be accorded equal weight in a model which should 
see the links as both reciprocal and dynamic. 
Similarly, though from a more politically radical standpoint, we have 
already seen that Galper argues that social work is not so much 
conservative because it is wedded to the methodological axiom of 
casework, but rather by the inadequacy of how it approaches the 
environment, a weak concept which represents the mere surface of social 
existence. For Galper, the impact of the environment should be re-cast as 
the impact of capitalism on individuals, and the vagueness of 'person-in-
situation' replaced with 'an integrated analysis of the psychic manifes-
tat}ons and the social roots of people's problems', together with an 
insistence on ' ... focussing on the particular problem that the client 
experiences'. He continues (and cautions) that '[r]adical casework must be 
of concrete service to individuals ... responsive to people's real needs' 
(GalperIO). In so doing he stresses the necessary importance of the 
individual to radicalism, implying that neglect of this is to lose sight of that 
with which social work is rightfully concerned. 
Whether it is radical or traditional, social work can overlook neither the 
person nor society, and to talk of the configuration between the individual 
and social structure is to speak within the rules of formation that lend the 
distinguishing characteristics and constraints to the social work discourse. 
The heritage of philanthropic humanism gave to social work the right to 
speak for the deviant, and Fabian social science legitimated the quest for 
the determining influences of the environment. These are the historically 
constituted rules that society lays down for social work to operate within II 
and to step outside them it can no longer be social work. 
Both traditional and radical theorists are therefore engaged in (he task of 
articulating the links and interdependencies between the individual and 
society, and in seeing how each accomplishes this it is possible to assess the 
degree to which there are similarities and differences between these two 
paradigms. 
What I am suggesting then, is that there exists a relatively high degree of 
determinism over the limits and possibilities contained in the conceptual 
and practical category social work. In outlining the way in which radical 
social work is constrained in its endeavours to break out from this 
discourse, and how a certain reading of conventional approaches reveals 
the radical kernel of something hItherto regarded as irredeemably conser-
vative, I want to point out that not only is traditional social work more 
radical that the various representations of it would suggest, but also that 
radical and Marxist approaches are more conventionally inclined than 
either their adherents, or their critics, allege. But such a reading is 
dependent on some consideration of the context in which this theory both 
emerges and is received. 
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THE CONTEXT OF THEORY 
I have already suggested that ideas, including social work ones, cannot be 
isolated from the context-or circumstances-in which they are produced. 
A number of commentators argue that this context is so specifically 
capitalist and that social work is so closely articulated with the preservation 
of class interests that the limits to what is permissible thinking are very 
highly circumscribed indeed. Because the historical mission of social work 
is to mediate between the casualities of capitalism and the society which 
blindly creates the conditions for social work problems, anything else that 
social work theory says is possible is simply fraudulent idealism. There is, in 
such a schema, no possible way in which social work theory can break new 
ground since it is determined by a logic of place, the position of which in the 
structure of class relations determines both practice and beliefs of the 
individuals concerned. 12 Social work is therefore hemmed-in as it struggles 
to offer newer, or better, or more comprehensive theories; it just cannot 
avoid the fact that its place is that of an integral functional component of 
capitalism. Thus Skenridge and Lennie imply a hopeless futility in social 
work pretending it can be anything other. than the hand-maiden of 
bourgeois ideology . 
. . . production of social work theory, the ideologies through which social workers 
reflect their position as agents within a state apparatus, is not a function of the 
agent's subjective consciousness, but of the place these agents occupy in the social 
formation. 13 
Once we can establish the nature of social work-its pre-given determinate 
characteristics vis-a-vis the requirements of capitalism, then we lose the 
separateness of various theories or paradigms within social work. Instead 
of the concentration on the mere content of theories, we arrive at an 
emphasis on a form whose nature is determined by the function social work 
performs. Now if this is the case then it is indeed very bad news for radicals 
and Marxists since it forecloses on the possibility of ever being able to think 
in other than specifically determined categories. Although the determinist 
approach of those commentators who would deny that social work can step 
outside what it is structurally limited to being may have its weaknesses, not 
least of which is the mood of crushing pessimism it fosters, it does at least 
remind us that we cannot merely preface social work with any radical 
adjective and thereby guarantee a new theory. 
However, it is important to appreciate that class hegemony is not 
necessarily automatic nor is it always too easily secured, and that just as 
economic and social relations are fraught with antagonisms, so too the 
ideals linked with that class may be marked by ambivalence and their own 
mental contradictions. A familiar example of this would be the way in 
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which the Charity Organisation Society become progressively more 
isolated as a vehicle for the bourgeois approach to poverty as the 
importance of state intervention became increasingly viewed as the onlv 
way in which the necessary social pre-conditions for capitalism could b~ 
secured. Although dubbed with the dismissive epithet 'Cringe or Starve' by 
working class recipients, who thereby conveyed their own particular 
rejection, it was by the middle and professional classes that the ideological 
and practical challenge to charitable philanthropy was mounted ..... The 
welfare state not only made legitimate the intervention of government in 
the economic and social fabric of society; it also made possible the break 
with a moral individualism which had hitherto dominated the approach to 
personal failure. 14 
Like its nineteenth century forbear, modern social work has also been 
close to the contradictions in the economic arrangements of capitalism. If it 
is indeed bourgeois ideology, then the extent to which social work is totally 
insulated from the manifest irrationalities of that system is perhaps less 
than for other components of the 'Ideological State Apparatus'. Just as 
bourgeois ideology equivocates between the competitive individualism of 
utilitarianism and the social intervention of corporatism,15 so do the 
constituent elements of social work theory waver between the person and 
society. As Brown observes in a paper significantly titled 'A review of 
casework methods' (my italics): 'During the decade 1929 to 1939 social 
workers in Britain and the United States were largely preoccupied with 
problems of unemployment and financial insecurity resulting from the 
economic depression .. .'16 In speaking for the people who constitute this 
problem, social work may not necessarily be representing them as the 
casualities of the specific social formation capitalism, but it may at least be 
suggesting that all is not well in society-its voice of criticism is subdued, 
but certainly not still. 
Because of this, it would probably be unjust to indict conventional social 
work thinking for skirting the social to the extent that it reifies society to the 
point of total neglect, where intervention' ... is directed wholly inward ... 
(T)he attempt to change the world at its only remaining free point, namely 
man himself' (Lukacs I7). Of course, critiques of traditionalism argue that 
this is precisely what it does do, though this grants a closure to the 
conventional model, which-as I have suggested-overlooks the very real 
economic and social contradictions within which the knowledge base was 
incubated. If this was so for early developments in Britain, 18 it was not less 
the case in the United States, where successive waves of immigration, urban 
poverty and cyclical unemployment found expression in (an admittedly 
tentative) acknowledgement that somehow society was an important 
source of personal troubles. Given their historical location, we should not 
expect those early theorists to have been fully fledged in their espousal of 
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structure, but amongst them there were writers who sometimes advanced 
considerably expanded models of the individual which reach we]] beyond 
the psyche; Mary Richmond, for example, urges in 1922 that ' ... family 
caseworkers should be making social discoveries as a by-product of 
successful casework. They should be bearing faithful witness to the need for 
social reforms whatever their daily work reveals the need.'19 The psycho-
social approach that exemplifies traditionalism is thus in its somewhat 
muted, and frequently (but not tota]]y) reified recognition of the social, 
testament to the ambivalence held by bourgeois society towards the 
problem of its own social and economic formations, and the emerging 
recognition that state interference is necessary to manage the contradic-
tions. 
My reading of traditional social work texts is thus informed by the 
context within which they are produced, a context marked by a far from 
smooth progression in the forces and relations of production, nor at the 
level of ideology, in the comfortable supremacy oflaissez-faire individual-
ism. That, in the resulting inchoate representation of society, this could be 
taken as the 'quiet radicalism' of social work orthodoxy, may not therefore 
be too strong an assertion, despite what others have detailed as its 
profound conservatism. 
FOUR DIMENSIONS OF THEORISING THE PERSON-
SOCIETY CONNECTION 
I have attempted to suggest that there is something more to traditional 
social work than 'meets the eye', and that equa]]y radicalism is less of a 
theoretical break than its partisans would have us believe. It is in how these 
theories have approached the central social work problem of the person-in-
situation that we may be able to adduce some of those signs which point to 
a degree of convergence between radicalism and traditionalism. Four 
separate dimensions of the individual-society relationship are identified 
and assessed in this section, though it should be remembered that this is an 
analytical and not an empirical distinction-the dimensions are not 
identified and discussed as such in the various texts to which I refer. 
(i) The contributing role of society to personal problems 
The consideration of social structure is conventionally taken as the sine qua 
non of radicalism. In attempting to de-particularise problems which present 
themselves to social workers as a sequence of discrete cases, and which are 
thereby susceptible to an individualisation which neatly side-steps any 
indictment of society, the radical social worker is looking to a means of 
more adequately grasping the totality of the client's life. Bailey and Brake 
exemplify this: 'Radical social work ... is essentially understanding the 
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positIOn of the oppressed in the context of the social and economic 
structure they live in.'20 In this reference to oppression, and the location of 
personal troubles within the economic and social relations of capitalism, 
radical social work goes beyond vague talk of-situations and refers to the 
specific role of capitalism in generating social problems.21 The radical is not 
merely content with cook-book assemblies of social influences on beha-
viour but seeks to meet the call for politically significant conceptions of the 
social situation that reach beyond the surface of social existence implied in 
words like 'environment.' 
Against this it is tempting to set a traditional social work which 
consistently and assiduously ignores the social. This is an image probably 
more apocryphal than true, and traditional writers are prepared, on 
occasions, to grant society a degree of quasi-causal significance in shaping 
personal troubles. As Hollis (admittedly rather circumspectly) puts it: 
' ... to be understood, the person to be helped-· or treated if you 
prefer-must be seen in the context of his interventions with the external 
world; and the segment of the external world with which he is in close 
interaction must also be understood. This may be his family or particular 
members of it, his social group, his educational milieu, his employment 
milieu or some other social system of which he is apart. '22 
This may not, it is true, mark a profound shift in the direction of 
radicalism for one of social work's allegedly conservative thinkers, though 
Hollis's reference to systems of interdependencies and tensions marks 
something of an epistemological closing with the structural insistence of 
radicalism, despite substantive differences in content. In talking more 
openly and more specifically about the environment, traditional social 
work may thereby find itself able in turn to speak to radicalism. 
(ii) The capability of man to act back on society 
The critique of traditional social work theory has alleged that because of an 
inability to step outside the particular place it occupies within capitalism 
and confront the real nature of the environment, it has been forced to adopt 
a psychologically determinist model of man in the pursuit of a secure 
theoretical base from which it can operate with any confidence.23 In 
bracketing off society, psychic determinism is seen to pathologise the client 
through suspending the possibility that what may appear as maladaptive 
behaviour is in fact intelligible, reasonable, and even has integrity, once we 
acknowledge that people actively engage with the world by interpreting 
their circumstances and acting accordingly.24 This is the well rehearsed 
sociological insistence on moral pluralism that has lent to social work a 
sceptical relativism towards the status of any judgment about normality or 
pathology. This radicalism has also bequeathed a voluntarist insistence on 
man's capacity to act back on the world, however bizarre or anti-social it 
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may appear. It runs through what Philp calls the Hegelian heritage of social 
work, finding a shared resonance in radicalism and traditionalism alike. 
Thus the Latin American theorist Alfero is able to talk of a psycho-social 
project in which self realisation occurs through the practical engagement of 
th-e individual with the world: 
In spite of the fact that reality conditions man, we conclude that he is capable of 
influencing and transforming this reality. Even under conditions of oppression, 
man is capable of seeking his own liberation.25 
This dialectical sociality (to use the language of Frierian radicalism) is not 
entirely absent in more obviously orthodox approaches, even though these 
occupy a space marked more by the optimism ofliberal individualism than 
by a concern with the overthrow of oppression. Like the spirit of man in 
Alfero's radicalism, traditionalism expresses a commitment to the autono-
mous individual who can use his reason to gain and secure freedom, as 
Hollis here demonstrates with some clarity: 
It is assumed that man is not only acted upon but is capable of spontaneous activity; 
that he had some measure of control over his own fate both by adapting to and by 
changing his external realities ... It is also assumed that adults can still change and 
develop towards greater self-realisation. The greater the client's active involvement 
in the change process, the greater his mastery of the interadaptation process is likely 
to be.26 
(iii) The pursuit oj client autonomy 
Hollis is quite clear then, that in part at least, the limitations on people's 
autonomy and freedom may reside not so much in the psyche, but in the 
objective material world and the individual's place within it. Neither does 
she suggest that knowledge of this should be hidden from the client f,?r fear 
that the awfulness of his social oppression may somehow overwhelm him. 
The goal of existential authenticity-which goes well beyond simple 
questions of social work merely making people happy-is demonstrated 
when Hollis writes that 'emphasis in work with the individual is placed 
upon the client's developing understanding of his situation, of significant 
others, and himself'. 27 
But a certain vagueness over the nature of the situation nevertheless 
remains, whereas radical theorists, and especially Marxists, are unequivo-
cal in identifying the dehumanising system of capitalism in its full 
irrationality as the specific content of that situation. It is in combatting a 
domination imposed through a ruling ideology that radical social work 
serves the cause of individual autonomy. In defending alternative life styles, 
forms of sexuality, attitudes to work and so forth, radicalism champions 
pluralism against the monolith of bourgeois moral uniformity. Daphne 
Statham, for example, in a feminist call for a radical social work practice, 
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argues strongly for counter ideologies of gender and fonns of family 
organisation which run in opposition to dominant expectations and 
practices: the object is clearly to affinn the individual's right to indepen-
dence outside the structures and routines laid down by ideologies of sex, 
marriage and domesticity.28 
Marxists, too, are committed to thinking of the autonomous person 
freed from the oppression of present social arrangements. Although by no 
means methodological individualists, Corrigan and Leonard lay consider-
able emphasis upon a Marxist tradition in which human felt-needs have 
been a significant focus of analysis. They refer approvingly to the French 
Marxist psychologist Lucien Seve, who talks in tenns of' ... the problems 
of human individuality ... at the heart of Marxist science and of the 
construction ofa classless society,'29 and go on to assert that only through a 
socialist transfonnation will the conditions for what they call a 'truly 
human' practice be realised. 3D 
It is this commitment to the individual which for Corrigan and Leonard 
gives Marxism an appropriate and legitimate place within the speech 
community of social work. Marxism can address the problems which are 
pre-given social work ones, and appear relevant to non-Marxists as well as 
to non-radical social workers. And in point of fact it may actually be 
relevant since, as we have seen, even traditional social work recognises the 
need of the individual to be freed from corroding social situations. Because 
of this Corrigan and Leonard lend to conventional social work a mode of 
thinking which is recognisable-and indeed may be intelligible as well-for 
in their Marxist penetration of social work they have also entered a 
pre-given discourse that has rules and organising principles to which they 
must subscribe if they are to successfully talk social work. 
(iv) The place of understanding and consciousness 
In the previous section there was a quotation from HoIlis which suggested 
the importance she attaches to a client's awareness of situation as a 
pre-condition for both personal autonomy and the reconstitution of the 
environment. This is the pragmatist inheritance in which knowledge is 
vested with considerable capacity to change an individual's objective 
circumstances. 
Significantly this inherent idealism also shapes the radical method of 
conscientisation, an approach which rests upon transformations in the 
individual's conceptualisation of the world which oppresses him: 'the 
development of critical consciousness by which the demystification of 
political structures and economic relations takes place, [enabling] a group 
and the individual within it to assert their own humanity and to confront 
dehumanisation systems' (Leonard31 ). Transforming the individual's sub-
jective grasp of the world is therefore an important element in the radical 
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social work programme, with the insertion of a political understanding 
again marking the radicals' emphasis upon the specifics which traditional 
social work is regarded as leaving unsaid. But the continuity-the 
radicalisati6n of the tradition-is discernible, for once the principle of 
understanding of his situation is accepted-as it clearly is by Hollis-then 
there is no a priori reason why this process should halt at the point when 
political understandings of a situation are tackled.32 It must be acknow-
ledged that understandings-political or not-are processes of cognition 
rather than simple transferrals of information through didactic hectoring.33 
Conscientisation, rather than being some aberrant corruption of social 
work purity, shares with orthodoxy the principle of beginning where the 
client is. Hollis gives us the traditional guidelines here: 
... the process of understanding begins with what the client see as his problem, then 
moves into understanding some aspects of the client himself and some aspect of the 
rest of the system within which he locates his trouble-and of the ways in which 
these facets interrelate, interact, transact and affect each other. 34 
And Leonard is informed by the same principled commitment not to 
impose authoritarian meanings on the client. 
The development of critical consciousness cannot take place where the oppressed 
are treated as merely empty vessels to be filled with 'liberating' ideology: critical 
consciousness develops from the acknowledgment of the existing consciousness of 
the oppressed however fatalistic it may be, and from mutual dialogue between all 
those involved in the task of liberation.35 
Now if there are resonances between this prescription for conscientisation 
and Hollis's more modest talk of understandings, then these are to be found 
in a common idealism, a humanist rejection of either psychic or material 
determinism, a philosophical anthropology of man's fundamental good 
and an ultimate belief in his volitional capabilities. 
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW SOCIAL WORK? 
Up to this point I have hinted, if somewhat obliquely, at the attempt by 
Marxist social work not only to break with traditionalism, but with the 
subjectivism and idealism of radical social work. I have also alluded to 
some of the problems in achieving such a departure, to which I now turn in 
more detail. 
Though capable of being dismissed as political, Corrigan and Leonard's 
contribution is, in fact, founded upon a relatively straightforward 
principled moral imperative; if individual's problems can be ultimately 
traced to society, then that society must itself be transformed. In 
accomplishing this, reformism has proved compromised and bankrupt, 
and indeed ~ill always be so, given the chimerical nature of redistribution. 
RADICAL AND TRADITIO~AL SOCIAL WORK ISS 
Both ethically and strategically, Marxism offers social work the promise of 
something more 'than the inadequacy of traditional ... theory and 
practice'.36 Ethically this may be the case but a Marxist strategy implies 
putting social work in an unquestionably oppositional relationship to the 
bourgeois state, and this involves certain difficulties. In particular there is 
the problem of how far social work is determined by the relationship it has 
to other key social institutions and from which it cannot break free. As 
Skenridge and Lennie point out: 
a practice based on historical materialism would place its agent in an objectively 
different position vis-a-vis the state (that is working against rather than for the 
state's function of unity) and in this sense it could be argued, they would no longer 
be occupying the place of social worker in so far as they were engaged in this 
practice.37 • 
Corrigan and Leonard seem to be aware of this caution, and do want to 
demonstrate the merit of a Marxist perspective in practice terms. They do 
this by taking a number of instances and sensitising the reader to the 
complexity of the situation facing the client. Like liberal sociologists they 
attempt to fill out the social component to the dominant psycho-social 
paradigm of social work. Hence as a more comprehensive account of the 
totality of human experience, Corrigan and Leonard's is a welsome 
contribution. Their dialectical sociality goes beyond crude social influences 
on behaviour and they allow for a human reflexivity and intentionality 
which is grounded in the everyday material experiences of living in a class 
society. The practice recommendation here is for sensitivity to the 
complexity of the social situation, though it also means that this approach 
can readily be incorporated into mainstream social work, especially now 
that the system model has given theoretical legitimacy to a broader range of 
interventions. For example, how far would Corrigan and Leonard's 
conclusion to their section on family conflicts be regarded as unexcep-
tional, even to conventional social workers, when they write that ' ... the 
social worker should, then, start to work not simply with the daughter but 
the whole family, helping them to understand the tremendous contradic-
tory pressures placed upon them by the economic structures of capitalist 
society.'38 
Such a modest conclusion could be seen as no more than equipping us 
with a full appreciation of the person-that very centrepiece of traditional 
social work-and as much an affirmation of traditional commitments as 
marking any radical departures. This is not a specifically Marxist break, 
and represents little more than the kind of understanding of biography and 
history that could be derived from Wright Mills' synthesis of pragmatism 
and Weberian Sociology. The Marxism to which they adhere has been 
imperceptively diluted by virtue of the very discourse into which they were 
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bo~nd to enter once ~hey even began to think in terms of the given category 
SOCIal work. There IS the problem of what was earlier referred to-the 
attempt to preface the pre-given (bourgeois) practice of social work is 
inevitably flawed given the determinate nature of that activity. As it stands, 
the direction in which they point us is the manner in which a structural 
analysis can add to our empathetic understanding of say, the elderly, rather 
than how social work practice might remove the very reasons for the 
presence of this social problem. 
Of course, given that the plight of the elderly is a product of the economic 
relations within capitalism,39 it is unlikely that social work alone will have 
much purchase on the issue's successful resolution through the class 
struggle. Hence it is argued that only by closer links between social 
workers, their clients and the labour movement can this be accomplished. It 
is this that comprises the other element to Corrigan and Leonard's Marxist 
practice; it remains though 'an aspect of occupational militancy and of 
political action, and is external to the much more intimate arenas of 
practice which they discuss elsewhere in the book. The links between the 
two are, as we saw earlier, that the pursuit of the one (socialist 
transformation) will eradicate the other (personal troubles), but this is a 
sequence which is trapped within its own internal logic. It neglects to 
consider that what is eventually being discussed is no longer social work. 
Intent on making social work Marxist, the historical and structural 
limitations on that social work are simply being wished away. 
It is this logical impossibility of attempting to unite the irreconcilable 
which suggests the greater degree of continuity between radical and 
traditional social work: radicals have been inclined to overlook the radical 
kernel of traditionalism, its tentative social critique and attempt to 
establish the creative potential of man. Equally traditionalists have tended 
to neglect the very real ways in which radical social work has spelled out the 
exact nature of those social 'arrangements which constitute an otherwise 
reified society, and the collective strategies open to individuals in 
confronting the constraints that society would seek to impose on clients' 
self-determination. Ultimately and somewhat paradoxically, the strength 
of radical (and Marxist) social work may be that it is not the dramatic shift 
that it is sometimes meant to be; rather the fact that it shares a 
psycho-social continuity with traditional social work may mean that its 
significance will emerge in being able to specify the person-society 
connection more satisfactorily than can the conceptual uncertainties of 
traditionalism. 
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Dennis Chapman and the New Criminology in Britain 
DAVID WEBB (Leicester)* 
IN 1968 a book appeared from a British sociologist offering a sustained 
critique of " establishment" criminology. It adopted an uncompromisinO" 
stand about the ideological underpinnings of a criminology which was mor~ 
concerned to reform criminals than understand crime, and it attempted to 
describe what were said to be the close links between class interests and 
juridical control exerted over the less powerful. It was not explicitly 11arxist, 
though the direction of its analysis shared many similarities with what has 
subsequently appeared within that sub-discipline known as "the political 
economy of law and crime ". The book was Dennis Chapman's Sociology and 
the Stereotype of the Criminal. It probably raises only a faint glimmer of re-
collection, but its powerfully critical thrust puts it well to the " Left" of 
what then, in the late I 960s, stood as radical British criminology. Whereas the 
compromised and reformist weaknesses of the new deviancy are now acknowl-
edged (e.g. Taylor, 'Valton and Young, 1975), Chapman's book stands the test 
of time far better; his structural analysis of the links between economy, crime 
and law anticipate many elements now deemed to be the sine qua non of a 
revitalised (i.e. l\1arxist) criminology. Thus, in summarising his own thesis, 
he condensed much of what later emerged in a "new wave" deviancy 
which never acknowledged one of its progenitors: "Much of this social 
control derives from the organs of political power and is often the arbitrary 
imposition of the interests of groups with power, or of broad social classes, on 
the population as a whole or on other groups or classes. This process is 
masked by the substantial identity of those with social, political, economic 
and religious power, and control of the ideology through education, religious 
teaching and the means of mass communication ". (Chapman, 1968, p. 242.) 
Sociology and the Stereotype of the Criminal brought together the ideas which 
Chapman had been sketching out and developing over the previous five 
years in his lectures at Liverpool University. It appeared at about the same 
time as the emergence of the National Deviancy Conference; as a contri-
bution to a new, more radical and less correction ally hide-bound British 
criminology it was totally eclipsed by the dominance which the NDC came to 
exert over the " new criminology". To judge from the sparse references to 
Chapman's book by later radical writers,1 its impact upon them was appar-
ently slight and it is accorded no significant place in the" official" histories 
of recent British criminology. (Cohen, 1974; Wiles, 01 976; Do,;nes, 1~78; 
Taylor, 'Valton and Young, 1975.) Ironically, the reason for his margInal 
position in these radical departures may be the very fact of his thorough-going 
* Lecturer, Leicester University School of Social V\~ork. 
1 The only ones I have come across are Taylor, 'Valton and Young, 1973, p. 36 ; 1975, p. 67; 
Box, 1971, pp. 62-63; Fitzgerald, 1977, p. 3 1 • 
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rejection of the whole enterprise called " criminology". 'Vhereas the new 
dev~ancy theorists clearly accepted that there was indeed such a thing as 
devIancy, Chapman was not so sure. One of the thrusts of his book is 
seriously to question ~~e ontologi.cal stat~s of crime and deviancy indepen-
dently of socIal defiruoons, and In so dOIng to expose the activities of the 
powerful as behaviourally (though not socially) identical to those for which the 
less influential were ce~sured. Chapman accordingly regarded any sociology 
which concentrated on the " underdog" as fundamentally misplaced; since 
this was precisely what" hip" criminology was doing towards the end of the 
sixties, his contribution to the debate seemed of little direct relevance. There 
appears then to have been no direct association between Chapman's radical 
break with criminology and the more assertive but theoretically less adequate 
a pproach adopted by the NDC. 
There is substantial agreement amongst commentators (Cohen, 1974; 
Downes, 1978; Wiles, 1976) that radical British criminology emerged as an 
alternative to " ... the arid criminological conferences of the Institute of 
Criminology at Cambridge" (NDC, 1980, p. viii). Initially under the strong 
influence of American labelling theory, the umbrella organisation for these 
sociologists-the National Deviancy Conference-enabled the new crim-
inology to depart from an orthodoxy contaminated by state sponsorship. The 
NDC was both a cultural and intellectual movement, as is acknowledged by 
its members (Cohen, 1974; 'Viles, 1976). An atmosphere of moral pluralism 
and relativism, and the spontaneous activism of the new Left, were receptive 
to the intellectual break with traditional criminology made by writers like 
" the enchanted triumvirate of 11atza, Becker and Lemert" (Ditton, 1979, 
p. 4). Lelnert, especially, captured it well in what was to become a catch-
phrase of the new deviancy, with his inversion of the axiom of orthodox 
criminology, namely that crime leads to social control. From henceforth the 
theory that" social control leads to crime" characterised all work in the area 
of crime and deviancy. (Bottoms, 1978; Ditton, 1979.) But emerging 
intellectual movements, asserting their independence and autonomy, 
undoubtedly need to dranlatise, sometimes to the point of caricature, the 
differences between the established and the new. The NDC, it is clear, was no 
exception to this (Cohen, 1974). It may be a necessary step in establishing 
the new paradigm, but it results also in setting limits on what is acceptable 
within the new discourse. It is likely that this is precisely what the" counter-
institutional hegemony" of the NDC did to Chapman's contribution to the 
debate with criminological traditionalism. That the NDC could not appar-
ently accept the thesis advanced in Sociology and the Stereof)'Pe of the Criminal 
serves as a reminder that radical knowledge is as relative and contingent as 
that of the conventional sociology which it periodically criticises (if. 
Gouldner, 1971). 
The institutional and intellectual' pre-conditions for "overlooking" 
Chapman's book were therefore all present; he was not engaged in a debate 
with Cambridge Institute postivism, nor was his thesis readily assimilated 
into the language of labelling theory. His work certainly emerg~d ?ut of a 
sense of inadequacy with the sorts of questions asked by orthodox cnrrunology. 
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Like that of the NDC it was marked by that" problem-shift "which makes 
" normal" knowledge and ways of thinking appear increasingly redundant 
though the setting within which these conflicting perspectives were worked 
out. was. not Cambrid?e but the social science department at Liverpool 
Umverslty. Under the Influence of John 11ays this had established a secure 
and extensive reputation during the 1950S for ecological criminology. A 
string of descriptive studies of working-class "under-life" (11ays, 1954, 1959, 
1964; Kerr, 1958 ; Lowson, 1970) had taken as their point of departure a 
variant of sub-cultural theory in which the specific" deviant" properties of 
working-class culture were identified as the source of delinquency. Rule-
breaking was seen as endemic and "normal" in these working-class en-
closures and detached from what happened elsewhere in society. It was, 
though, an approach which, in stressing" culture" rather than individuals, 
at least broke with the clinical psychopathology which had so extensively 
infiltrated criminology (Downes, 1978). 
Nevertheless, these studies tended to represent the working-class com- . 
n1unity as a kind of bizarre enclave of anthropologically interesting charac-
teristics, so contributing to received wisdom about the close association 
between crime and the working class. From his own knowledge of middle-
class business and professional life Chapman was well a\\'are of the greater 
complexity of the problem. He argued that the studies did little more than 
reproduce in sociological form the same vicarious" slumming" that lay 
behind the settlement movement with which the department of social 
science had been so closely involved since the turn of the century (Chapman, 
1968, p. 244). Instead of investigating the darker social corners of Liverpool, 
Chapn1an looked more systematically at the criminality of his own class (and, 
we suspect, his own acquaintances )-the fiddles, bending of perks, the use of 
privacy to screen deviancy and the monopolising of the control apparatus 
generally. In so doing, his objective ,vas to correct the ideological intrusion 
which he regarded as pervading the work carried out by observers of working-
class life (Chapman, 1968, p. 50). 
Based in Liverpool, Chapman was without institutional connections with 
those universities where the new deviancy theorists were teaching or re-
searching. The style in which he wrote increased his remoteness and excluded 
him from the" speech community" within which the invisible college of the 
NDC operated. His approach owed little, if anything, to the then prevalent 
social reaction perspective. Unlike labelling theory, which shared with its 
positivist rival a concern with the (mis) management of deviancy, Chapman's 
criminology looked from the very outset to the nature of control, in order 
better to " ... account for the identification of certain behaviours for 
disapproval and certain persons for punishment" (Chapman, 1968, p. 240). 
Institutional location and theoretical uniqueness may have contributed to 
Chapman's relegation to the periphery of British· criminology in the last 
years of the 1960s, though biographical factors probably played a part also. 
The spirit of anti-utilitarianism and expressive hedonism which took the new 
deviancy into its studies of " nuts, sluts and perverts" (Liazos, 1972) was 
not relevant to someone whose age (then in his mid-fifties) precluded 
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" h~~ging arour:d " ~th marijuana users, ~ndustrial saboteurs, hippies or 
pohtIcal revolutIOnanes. The new deviancy embraced the criminial the 
outcast; the old criminology took its sidewith the state. Chapman could do 
neither, though it did mean he was not" corrupted" by the voyeuristic 
" zoo-keeping" tendencies with which an increasingly "Marxist" Jock 
Young charged the burgeoning new discipline in its preoccupation with 
"freaks" of various kinds. (Young, 1975.) It was marginality which lent to 
Chapman's approach a certain" sociological impertinence"; students were 
introduced to his (regrettably unpublished) research on prostitution, which 
was not concerned with their childhood experiences, personality profiles or 
argot, but with the geographical (and, by inference, social) origins of their 
clients. These were identified through tracing the number plates of vehicles 
observed in the" red light" district of Liverpool-an approach not 'without 
its methodological difficulties, but nonetheless imaginative as an attempt to 
break away from what was then an almost exclusive concern with the weak 
and powerless. (See also briefly Chapman, 1968, p. 43.) 
Sociology and the Stereotype of the Criminal was an attempt to do what radical 
and 11arxist criminologists have pursued since their self-proclaimed depar-
ture from orthodoxy, namely to analyse the close connection between society 
and crime and deviancy. Chapman accomplishes this in a number of ways: 
describing the discrimination with which the classes are treated over rule 
infraction by studying the typifications held by the police and judiciary; 
examining the systematic way in which the powerful avoid criminal sanctions 
and the highly relative way in which behaviour is judicially identified as 
criminal; the role of" rehabilitation", which he regards as largely directed 
to working-class rule-breakers who are consequently deemed to constitute the 
sum total of " the criminal population". 
These are the substantive areas which Chapman examines, and his 
findings are interesting; but, by adopting a comparative approach to class 
differences in criminal processing which is derived from newspaper reports, 
his methodology is open to criticism for its" socially produced" nature. 2 I do 
not want to enter into a debate about the methodology which Chapman 
employed; given the absence of other source material and the minimal funds 
at his disposal, it was an imaginative (and well executed) "unobtrusive 
measure". More interesting, though, is the theoretical and epistemological 
departure which the book represented. 110st significant, perhaps, is .his 
questioning of the whole criminological enterprise which he sees as nothing 
other than a front for correctionalist social engineering. As Chapman rather 
nicely puts it,> " sociology has simply added its voice to the cry of ' stop 
thief' " (Chapman, 1968, p. 27), and he directs his book, with a charac-
teristic blend of cynicism and sarcasm, to reforming not criminals but rather 
criminologists (Chapman, 1968, p.' 96). Through insisting on " ceasing to 
concentrate ... attention on the ' criminal' of the popular stereotype, and 
look at society as a whole" (Chapman, 1968, p. 91), Chapman is making 
2 Interestingly, the same" method" is adopted in a recen~ " radical " ~o?k on imprisonme~t 
(Fitzgerald, 1977), where differential sentencing is examined m a way rerrumscent of Chapman s 
approach. 
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th:oretic~l, ~ethodological an~ political points. He emphasises that an 
?bJect of InquIry. must be ~reate~ I~ theory ?efore it can be researched (p. 240 ) 
In ord~r to aVOId 0I?e:-ating wIthin pre-gIven administrative categories of, 
say, cnme. Today thIS IS a commonplace soCiological maxim, but then it was 
a significant departure from an empiricist fact-gathering tradition. 
Politically, Chapman was led into expose sociology, and his book is 
amongst the earliest British attempts at documenting the way in which the 
bourgeoisie break their own rules and in so doing lay bare the true nature of 
civil society \cJ. Young, 1976, p. 17). At the same time, though, Chapman is 
concerned wIth more than moral outrage, a quality which Taylor, vValton 
and Young view as the defining feature of this demasking (Taylor, \'\Talton 
and Young, 1975). He regards the systematic obfuscation of the crimes of the 
powerful and the emphasis on working-class criminality as an essential means 
of class control, arguing that" the identification of the criminal classes and its 
social ostracism permits the reduction of social class hostility that could 
otherwise be directed towards those with status, power, reward and pros-· 
perity" (Chapman, 1968, p. 4). Chapman is neither surprised nor outraged 
at such goings-on, since he employs a class, rather than a pluralist model of 
society. The functionalism which he adopts as his over-arching n1ethodology 
(Chapman, 1968, p. 1) is always harnessed to the query" functional for 
whom? ", though given the (admittedly implicit and theoretically under-
developed) class analysis from which he begins it is not altogether surprising 
that this question has something of a rhetorical flavour about it. 
Chapman is clearly not bound by a Durkheimian notion of crime operating 
in a system-maintaining way to define moral boundaries; neither is a 
reified society the reference point for this functionalism. In a comment that 
" ... central to the writers' approach is the notion of crime as part of the 
conflict situation; a thesis antipathetic to the universalistic concept of 
Durkhein1" (Chapman, 1968, p. 240), he reveals the way in which func-
tionalism can offer a liberating model for analysing the links between 
institutions without necessarily falling into the conservatism of a Parsonian 
approach. All the same, Chapman is indebted to Durkheim since~ in asserting 
not the abnormality of crime but its inherently societal quality, Chapman 
breaks through the conventions about the "pathological" nature of the 
·phenomenon. Social arrangements, rather than personal qualities or 
subcultures, are firmly placed at the centre of his causal model. These are 
what he refers to as the" normal workings" of a society that" selects out" 
individuals for the specific purpose of controlling working-class delinquen~y, 
whilst at the same time systematically permitting the criminality of those With 
the economic and social power to divert attention and censure away from 
their own infractions. Thus he writes that" the intention of this discussion is 
to call attention to the causal role of the police, of the courts in the designation 
of criminals, that the process is selectiv~ in that the poor and illiterate are mor,~ 
likely to be thus designated than the well-to-do and well educat~~ 
(Chapman, 1968, p. 15 1 ). Chapman therefore pursues an ex:reme relatwzsm 
to what constitute the personal attributes of criminality, alongSIde a structural 
determinism over the origins of crime. Thus he mocks those who would argue 
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tha.t criminalit~ is the result of physiology as well as advocates of crimino-
logI~al naturahs~ when. he writes: "The fundamental difficulty of (con-
ventIOnal) theones ... IS the assumption implicit in them that when the 
number of criminals changes through legislation, or through changes in 
retail dist~ibution, like the opening of a supermarket, such changes will be 
accomparued by changes in the EEG patterns ... of certain persons." 
(Chapman, 1968, p. 47.) 
R:peat:dly Chapma~ r~fe~s to the ~?me-producing nature of society. 
I~. discussIr:g. so-called cnffilnal .areas ~e attempts to articulate a pro-
VIsIonal polItical economy of the City, argumg that" delinquent areas were 
consciously and systematically created for profit by wealthy middle class 
property owners with the assistance of building societies and insurance 
companies during which the law was broken with impunity" (Chapman, 
1968, p. 43). Far from being an aggregation of people with disabling personal 
qualities, these" dreadful enclosures" (to use Damar's later (1974) graphic 
phrase) themselves created the pre-conditions for what criminologists may 
otherwise have been tempted to describe as " the culture of poverty". As he 
sardonically observes, " it does not appear to have occurred to the authors ... 
that working class culture which they purport to describe could be adaptive 
to the social and economic conditions in which the working class live". 
(Chapman, 1968, p. 49.) Once again there is the recurring theme of social 
control.as the cornerstone of a criminology which must be based on an 
analysis of class relationships if the phenomenon of crime is to be accurately 
represented, rather than distorted, by social science. Chapman is doing more 
than pointing to the bias in the criminal justice system. Certainly he docu-
ments this through the workings of the police and courts, and he attracted 
favourable comments from otherwise hostile reviewers for apparently 
pointing to the need for reform. (Sparks, 1968; Willett, 1969.) He is not, 
however, referring to an " otherwise just" system, nor was he concerned with 
a " bad-apple" model of isolated instances of corruption or administrative 
error; because of the linkages between law and class interests, he already 
suggests in embryonic form what Taylor, Walton and Young were later to 
identify as the fundamental properties ofa radical criminology: " a patterned 
·or structural view of ruling class deviancy". (Taylor, Walton and Young, 
1975, p. 32 .) 
Chapman was able to approach "crimes of the powerful" because he 
recognised, in an exceptionally early piece of sociological self-awareness, that 
" criminologists ... identify themselves with the ideology of their own social 
stratum", and because of this " they devote their studies exclusivelf ... at 
the perfecting of existing institutions of detection, sentencing and punishment 
or reform" (Chapman, 1968, p. 98). Their vision is shorten~d ~ough 
accepting" the thesis that crime is bad, that society c?uld f~ctIOn ~tho~t 
crime, and that crime is a special category of behaVIOur Wlth special d:s-
coverable causes" (Chapman, 1968, p. 3). And he also cor:ec.tly no:es-In 
one of the few passages from his book quoted by radical cnrrunolo~sts (cJ. 
Taylor, '''Talton and Young, 1973, p. 36)-that "th~re ar: cons~derable 
professional costs involved to the sociologist in breaking Wlth this set of 
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correctionalist parameters ~n pursuit of a~ analysis of the sociological 
phenomenon (rather than socIal problem) of cnme. The penalties are: to be 
isolated from the mainstream of professional activity, to be denied resources 
for research, and to be denied official patronage with its rewards in material 
and status ". (Chapman, 1968, p. 23.) 
Chapman's more expanded vision of criminological enquiry takes him off 
to examine" identical behaviours only one of which is subject to disapproval 
and accordingly only certain persons for punishment". (Chapman, 1968, 
p. 240 .) If, in other words, " criminal" activity (i.e. independent of sanc-
tions) can be held constant, we learn a lot about the social creation of" the 
criminal " through an analysis of differential reactions, if indeed there are any. 
And such an approach allows us to look at activities which, although not, for 
example, subject to the criminal sanction of " theft", can nevertheless be 
regarded in " scientific" or operational terms as " the transfer of goods or 
rights from one person to another without the former's full knowledge and 
consent" (Chapman, 1968, p. 85). Chapman does not atheistically hold to a 
stance which regards behaviour as "criminal" or "deviant" only if it 
happens to have been subject to official sanction, though clearly the social 
reaction is of central importance to a theory which rests upon a differential 
processing model. This is clearly illustrated, for example, in his chapter on 
the social meaning of imprisonment. However, like many subsequent 
writers he equivocates over the extent to which deviancy is a quality of the 
act or of the reaction to it, and he presages a later debate in the following 
way: " The nature of criminal and delinquent behaviour may be regarded in 
terms of the action itself, the consequences of the action, and the degree of 
approval or disapproval excited by knowledge of the act in different persons 
or groups of persons and in different institutions ". (Chapman, 1968, p. 167.) 
Significantly-and this really is the whole core of his substantive analysis, as 
opposed to his embryo" sociology of knowledge " critique of criminology-it 
is to the source of the censure of " criminal" that Chapman constantly 
returns in emphasising that it has no pre-given ontological status, and he 
refers quite unequivocally to the way in which these definitions are framed 
and enforced by those with economic, social, political and moral power. 
(Chapman, 1968, p. 242.) 
. Chapman's anticipation of subsequent developments in radical crimi-
nology is again here quite marked. Almost a decade after the appearance of 
Sociology and the Stereotype of the Criminal, Sumner virtually (but unknowingly) 
paraphrases the thrust of Chapman's analysis. Sumner is here discussing 
what an authentic Marxist criminology might look like, arguing that it is the 
censure of criminality which should be the object of inquiry: "D.iffere?t 
social 'practices are censured, formally or informally at different Urnes In 
history, and vvithin the same society the same may not be equally c.ensured, 
depending on factors such as the class of the person; his age, sex, neIghbour-
hood of arrest, etc. " (Sumner, 1976, p.' 169.) It was, of course,. precisely th.ese 
variables which Chapman attempted to identify, though he dI~ so by r~IYlng 
upon a provisional empirical verification rather than by the IncantatIon of 
theoretical formulae. . 
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At t~e time Sociology and t~e Stereotype of the Criminal appeared, criminology 
was stIll largely obsessed wIth a paradigm which paid more attention to 
" findings" than to ~heories. It is unremarkable, then, that it was Chapman's 
methodology (of uSIng newspaper reports) which attracted most comment 
from t~o,s,e revi~wing hi.s wo.rk. Given that his "theory" relies upon a " class 
analysIs . (~lbelt an a~lstoncal and under-developed one), then perhaps it is 
not. surpns.lng th~t his book was read as an excursion into politics. Two 
reVlewers, In partlcular, struggled to unravel what they obviously regarded 
as the unwarranted blending of the ethical dualism between" facts" and 
" val:xes ": Ri~har.d Sp~r~ agreed that" There is much which is interesting 
and llluffilnatlng In thIS hne of theory", but continued with the caution 
" provided it is not taken too far, which alas is just where Chapman pushes 
it " (Sparks, 1968). And, of course, where Chapman does push it is straight 
into that uncomfortable space which labelling theory took so long to occupy, 
namely the political economy of the censure which comprises" the label ", a 
departure which reduced another reviewer-Willett-to the heavy sarcasm 
of outraged amazement that anyone could utter in the same breath words 
like" law" and "class interests". In a somewhat hysterical review he 
caricatured Chapman's thesis: "Criminals are depicted as deprived and 
under-privileged scapegoats for a guilt ridden and priggish establishment, 
most of whom are on the fiddle as well"; and he ended his observations with 
the revealing comment that" ... what it has to say is as dated as the archaic 
term ' working class' " (\"'illett, 1 969). 
But Chapman was not only criticised by the criminological establishment 
for daring to challenge the liberal and reformist orthodoxy of the time; he 
was also mis-read by otherwise sympathetic reviewers as an interactionist and 
then judged to have failed on criteria to which he owed little allegiance. His 
approach was crammed into this epistemology (if. Messinger, 1970) and he 
was regarded as " an unwitting follower of a new orthodoxy" (Rock, 1968), 
a somewhat inaccurate comment when he was endeavouring to address the 
question of" primary" deviance that social reaction so neatly" bracketed". 
" Controlology" may have been recently coined by Jason Ditton (1979) to 
take the social reaction perspective beyond the critique of Taylor, Walton and 
Young and into the criminological nirvana of how crime is " produced" ; 
but it was a point reached by Dennis Chapman something like a decade 
earlier precisely because he failed to cite the people reviewers said he should. 
Ironically this omission of Becker, Lemert, Cicourel et ale freed Chapman 
from the subjectivism which recent commentators have regarded as the 
major hindrance to a fully developed social theory of crime (Taylor, Walton 
and Young, 1973). 
In terms of the recognition it received, Sociology and the Stereotype of the 
Criminal therefore occupied an intellectual no-man's land between conven-
tional traditional criminology and the New Deviancy that was so stridently 
asserting its radicalism. For the one, Chapman's book .was too." political."; 
for the other it was unsufficiently immersed in an Amencan hentage of soclal 
reaction perspectives within which all work" had", ~ it were, to fall. But 
Chapman's contribution has to be seen as an exceptlon to the east\'~,·ards 
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movement of criminological ideas across the Atlantic noted by Young. " It is 
to American deviancy theory of the 1960s that we owe the first concerted 
attempts to demolish the acceptable paradigm in which crime and social 
intransigence had been framed. throughout the century" (Young, 1976, p. 1 I). It. e~erged, as I have tned to ~how, from a somewhat quirky and 
Insular shift In knowledge, more correct In content than" correct" in form.3 
?o,:nes is surely correct in saying recently that" as it evolved, criminology 
paId httle attentlon to how and why the criminal sanction came to be 
involved against certain kinds of behaviour and not others, or against 
certain individuals and not others who engaged in similar infractions" 
(Downes 1979); but in so writing he is also closely paraphrasing the very 
words that Dennis Chapman used a decade earlier to describe the work 
which he had attempted in his book. Downes goes on to identify three 
particular contributions which provided a "more inclusive deviancy 
framework for the study of crime and delinquency" by answering those 
questions about the criminal sanction; namely The New Criminology (Taylor, . 
Walton and Young, 1973), Critical Criminology (Taylor, ''''alton and Young, 
1975) and Crimes of the Powerful (Pearce, 1976). All of these, it is suggested, 
mark the point at which radical criminology departs from a liberal sociology 
of deviance. But Chapman had already sketched out a "more inclusive 
theory" before these books appeared, perhaps because, unlike those authors, 
he had not been diverted by that "liberal sociology of deviance". This 
emerging Marxist criminology to which Downes refers was obviously little 
influenced by Chapman's attack on orthodoxy; his style and language share 
nothing with the discourse of European 11arxism that so dramatically 
changed the nature of British sociology, and he retains a commitment to 
" science" and" empiricism" that was irredeemably outre by the seventies. 
Chapman's book, which is idiosyncratic in style, shot through with 
citational blanks and theoretically heterodox, just did not relate to the 
particular stage through which criminology was passing in the late 1960s. 
His" labelling theory" was too little, his " 11arxism" (such as it was) too 
early. But despite being something of a homespun amalgam of both these 
" paradigms", nevertheless in theoretical method, object of enquiry and 
critique of correctionalism, it is surely an early instance of radical British 
criminology. Rock's comments on the erratic, disorganised and oblique 
nature of the history of criminology could have been tailor-made to account 
for the absence of Chapman in the" officially recorded" developments of 
that subject: "Such innovations have usually swept in and out of crimi-
nology, leaving confusion in their train. They have not ~lways b~e~ steeped 
in criminology .... They have not always phrased theIr analYSIS In a style 
that c·an be grafted on to the tradition .... They have furnished comme~­
taries which are unread, arguments which are ~nanswered and analYSIS 
which is unused ". (Rock, 1979, pp. 54-55·) 
3 Stephen Cole talks of the way in whi.cb the intellec~al.org~nisation .of the ~,tudy of deviancy in 
the United States is also shaped by varIous" extra-sclentlfic f'!-ctoz:s.... the .acceptance or 
rejection of a theory is ..• dependent on the way the theory fits m WIth the other mterests of the 
community of scientists ... " (Cole, 1975, p. 212). 
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MORE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE: 
GIRL OFFENDERS ON SUPERVISION::-
DAVID WEBB 
Abstract This anicle discusses the findings from a survey of 14-16 year olds made subject to a 
supervision order in 1978. The social enquiry repons and case files of 241 girls and 971 boys reveal a 
number of noticeable differences between the sexes in the imposition of this panicular sentence. 
Girls are made subject to an order for less serious offences than committed by boys, after having 
been involved in fewer previous misdemeanours and for having committed fewer current offences. 
Taken together, the data would appear to point to a degree of discrimination in the administration of 
juvenile justice. 
This pattern is set within the contexts of the supervision order being a disposal of wide and often 
unspecified remit and can thereby be readily interpreted by both sentencers and social workers or 
probation officers as extending general superintendence to wayward youngsters. Because 
troublesome girls are viewed as exceptional delinquents, they are vulnerable to a greater degree of 
control and regulation 'for their own good' than are boys. Whilst ideas of welfare that are enshrined 
in legislation directed at young offenders have a benign objective, an emphasis upon 'needs' can be 
variously interpreted meaning that everyday typifications become expressed in the penological 
regulation of delinquent girls. 
J ntroduction 
THE concern here is with the disposal of girl offenders before the law, and specifically with 
the use of the supervision order' for criminal offences committed by 14-16 year olds. By 
comparing the respective antecedents and offence behaviour of boys and girls subject to the 
same disposal, it is possible to assess the degree to which there is any variation in the 
imposition of this particular sentence according to the young delinquent's gender. 
The evidence to be introduced suggests a number of rather distinct differences in the 
criminal biographies of the boy and girl offenders in the sample; most notably, girls are 
subject to supervision orders for less serious offences than committed by boys, for having 
been involved in fewer current offences and for having fewer previous convictions. 
Whether this constitutes 'injustice' in the sense of a systematic bias in the administration of 
juvenile justice is not a question which is directly addressed here, but it tends rather to 
emerge from considering the data as an instance of the penological regulation of deviant 
girls, through extending to them what in official discourse is 'care and protection', but 
which in effect stands as a censure of their 'stepping out of place' (Carlen, 1983); for 
behaving, in short, not as young girls should. 
The supervision order is one of a range of disposals available to sentencers when dealing 
with 'young persons' (defined in law as between the ages of fourteen and sixteen) found 
guilty of criminal offences. With slight variations about a quarter of 14-16 year old girls 
convicted of indictable offences are placed on supervision orders in anyone year. A lower 
(and gradual1y declining) proportion of boys are subject to the order for criminal offences, 
in part because of the wider range of disposals available for young males - the detention 
centre and, until comparatively recently, the attendance centre, just did not exist in the 
sentencing repertoire for girl offenders. (HMSO, 1984: Table 7.8). The supervision order 
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is, then, employed with some frequency so far as delinquent girls are concerned. Lik 
good de~l of juve~ile j~stice ~rovi:ion, it seeks t~ meet two objectives (Harris, 1982). It i: : 
conve.ntIonal tanff dIsposal actmg as a pUnIshment through imposing a measure of 
supenntendence on the wayward youngster and suffering him or her the inconvenience of 
reporting to a supervis.or for anything up to three years, though two years is by far and away 
the norm, and early dIscharges for good progress are possible. But the supervision order is 
also, though, an individualized welfare measure intended to provide the opportUnity to 
meet those personal or social needs which considered opinion regards as precipitating the 
young person's delinquency in the first place. It embraces, to use a somewhat crude and 
overplayed dichotomy, the co-presence of care and control. 
The effect of the order is to place the young offender under the supervision either of the 
local authority Social Services Deparunent or of a named probation officer. The duty of the 
supervisor as it was phrased in the Act (the Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, s.14) is 
to 'advise, assist and befriend' the supervised child or young person, a requirement which is 
as vague as it is broad, and clearly open to a wide range of interpretations. What these might 
be with respect to girl offenders is the concern throughout this present discussion. 
Whereas probation officers are given some, if not very precise, guidance on how to 
proceed in supervision by reference to the Probation Rules, no such formal assistance is 
available to local authority social workers (Roberts, 1981: 119-128). Not unexpectedly 
procedural vagueness is expressed in occupational practices; other findings on which we 
have reported point to the uncertainty with which probation officers, and especially social 
workers, approach this task of supervision. (Webb and Harris, 1984). 
Procedure 
The data around which the present discussion is arranged were collected in the course of a 
survey of 14-16 year olds who were made subject to a supervision order for criminal 
offences in 1978 . From content analysis of the social enquiry reports and files 
accompanying each case, information was collected on 241 girls and 971 boys. Because files 
were not always complete it was sometimes impossible to extract all the intended 
information from each case: the tables presented later reflect a number of 'missing data'. The 
schedule used to code the content of the files was piloted through twelve drafts when 
discrepancies between the three researchers conducting the fieldwork were reduced to a 
random rather than systematic minimum. The study was conducted in six high delinquency 
areas geographically spread across England and Wales (Harris and Webb, 1983). 
The files afforded information concerning, inter alia, the nature and seriousness of the 
young person's offence; his or her previous criminal record, if any; the number of offences 
found proved, and the degree to which a social worker or probation officer made reference 
to particular 'problems' facing their young client that could be met through social work 
. . 
mterventIon. 
Whatever might be the omissions occasioned by a study with a heavy quantitative rather 
-than ethnographic emphasis, such a survey does at least have the virtUe of wide coverage, 
complementing and substantiating conclusions drawn elsewhere from different orders of 
research activity. In particular, the availability of data on both girls and boys offers the 
comparative element which is not always present when the question of sexual divisions in 
the administration of criminal justice is invoked. At least on a prima facie basis, any 
significant differences in the criminal biographies of the two sub-populations would point 
in the direction of. a particular penological response on the basis of the young offender's 
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gender, standing thereby as a test of juridical sexism, that 'tendency to think about and 
behave towards people mainly on the basis of their gender, to generalize. about individuals 
and groups on the grounds of their biology ... ' (Sachs and Wilson, 1978: ix). The findinCts 
set out in the .n~xt section indicate that :uch a pattern of penological response indeed appli:s 
to the supervlSlon order. The presentatIon of these data is then followed by a more extended 
discussion of some reasons for this, suggesting that juvenile justice legislation, welfare 
ideologies and assumptions about girl offenders coincide to produce a 'panic' about the 
criminal waywardness of these young women. 
Girls and supervision: Some empirical data 
The pursuit of a delinquent child's welfare as the most propitious approach to 
waywardness has increasingly been challenged for the way in which it abrogates strict 
notions of justice (Platt, 1977; Bean, 1976; Freeman, 1981; Morris, et al. 1980). Sentencing 
offenders to help makes them subject to an incursiveness and intrusiveness from 'relational 
experts' which is more controlling, more stigmatizing and temporally more enduring than 
would be an unequivocal punishment for what are often trivial offences. Significantly 'what 
are admitted under the guise of 'best interests' and 'welfare' do not stand as unambiguously 
fixed but are contingent and closely dependent upon what Smith terms the 'precepts and 
concepts' of professional workers (Smith, 1980; 196); not surprisingly, in matters outside 
the strict purview of solidly professional concerns and training, these concepts and precepts 
are likely to be infiltrated by common sense. The responses to women offenders, both by , 
magistrates (as suggested for example by Farrington and Morris, 1983) and by social 
workers and probation officers are marked by a residue of assumptions about the especially 
worrying and troubled (rather than troublesome) nature of young women's delinquency, 
and which finds them hastening to do something for a girl's own good. 
The data which follow are offered as some endorsement of the way discretion and sexism 
might operate to give particular form to juridical process. Table One shows that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the seriousness of the offences committed by the boys 
and girls in the study; although the most prevalent offence for both was one of medium 
seriousness - most typically, involving property of between £10-£100 in value - a greater 
proportion of girls had been placed on supervision for trivial offences. Gender then is 
beginning to look as though it might be an element in skewing that requirement of at least an 
approximate equivalence between offence and sentence which in sentencing terms is termed 
proportionality. A specific offence illustrates this: the trivial misdemeanour of property 
theft up to £10 accounted for 15% of the supervised boys in the study, but 26.6% of the 
girls. 
TABLE 1 
Seriousness of offence by gender 
Boys Girls 
Trivial 256 (29.7) 84 (38.7) 
Medium 454 (52.7) 114 (52.5) 
High 152 (17.6) 19 (8.6) 
TOTAL'c 862 (100.0) 217 (100.0) 
x
2 
= 14.76 df = 2 p<O.OOl 
,;- 'Total' in all tables reflects usable data and excludes 'missing cases' 
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The trend towards girls finding themselves on supervision orders for lesser infractions is 
suggested further in Table 2. Girls on supervision were slightly more likely to have been 
sentenced for be.ing involved in one offenc~ only whereas the tendency was for boys to have 
been made subject to an order for multlple offences. Perhaps of more simificance in 
documenting what appears to be a pattern for girls to be moved up the tariff ;ore quickly 
TABLE 2 
Whether or not convicted of more than one offence, by gender 
Boys Girls 
Convicted of more than one offence 434 (45.3) 84 (35.4) 
Convicted of one offence only 524 (54.7) 153 (64.6) 
TOTAL 958 (100.0) 237 (100.0) 
x
2 
= 7.52 df = 1 p<O.Ol 
than boys, are the data shown in Table 3. Criminal 'record' will- other things being equal-
bring about a more severe disposal, since it reflects a previous indifference to earlier, milder 
punishment. However, it is clear from these data that previous offence behaviour is much 
less salient amongst the girls on supervision than it is for the boys; whereas 46% of the boys 
in the survey were subject to a supervision order for their first offence, this rose quite 
dramatically to 75% of the girls,4 pointing again to the apparently more rapid deployment 
of a supervisory sanction for girl delinquents. 
TABLE 3 
Number of previous court appearances by gender 
Boys Girls 
None 437 (45.9) 174 (75.0) 
One 294 (30.9) 40 (17.2) 
Two plus 221 (23.2) 18 (7.8) 
TOTAL 952 (100.0) 232 (100.0) 
2 
x = 65.24 df= 2 p<O.OOl 
The tendency towards a noticeable difference between the boys and girls, despite being 
subject to what, in their eyes at least, might be seen as the 'same' disposal, is suggested 
further in the following tables. Here those young offenders who were subject to a 
supervision order for a trivial offence and without previous convictions have been 
compared with the remainder of the study population. It should be noted that because of 
missing data, the 'leakaae' of useable cases increases as more conditions for each are sought 
and this explains the to;als which are smaller than those of tables 1-3. 78% of the girls' files 
are useable for the remaining analysis, and 73% of the boys. 
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Table 4 indicates that those on supervision with a modest 'criminal bl'o~aph ' 51 Y were more 
likely found amongst girls than boys; almost a third of the fonner and sll' ""htl d 
seventh of the latter. 
t> Y un er one 
TABLE 4 
Supervision order by criminal status::' and gender 
Boys Girls 
'Not serious' 105 (14.76) 57 (30.0) 
'Other' .. 606 (82.24) 133 (70.0) 
TOTAL 711 (100.0) 190 (100.0) 
2 
X = 23.21 df = 1 p<O.OOl 
::-Criminal status is a composite derived from seriousness of present offence and 
offence history. 'Not serious' refers to a trivial offence with no previous 
conviction; 'other' to medium and serious present offences together with one or 
- .. 
more prevIous conVictions. 
This susceptibility to supervision for what on the face of it might seem slender reason, is 
not as boundless as might have been implied. If it were, then proportionally more girls than 
boys with modest criminal biographies would be expected to find themselves on two years 
rather than one year orders. This proved not to be the case; about two thirds in both 
instances had been placed on supervision for two or more years, and there was no statistical 
difference between these two particular sub-populations ( X2 = 0.27 df = 1 n.s.). 
In general, the length of the supervision order tends to reflect the seriousness of the 
offence committed and previous convictions, and it operates in this manner for boys and 
girls regardless of gender; in both cases, virtually identical proportions of boys and girls 
with more serious criminal biographies (75.8% and 77.4% respectively) were subject to an 
order of two years or more. It seems here, in the length of order, that sentencing would seek 
to claw back some of the proportionality lost in the making of the supervision order in the 
first place: the pursuit of welfare as a self-evident 'good' is at least apparently tempered to 
some degree by traditional considerations of justice. 
In submitting Social Enquiry Reports to the court, social workers or probation officers 
stand as professional advisors on sentencing, tendering their considered view about the 
most appropriate disposal, but giving due weight to the young person's welfare in so doing. 
Recommendations thereby convey the welfare worker's own sense of what should be the 
response to a young person's infraction. In the case of three quarters of those girls convicted 
of trivial offences and with no record, the report writers considered a supervision order as 
the most appropriate. (74.1 %, N = 40). As Table 5 indicates they were as likely to hold 
such a view on all other offenders as well, including boys whose criminal biography was of a 
modest nature; in other words the advisors on sentencing do not apparently discriminate 
between offence variables when making a recommendation for supervision. 
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TABLES 
Recommendations made for super-vision, by gender and 'criminal status' 
Boys Girls 
Not Serious Other Not Serious Other 
Specific recommendation 
made for supervision 74 (75.5) 410 (71.3 ) 40 (75.1 ) 86 (68.3) 
No recommendation made 23 (24.5) 165 (28.7) 14 (24.9) 40 (31.7) 
TOTAL 98 (100.0) 575 (100.0) 54 (100.0) 126 (100.0) 
Those placed on supervision are as likely to have been involved in trivial as in more 
serious offending; given the greater proportion of girls rather than boys characterized by 
modest criminal biographies, it is not therefore surprising that the overall link between 
gender and trivial criminal activity is stronger for girls than it is for boys. Since this 
particular group of girl offenders did not possess the 'formal' requirements for a moderately 
high tariff disposal (which at least applied to those young people whose offence was more 
serious or whose history of criminal behaviour was more pronounced) then one would 
imagine that the reasons for a supervision order being recommended might lie in those 
'needs' revealed by the routine professional practices of social workers or probation 
officers. 
Although the question of the objective status of these needs must be suspended, their 
precise determination being contingent upon for example the professional ideologies of the 
welfare workers and what their agencies are constituted to address (Smith, 1981; Dingwall, 
et al. 1983), it is nonetheless important to see how far the offender is viewed as possessing 
personal or social difficulties that might be addressed through social work involvement. 
After all, locating and specifying problems and needs is part and parcel of the professional 
remit of the social worker and probation officer, since it is through this that otherwise 
'irrational', 'anti-social' or unaccountable behaviour can be made publicly intelligible 
(Hardiker and Webb, 1979; Philp, 1979). In other words the supervision order would be 
serving specifically welfare objectives should 'needs' be identified to be subsequently met 
through social work, even if strictly speaking the severity of the offence merited a less severe 
disposal. Although for critics of 'welfare sentencing' this is seen as 'unjust', it would 
nonetheless point to rationality and purpose in what was recommended rather than reflect 
no more than fairly deeply embedded 'feelings' about the girl offender being so exceptional 
that a small scale moral panic is set in motion. 
Despite recommendations for supervision orders being made on girl offenders, largely 
irrespective of the seriousness of their offence, it is difficult to see any way in which these are 
linked to a coherent welfare response. The social enquiry reports had been coded to see 
whether clearly identified social work strategies had been proposed; if they had then this 
would stand as some 'justification' for recommending supervision. 
Clearly stated reasons were more likely not to be made than made, and this applies to 
both boys and girls, something which has doubtless contributed to the sense of unease 
sometimes expressed by the magistracy about the vagueness of content in Social Enquiry 
Reports (Webb and Harris, 1984). Nonetheless, Table 6a indicates that at least in the case of 
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b.oy: .involved in minor misdemeanours, social .workers and probation officers were 
slgmflcantly ~ore likely to sp.e~ out a social work strategy to accompany their 
recommendatlon than when wntmg about more serious offenders. There is no h 
d·· . h d h suc IstmCtlOn owever rna e wit respect to girls; as Table 6b shows, those involved in trivial 
offe.nces were not more likely to be regarded as having needs to be met throuah social work 
inte~enti.o~, suggesting .that whatever it is that the supervision order mi;ht be seen as 
meetmg, It IS not to do WIth those problems which social workers or probation officers are 
abl.e to spell out with any particular clarity. The identification of 'needs' appears no more 
salIent for these 'trivial offenders' than it does for ·others. If there is a general uncertainty 
TABLE 6 
Specific social work strategy in Social Enquiry Report by criminal status 
(a) Boys 
Social work strategy in social enquiry 
No strategy 
TOTAL 
x
2 
= 5.21 df = 1 p<0.05 
'Not Serious' 
42 (40.0) 
63 (60.0) 
105 (100.0) 
(b) Girls 
Social work strategy in social enquiry 
No strategy 
TOTAL 
x
2 
= 0.07 df = 1 n.s. 
'Not Sen'ous' 
19 (33.3) 
38 (66.7) 
57 (100.0) 
'Other' 
173 (28.5) 
433 (71.4) 
606 . (100.0) 
'Other' 
42 (31.5) 
91 (68.4) 
133 (100.0) 
about what the supervision order might offer delinquent you~gsters, this seems most 
pronounced amongst those girls whose law breaking has been of a more or less 
inconsequential nature. Given the rather unclear picture of what their 'needs' might be, or 
the problems in their lives that need addressing, the basis of any concern that prompts a 
supervision order (other than a general anxiety about their 'moral welfare') is not 
immediately apparent. More ethnographic, observational studies might reveal otherwise, 
though the data on sexual stereotyping by welfare personnel from this perspective is scant. 
Certainly, the inference we would draw from our analysis of their ftles is.ti1at girl offenders 
who were placed on supervision for mild misdemeanours (in about three quarters of the 
instances at the behest of the writer of the social enquiry report) had no especial evidence of 
. 'problems' to the extent which would justify a welfare disposal overriding more traditional 
notions of proportionality. The question that presses in becomes increasingly insistent: just 
why were these apparently 'low risk' girl offenders placed on supervision - and 
recommended that they should be? As already intimated, on neither criminal seriousness or 
history nor 'need' do they warrant this disposal. It is to this that the following discussion 
turns. 
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Discussion: Social control, deviant girls and welfare 
The fin~in~s rep~rted on here, it must be emphasised, refer to one disposal only and 
apply to gIrlS m ~artlcular rather. than women offenders in general. E>..."trapolations to the full 
span of sentencmg and the entIre age spectrum must inevitably therefore be limited d ca~tious. This is important to ?ear in min~. Adult women offenders appear to be subjec~o 
neIther harsher nor more lement sentencmg than men, when seriousness of offence and 
criminal record are held constant (Nagel, 1980; Farrington and Morris, 1983). Within this 
apparent equality of disposition, the actual practices of the sentence are likely to be around 
the women offender's gender competence (Carlen, 1983). 'Sexism' in the administration of 
justice therefore occurs latently. But for girls the procedures are more formal and overt. 
Conventionally represented as the weakest family members (namely women and 
'children') the provisions of 'care' within the juridical framework of the 1969 Children and 
Young Persons Act extends the prospect of sentencing them to supervision. Though benign 
in intent, such strategies have been criticized for the suspension of justice entailed, though 
only rarely has the point been made about the amplified impact that this might have on girls 
in particular. (Campbell, 1982; Casburn, 1979; Hudson, 1983). It is the penological 
consequences of being a delinquent, female, 'child' that is the question at hand. Clearly, 
there is a broader whole within which the findings presented here are a part, namely the 
social control to which deviant women are subject. These data are both a reflection of and 
lend weight to a perspective on crime which asks more about the social reaction to . 
delinquency than about the original perpetration. 
Labelling theory substituted the social genesis of delinquency for aetiology; by its 
emphasis on social control as the means by which deviant and delinquent statuses were 
ascribed it broke with the essentialist doctrine which had hitherto stood so securely as the 
focus for criminological investigation. The characteristics of criminogenic individuals or 
social groups no longer occupied the enquirer'S mind, but rather the nature of rules created, 
endorsed and sustained by this or that set of moral entrepreneurs. An approach which 
stressed the relative and contingent nature of all rule breaking behaviour, it also opened up 
the prospect of a detailed examination of the underlying assumptions, interests and 
typifications of those seeking the censure of particular forms of behaviour. The control 
culture became a legitimate target of ironic enquiry, as the agency which 'created' through 
its rules, laws and attributions the deviant phenomena that in another voice it sought to 
extinguish, treat or reform. 
These changes in perspective and emphasis were played out against the issue of male 
criminality; it has taken time for the same approach to work its way through to the question 
of the delinquency of women, the study of which retained secure connections with 
biologism even when the general tide of criminological thought was turning against this 
form of reductionism (Smart, 1976). Given the paucity of information on women's criminal 
behaviour, and the oft-times curious theories profferred to account for it, it is not surprising 
that social book-keeping along the lines of 'who does what and how often' should have 
persisted ('to set the record straight') when sociological criminology elsewhere was turning 
an agnostic eye on such things. The recognition, however, that ultimately 'the idea of a 
"true picture" (is) inherently imprecise and elusive' has prompted ... 'A shift of emphasis, 
away from attempts to discover the truth about the extent and nature of women's offending 
towards a closer study of their actual involvement with the criminal justice and penal 
system' (Morris cind Gelsthorpe, 1981: 140). 'Women and crime' increasingly becomes a 
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question of women and social control (Hutter and Williams, 1981). Social reaction theory 
and penology share a common concern with the management of the socially deviant; 
though the former pr?fesses a detachment from the administrative concerns of the latter. It 
invites, too, an enquiry into how far and in what fashion the nature and pattern of 
sentencing might convey both the formalizing of precepts about behaviour and the 
interpretation of statute. In both, the law has been regarded as subjecting women to a fonn 
of cO.ntrol intend~d to remin.d t~~m of familialism, p:opri~ty and conventional gender 
practIces. ParadoXIcally, and sIgmfIcantly, any general dIscretIonary latitude allowed to the 
law will either by lenient or harsh treatment serve as a means of reaffuming cenain 
preferences; for example, leniency extended to one woman because of her demonstrably 
competent motherhood, harshness towards another in order to offer her thereby the chance 
to be appropriately remoralized (Carlen, 1983; Nagel, 1980; Sachs, 1978). The apparently 
discriminatory practices of the law are not therefore instances of mere mal-administration, 
but reflect the deep structure of material and moral interests to which women are subject. In 
this view, juridical practices resonate with the patriarchal interests so securely embedded 
within the contemporary social order (Mcintosh, 1978). 
Though this can lend some intellectual respectability to shoulder-shrugging indifference 
to the practices so revealed, any study of control within criminal and juvenile justice tends 
towards at least an implicit statement about the ironical gap between officially stated 
universal criteria and the manner of their application in practice (Pearce, 1976). The 
particular treatment of women and girls before the law has accordingly been one way in 
which gender issues have been brought into mainstream developments within criminology, 
and in particular penology. De jure precepts, and de facto practices (which is what concern 
us here) both stand capable of being exposed for their abandonment of the principle of equal 
citizenship. 
Part of the way in which this works in the case of delinquent girls is through the latitude 
extended to social workers and probation officers in meeting needs. In seeking to remove 
law breaking juveniles from the criminal justice system under the guise of care or treatment, 
a system of superintendence which Donzelot calls tutelage' ... made possible a saving and 
corrective intervention of the state, but at the cost of a near total dispossession of private 
rights' (Donzelot, 1980, p. 93). 
Saving and correction are ushered in to regulate the lives of deviants under the banner of 
'welfare'. Welfare (at least in the juridical context), concerns itself with the 'root cause' of an 
individual's waywardness (McEwen, 1981), and seeks the remoralization and reintegration 
of the individual with society. The objective is refonn, with the 'best interests' of the child 
(as defined by experts) giving direction to rehabilitation. But inasmuch as the determination 
of what welfare or best interests might be is open to interpretation, there is scope for the 
intrusion of moral evaluations of need. In this ensemble of 'legal welfarism', and 
assumptions and attributions about gender, the delinquent girl finds herself subject to a 
particular regulatory censure. Because of the exceptionalness of their criminality, the 
delinquent woman has become, as the Victorians would have it, 'unsexed'. Girls who are 
delinquent are seen as departing not only from the legal code, but from gender expectations 
as well; by breaking criminal laws they are ipso facto offenders against a moral code which 
lays down particular expectations about the appropriate behaviour of the sexes. Delinquent 
girls are thereby subject to the attribution of multiple waywardness - not only formal, legal, 
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infraction but also that of being a gender deviant (Hiller and Hancock, 1981; Shacklady 
Smith, 1978; Campbell, 1981; Terry, 1970). 
Whereas the ordinariness of rule breaking by boys and its continuity with what is 
nonnally expected of males can be readily grasped within the purview of the natural 
attitude, the delinquency of girls is often regarded as quintessentially problematic and 
exceptional. Girls, when delinquent, pose cognitive problems dissonant not only with a 
preference by the control culture for obedience to the law, but also with its demand for 
acquiescence to more diffuse nonns. Because the natural attitude expresses the belief that 
'( d)elinquency among girls is such a perversion of, or rebellion against, their natural female 
roles' (Shacklady Smith, 1978: 75), behaviourally, greater compliance is expected of them 
(Parker et al. 1981: 7). 
Since offence behaviour is frequently viewed - both in statute (packman, 1980; Clark, 
1979) and occupational ideology (Morris et al. 1980; Bottoms and McWilliams, 1979) - as 
constituting incontrovertible evidence of problems in the offender's life, this means that 
criminal proceedings provide ample scope for welfare interventions over and above that 
demanded by justice alone. And since the legislative reference point for dealing with young 
offenders is inconsistent and theoretically confused (Harris, 1982), and as we have seen in 
the case of the supenrision order ambitiously vague, it is not surprising that phrases like 
'best interests', 'welfare', or 'need', will be variously interpreted. (Priestly, Fears and Fuller, 
1977). As Hiller and Hancock (1981: 101) obsenre from their work on girls and juvenile 
justice in Australia, ' ... as with all kinds of legislation couched in fairly general tenns, the 
personnel whose task it is to implement it are left to interpret the provisions as they see fit, in 
the context usually of prevailing values, attitudes and expectations'. 
The Super-vision Order as Tutelage 
The very vagueness to the procedures attaching to the supervision order is testament to 
the authority divested to those experts - above all social workers and probation officers -
charged with responsibility for wayward youngsters. They stand as custodians of the young 
person's good, offering a range of presences from family therapist to adult authority figure. 
\X'hatever the varying content to these presences, the fonn is constant and stands as an 
instance of what Donzelot (1980) has referred to as 'tutelage'. This' ... elaborate structure 
of counselling, guidance, advice management and supervision by statutory and voluntary 
agencies ... ' (Barrett and McIntosh, 1982: 98) introduces the state's agenda for regulating 
and disciplining actual or potential deviants into the private sphere of personal and family 
life. 
Donzelot lays some emphasis upon psychoanalytically derived knowledge as the 
particular way in which social work introduces disciplinary imperatives to disorganized 
families. But psychic reconstruction probably figures insignificantly in most social work 
intenrentions, with moral example and exhortation demonstrating a more empirical 
inflection to tutelage than arcane 'psyknowledge'. (Carew, 1979). Supervision, as revealed 
in its statute-defined elements of advice, assistance and befriending suggests something 
along these lines. It implies authority, but authority which is benign, resting upon a sagacity 
of life experience, rather than upon technical expertise. Assistance is extended to those who, 
on their own and because of a variety of deficiences (moral, cultural), have found it difficult 
to participate 'adequately' in civil society. And all this, which involves substantial lay rather 
than specifically professional qualities, occurs within the ministration of befriending, the 
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contingent offering of pseudo-mutuality. Supervision in these guises is a mundane task 
easily appropriated by common sense and the everyday; it is so vague that almost anythin~ 
can go. 
Although the remit of the supervision order is diffuse and wide, the remit of supervision 
as tute~age is very ~p~cif~c; its c~ncern is with n:oral departures and their necessary 
correcnon and resoClahzanon. IrOnIcally the very lantude allowed to the supervision order 
makes it responsive to the hidden and reified arrangement of things; within a multiplex of 
lay and professional assumptions about the extreme atypicality of female delinquency, 
which official statistics and 'criminological' accounts apparently endorse, the girl offender 
becomes an obvious case for the meeting of self-evident needs. In focusing upon social 
deviancy (however imagined or imputed) to a greater degree than on legal infraction and 
criminal history, the practices of juvenile justice, exemplified by girls subject to a 
supervision order, means that the coun does not really pronounce judgement on crimes, 
rather it' ... examines individuals. There is a dematerialization of the offence which places 
the minor in a mechanism of intenninable investigation, of perpetual judgement' 
(Donzelot, 1980: p.11 0, original emphasis). For delinquent girls (and probably for deviant 
women in general) the rehabilitative ideal which infonns liberal penal policy is given a very 
specific inflection. The refonn which marks in Pearson's (1975) phrase, their 'return to 
utility' is accomplished with singular emphasis placed upon their performing not so much as 
socially competent citizens, but in terms of demonstrably competent gender practices 
(Hudson, 1983). 
Some Conclusions 
I have not sought here to offer more than a panial account of the way in which girls are 
treated v.'ithin juvenile justice. The concern has been with one disposal only, though the 
panicularly ambivalent nature of the supervision order makes it something of a suitable test 
around which to assess the juridical and welfare balance in the operation of law. As was 
pointed out earlier, 'welfare' legislation vests authority and discretion in decision making 
with the expens, and in this are inevitably admitted their professional ideologies as they 
endeavour to make a 'competent' assessment of 'just what son of case is this?' (Giller and 
Morris, 1981). But such ideologies are not exhaustive and the lacunae that they cannot 
address are 'filled' with extra-professional assumptions, often deeply embedded common-
sensical responses. There is difficulty in accommodating atypical and exceptional offenders 
who stand outside the purview of the habitual knowledge which makes for the routine, 
relatively unproblematic handling of cases (Sudnow, 1969). Women offenders, whether 
young or old, do not fall easily into the familiar categories of 'norma}' crime, save perhaps 
that of being self-evident 'problems' with no more to be said. Not surprisingly, there is an 
absence of clarity in problem formulation and recommendation making by social workers. 
This is something which Hardiker has shown applies as well to another subordinate group-
in this case black offenders - knowledge about whom is also more panial, more infused with 
the everyday and the frequently mythological than for those kinds of offenders who 
comprise (or have comprised until recently) the bread-and-butter of typical professional 
and lay experience (Hardiker, 1977). There is here that vulnerability to a restricted 
representation which it has been suggested is a common feature of women's experience 
within the juridical system (Carlen, 1983; Dell, 1971); the person charged with speaking for 
the deviant is muted because of no recipe within which to offer an 'account' of the 
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wayv.rard's actions. Though recommendations for supervision were made in the case of the 
girls in this study - and often for very trivial offences - this was much less frequently linked 
to any clear strategy of social work involvement than amongst the boys. Both in the 
commission of recommending these girls for a supervision order, and in the omission of 
saying what might be offered then, there is a tendency towards limiting the visibility of airl 
delinquents as legal subjects. . I:> 
All young offenders are subject to being sentenced on the basis of their welfare beina 
I:> 
thereby directed. But for girls the discretion allowed by this finds them subject to a greater 
distortion of proportionality in sentencing than found amongst boys. The trend is clear: the 
data here show that girls recommended for, and subject to, supervision orders include a 
higher proportion of offenders committing trivial offences and with no criminal history 
behind them. More frequently than amongst boys, the girl offender is apparently presumed 
to be a case for supervision even with the relative absence of those needs which social 
workers and probation officers might see themselves as capable of addressing. 
Discrimination of an intentionally sexist nature is without doubt too crude an explanation 
for the tendencies outlined here, though the structure of events is such to suggest that the 
system of juridical enforcement is discriminatory. There does seem that there is sufficient 
evidence to aver that the supervision order appears to be a disposal which plays into deeply 
held sentiments about the more or less unquestioned need to 'watch over' the delinquent 
girl. This means that what Black (1976) has referred to as the 'behaviour of law' - or at least 
this small corner of juvenile justice - is such that its operation is sometimes applied with 
greater force to some citizens on the basis of their gender as much as on any other, more 
strictly criminal, quality they might possess. 
Notes 
:;- Earlier drafts of this paper benefited greatly from comments and substantive contributions by 
Robert Harris and Pauline Hardiker. 
The project from which the data are drawn was funded by the Home Office, though of course the 
views contained here are solely the author's and are not to be taken in any way as those of the Home 
Office or its staff. 
Gill Bevis carried out most of the fieldwork and with remarkable resolution_ The assistance from 
many members of the probation service and social seryice department was more often than not most 
generous_ 
1. It should be noted that recent legislative innovations relating to young offenders have extended the 
powers available to the courts in directing the nature of supervision to which the young person 
might be subject. (Criminal Justice Act 1982). Our data refer to the situation prior to the 
implementation of these changes. 
2. The tariff refers to one (amongst a number) of the principles of sentencing. It rests on the principle 
of proportionality since it seeks to ensure that the severity of the sentence should be limited 
according to the seriousness of the crime. There ought, then, to be a proportional relationship 
betv.'een the nature of the criminal act commined and the disposal to which the offender is subject. 
The common-sensical expression would be the self evident truth that the more serious the offence 
then justice demands a heavier sentence. 
Individualized sentencing on the other hmd looks not to past offences but seeks to influence 
future behaviour throuah an appropriate form of treattnent. It is particularly mindful, in the case of 
juveniles, of their v.:elf=re, one consideration of which could see them receiving a sentence other 
than demanded by strict proportionality. 
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The range of disposals available to the juvenile coun combines sentences which are 
uncompromizingly punishment ones (such as a fine or detention centre) and those which are more 
individualized, intended (in part) to address an individual's problems. McEwen's (1981) small 
study of magistrates sug~ests this is h~w .they:view, on the ~ho~e, the supervision order, though a 
number acknowledged It also contams elements of retributIon. While it is possible that an 
indi~idual's needs migh.t fin~ them m~ving down th: tarif: demanded by strict proportionality (e.g. 
a serIOUS offence commItted because of severe relatIOnshIp problems between a child and his or her 
parents attracting a supervision order rather than a custodial sentence), it is also true that individual 
needs can move an offender up the tariff should, for example, it be deemed their problems are such 
that two years supervision by a social worker would be more appropriate than a small fine. 
It should be emphasized that the tariff is more a notional framework than a formal set of rules; 
there is no prescribed hierarchy of sentences, though of course limitations are set to length of 
sentence for particular offences. But latitude within this is considerable with the magistracy in 
particular being able to reflect in their sentencing local lay sentiment. 
3. The coding of offence seriousness was: 
Trivial Property offence up to £ 1 0 value in total 
11 Common assault 
11l Minor public order offence (causing an affray, etc.) 
Medium Property offence (including criminal damage) (£10-£100) 
11 Assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm 
11l Indecent assault 
IV IDA/Allow to be carried 
High Property offence over £100 
11 Grievous bodily harm/malicious wounding (5.18/5.20) 
III Rape or serious indecent assault 
IV Robbery (even where sum involved is trivial) 
v 'Obvious' serious offences - conspiracy, murder, etc. 
If more than one offence 
Up to 5 x trivial Trivial 
ii 6 x trivial and over Medium 
11l Up to 3 x medium Medium 
IV 4 x medium and over High 
v Up to 5 (trivial and medium) (except where 4 x medium/1 x trivial) High 
vi Over 5 (trivial and medium) High 
vii 1 x high plus any other High 
4. We have not here taken into account the impact that police cautioning might have. We sought to 
extract this information from files but were unable to do so with any confidence. 
Although not standing as a conviction in the strict sense of the word, 'cautions' are frequently 
introduced into the court proceedings as elements in the young offenders 'antecedents', and may 
therefore be taken into account in sentencing. Hence a young person who on the face of it is 
sentenced 'harshly' because they appear to have no previous convictions, may in fact have been 
earlier 'sentenced' to a caution. Insofar as girls might be more likely to be cautioned (the police 
acting chivalrously towards someone in especial need of protection), then their previous blameless 
existence may be mor~ apparent than real. Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest ~at th~ sex 
per se of a youna offender determines the likelihood of cautioning rather than prosecutIon (FIsher 
and Mawby, 1;82; Mon, 1983; Landau and Nathan, 1983), and on the basis ?f this it ~e~ms 
reasonable to assume that both boys and girls in our sample would have expenenced a sun~ar 
propensity towards having been previously cautioned. In other words, discrirninat~ry se~tencIng 
to which girls might be subject seems unlikely to have been brought about by theIr haVIng been 
earlier cautioned by the police. 
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Social Work and Critical Consciousness: Rebuilding Orthodoxy 
David Webb 
Abstract 
The paper has two interwoven themes. The first concerns pedagogy: how to construct an 
approach to teaching social workers which domesticates the radical critique of socialists and 
feminists. rendering this as a base for 'legitimate' social work, yet which will also 'liberate' those 
students for whom technique and procedure are exclusive concerns. 
The second theme is an elaboration and examination of the organising concept empowered to 
meet this teaching objective, namely critical consciousness. It is sustained not just for its strategic 
merit as an instructional device, but as a principled base for thinking about inten"ention. 
Critical consciousness is considered as a politico-moral enterprise of cognitive awareness 
aimed at people gaining an enhanced grasp of their objcClil'c circumstances. The ramifications of 
this burden of knowing are considered, as is the degree to which critical consciousness and its 
attainment reflect the particular knowledge held by the 'social worker as educator'. Although it 
is held that action is the test of the adequacy of an\' emancipator)" knowledge, the article is more 
concerned with developmg the ideas behmd, than wIth the ImplementatIon of, critical 
C(Jn~CiOusness" 
"And as he had acquired absolutely nothing about political economy or 
about logic and was therefore at the mercy of the first agreeable sophistry 
that might take his fancy by storm, his unfitness to commence the business 
of being a citizen almost reached perfection". 
Arnold Bennett, Clayhatigcr 
A Preamble 
In casual moments, caught off guard and finding themselves voicing impetuous 
utterances, social \I.'ork educators may sometimes speak, not always with subtlety, of 
the two broad constituencies of students with whom they must 'deal'. There are first 
the 'radicals', that querulous (or so it seems) cabal of socialists and feminists who 
charge much of \\.'hat passes for knowledge and practice with being perniciously 
oppressive, merely 'reproducing the present social relations of capitalism', 
Intellect ually it is perhaps difficult not to concur with certain elements of the analysis 
from which springs such sentiment; such agreement, ho~ver, stands alongside the 
recognition that these students will have to operate with competence and survive 
occupationally within agencies of which they are critical. They will have to discharge 
duties which are collaborationist and execute sanctions against society's victims. To 
construct amongst these students an occupational morality which is faithful to their 
principles is important if they are not to be lost to cynicism or despair. 1 So what 
follows could be seen as the beginnings of a theory of practice which looks to achieve 
just such a resolution of 'political' analysis and 'professional' objectives. It draws, 
accordingly, upon that critical analysis of social divisions to which radicals might 
turn, yet it seeks a 'praxis' deliberately and intentionally circumscribed by the pre-
given 'place' which social work occupies - and is 'allowed', as it were, to occupy-
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within contemporary British capitalism.1 Inevitably this 'paradigm' is accommodative: 
:t tends to prioritize change at the level of the human subject, though it allows for the 
transforming activity consequent upon shifts in the cognitive world of the person. 
Whilst knowledge and action are held as indissoluble, the knowledge-constituting role 
~ ~ 
of social work as it comes into contact with deformed subjects (and subjectivity) is 
emphasised. Subjectivism, but not philosophical idealism, and a commitment to 
change rather than social regulation places what follows within the 'Radical 
Humanism' set down by Whittington and Holland in their recent elaboration of social 
work's paradigmatic variety. 3 It could stand as an application of their more 'formal' 
exegesis: a working instance of one particular 'meta theory'. 
So much for the response, as it were, to the first - and should we say 'more. 
troublesome' - bunch of students. But there is the other, more 'invisible college' to 
whom we speak. This group we seek to enliven with our enthusiasm for theoretical 
reflection, kindling the imaginative expansion associated with the deliberately 
ironical view of things. These are the students we regard (perversely, given our' 
exasperation with their comrades) as 'too complacent', and 'insufficiently critical', 
'too concerned' with technique alone. To move them on poses its own tactical 
demands; perhaps they are too resistant to even the mildest 'debunking', to even the 
mildest of suggestions about social divisions and the distribution of the social 
product. To speak to them about the internal 'radical' momentum of social work, the 
immanence of a 'more progressive' element in that conventional enterprise, is, one 
hopes, to open up possibilities brought by their obligation to social workper s(' rather 
than by grafting on something outside its discourse. Social work as a 'cause', with 
certain ethical (Iiberative, emancipatory) purposes, with a moral commitment of a 
certain form to human-kind, paradoxically has an agenda which must be 'political' if it 
is to be professional. 
So what follows is not just an enunciation of a particular social work paradigm 
wherein we might helpfully sketch a particular view of society, outline the principal 
sources of social problems held, and set down some attendant social work aims. It 
stands, additionally, as a certain kind of teaching strategy, aimed at maximising 
'relevance' as well as 'education'. It presents too, perhaps, the pedagogic equivalent of 
Mathiesen's dilemma:~ to seek an impact, the new so effectively enters the speech 
community of the established that it is incorporated within that discourse: 
alternatively it is so 'wild' that it is 'defined out' as irrelevant, with no one 'hearing' 
what is said. Only in the space between, so the argument goes, can creative 
possibilities find realisation. 
Social \Vork: Yet More Dilemmas 
Social work faces an abundance of conundrums. I begin here with the one which 
arises from the profound discrepancy between what we know as the social genesis of 
the problems faced by aggregates of individuals, and the capacity of social work to 
deal with those disabling 'structural' conditions. Social workers, troubled by the 
ethical dilemmas produced by the rift between analysis and possible remedies open to 
them, collapse into angst or retreat into routine. Rhetorical advice to forge links with 
the labour movement, whilst perhaps strategically correct, does not on its own aid the 
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development of an occupational morality, nor does it lessen the mood of bad faith that 
is especially pronounced where idealism and reality are most often at loggerheads _ 
on training courses. 
There is no need to be a self-confessed 'radical' (which convention assumes to be of 
the Jeft) for such conflicts to cause unease; it requires only a m~derately well informed 
grasp of sociology and social policy to recognise that social divisions have an impact 
en those life chances which clients daily exhibit as their own problems. Not 
surprisingly, it is difficult for people whom Wright Mills somewhat disparagIngly 
referred to as 'social pathologists' to rise above a series of discrete cases and 
apprehend instead the broader sweep of public issues. It is difficult because inscribed 
upon the organisational practice and occupational culture of social work is the 
case-by-case approach and the individuality and uniqueness of each client. Though 
progressive when people are otherwise treated as labour power or reproducers oi 
labour power, such individualising of problems nonetheless sits uneasily alongside 
those social sciences which speak in terms not of idiography, but 'sociography'. 
It is not surprising then, that dissonance marks the occupational weltanschauung of 
social work, and more particularly, perhaps, that of the student facing competing 
stocks of knowledge which are so often apparently irreconcilable. 5 So any move to 
construct, ifnot in totality at least in elements, a set of theories of practice might serve 
to resolve this tension between 'knowledge of social causes' and the specific practices 
'al1owed' to SOCIal work and around which It discharges its allocatea ·charter'.6 
Emancipation Through Consciousness 
One strategy, in seeking simultaneously to address these competing discourses of 
knowledge set against practical possibilities, can be seen in the periodic interest which 
social work has given to the possibility of developing with clients a critical 
consciousness,' in which the mood ofhumanism is rescued as the individual develops 
a 'progressively more critical mode ofproolem solving ... as he (sic) faces and tries to 
solve problems of oppression'.s Here cogr:ition problematises the taken for granted 
world of both cultural and material existence, oppression speaks to the saliency of 
power in social divisions, and problem solving stamps upon that existence the 
affirmation that purposive action is indeed possible. The process involves 'a change of 
mentality invoking an accurate, realistic awareness of one's place in nature and 
society (and) ... a logical action aimed at transformation'.9 
But we should sustain the case for critical consciousness not by reference to the 
fortuitous manner in which it resolves practitioners' existential troubles in holding 
together 'the political' and what may pass for, (at first sight anyway), 'the therapeutic', 
but by its impact upon the lives of clients. We should be able to justify it morally or 
ethically; to substantiate why transformations in peoples' consciousness are merited 
and just why a deliberate challenge to their assumptive worlds might be mounted. 
These matters constitute the main body of this article. We need before this though a 
brief mention of the constituent traditions which contribute to this idea of critical 
consciousness and at least a pointer to how these might stand with more orthodox 
traditions in social work. Here the work of Paulo Freire is an enduring point of 
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reference. Although I do not propose to do more than allude to his thinking,'U it is 
important to recognise the centrality he accords to consciousness (of sociocultural 
reality) as a force capable of shaping people's lives. Only through knowledge which 
frees the individual from myth and a corroding dominant ideology - perhaps more 
conventionally expressed as hegemony - can the individual determine the source and 
nature of oppression'. Freire's exploration of the complex fashion in which 
consciousness is shaped by material reality, yet is capable of going beyond that 
determining forcefulness to the point of transforming concrete circumstances runs 
throughout his work. He writes, accordingly, that 'only beings who can reflect upon 
the fact that they are determined are capable of freeing themselves'. II 
Freire's blend of materialism and humanism, his ideas of actual ising individuals 
capable of affirming their humanity through will locates him at the creative interstices 
between idealism and materialism, where humanism cannot be declared by fiat, but is 
realised only through struggle against the very forces which dc-humanise. These 
concerns place Freire alongside, or rather within, Critical Theory'2. This rests upon 
the axiom that the social sciences should be emancipator),: that through their analysis 
of the impediments to human realisation they should establish means by which human 
needs and purposes might be satisfied. '3 Of some centrality is the way in which 
knowledge exerts an autonomous and independent effect on social existence, for 
history is made 'with will and consciousness'. Knowledge extends the self 
understanding of those social groups capable of transforming society: I~ from the 
perspective of liberation theology, problem solving action is impossible without 
understanding and elucidating the social, political, economic and psychological 
mechanisms which oppress. 15 Such is the humanist core of the variety of inflexions 
given to the task of 'liberation'. 
Conscientisation shares with critical theory a concern with what Habermas has 
termed the emancipatory interest; to reason self consciously and to make decisions in 
the light of available knowledge. Once it is acknowledged that history embodies 
domination, repression and the ideological framing of action, it becomes apparent 
that self understanding is often limited by unacknowledged conditions '6 • But through 
knowledge and understanding of a situation, individuals will thereby better grasp 
their sufferings. These understandings will certainly include those to do with the social 
structure and social arrangements, and to ignore these as irrelevant is to de-humanise 
the cognitive process. Accordingly Critical Theory "seeks to articulate the felt 
gri~vances of a specific group of actors, to provide a vocabulary in virtue of which they 
and their situation can be conceptualised, to explain why the conditions in which they 
find themselves are frustrating to them, and to offer a programme of action which is 
intended to end with the satisfaction of these desires" 17. 
Critical consciousness (or conscientisation) is concerned then, with challenging the 
given categories of thought with which people order their social world and thin.k 
about themselves. It addresses 'ways of seeing' in John Berger's phrase, and IS 
essentially a strategy for cognitive renewal; an approach to reappropriating a 
consciousness which has been hijacked by systems of meaning w'hich are alien to the 
individual's quest for an accurate grasp of their reality. It is what in more conventional 
social work parlance might be called self-determination (rather than 'other' 
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determination). But, crucially, the realisation of this is only possible by confrontin 
the mechanisms (ideological, linguistic, material) by which the subject's capacity t~ 
reflect on his or her acivities is eclipsed. 18 • 
But it is not 'Critical Theory' which has a monopoly over the 'emancipatory 
interest': it runs, for example, through liberation theology, and stands too within that 
radical kernel of 'conventional' social work. So when speaking of the purposes of the 
enterprise. Helen Harris Perlman writes '(it) seems fitting that social workers, among 
others who stand for humanness, should strive to hold and in some small way to 
expand the narrow margin of self-determination, because it is chiefly in the exercise of 
his will that man knows himself (sic) and feels himself responsible for his choices and 
his fate'.IQ 
J t may be possible, then, to see what critICal consciousness (following Freire I use this 
interchangeably with conscientisation) might offer social work: to construct it, as it 
were. lrilhin the protective shell of what already exists. Such intellectual civil 
engineering has at its disposal humanism and subjectivism to span the bridging points 
between the given and the possible, building thereby a 'theory of practice' which 
addresses the realities, history and purpuses of the extant, rather than the wishful. 
Indeed it is sometimes difficult not to be struck by the similarities of project between 
the emancipator), interest of critical consciousness (that people 'see themselves and 
their social situation in new ways' so that they 'can decide to alter the conditions 
\\'hich they find repressi\'e'20) and that of traditional pragmatism ('the very essence of 
mature humanness is the exercise of choice rather than his coercion by his own blind 
impulses or the power of others. It is what builds in him his sense of effectiveness, of 
identity. of selfhood ... '~I). Of course it is not surprising that there should be these 
significant points of superimposition, for critical consciousness is an amalgam of a 
number of philosophies, a meld of humanism, MarXIsm and perhaps most 
significantly for our purposes, philosophical pragmatismY It is this latter intellectual 
tradition which, Greenstone argues, has given significant impetus to (in particular) 
American social workY From Jane Addams to Pincus and Minahan, this has spoken 
repeatedly of the importance of rationality, of active interpretation, in orderto render 
intelligible the hitherto perplexing. Philosophical pragmatism is a spur not only to 
psychodynamics but to systems theory; both have a (however flawed) liberative 
agenda. 
So in a sense critical conSCIOusness is the politicisation of pragmatist philosophy; it 
provides. for example, an account of why the choices to which Perlman refers might be 
s~'stematically denied to some citizens, and once having offered such a theory, implies 
a corresponding praxis which is more political than is selfactualisation ~lone. But this 
does not necessarily point to a rupture of discourses; as I have argued elsewhere,24 
there are points where 'the new' can speak successfully (and appropriately) to the 
established. offering a revivifying impetus especially when the established (as with 
social work) has its own history of opposition to certain repressive social practices2s . 
So, in enunciating some purposes and properties of conscientisation I am attempting 
too to address the purposes of social work sui generis, arguing that critical 
consciousness actuallv looks to at least some of the inherent, essential and 
fundamental projects ~f the activity. 'Radical social work' as often advocated is far 
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from the root of social work; so far indeed that it ceases to be social work at all but 
some fanciful fiction, an idealist excursion in which the mere prefacing of soci-al work 
with the appropriate adjective is considered sufficient to transform an enterprise 
which is, in truth, constituted by a specific set of social, political and economic 
arrangements that cannot be 'wished away'26. 
In any event, prudence towards the forces of modernism is always worthwhile, and 
it is sometimes profitable to seek in orthodoxy a kernel that needs recovering if the 
unalloyed 'message' is to be rendered in pristine form. The separation of the radical and 
the traditional might therefore be less absolute. To return, very briefly, to the theological 
analogy: it is in the recovery of traditional teaching that are found the inspirations for 
liberation, and not the subsequent interpretations of Christ's ministry which ha\-e 
sought to somehow 'modernise' (perhaps render bourgeois) His teachingsY Cautious 
orthodoxy is sometimes a fruitful source of novelty, for it invites a reflection back on 
those origins in order to explore ramifications lost through subsequent re\'ision.~8 
Finally in thiS section mention must be made offeminism, and the contribution of 
'consciousness raising' to the discussion at hand. Feminism's analysis of the 
systematic, structured and above all gendered nature of what conventionally passes 
for individual ills, whether physical or 'psychological', lends to it a materialist or 
objectivist base, whilst its insistence that shifts in consciousness and social relations 
should prefigure changes in the infrastructure give it the kind of humanist-subjectivist 
praxis that characterises 'critical theory' more generally. 
But whatever the merits of this approach to working with women (and they have 
been many), 'consciousness-raising' remains feminist practice and as such is 
inevitably (and perhaps appropriately) separatist. It does not attempt to speak to 
social work: 29 it is not, in another not especially elegant word, 'generic'. It is difficult 
too to work out the transfers to other settings when method and subject population 
are so closely linked. To break with this sometimes limiting closure, a measure of 
autonomy from the feminist discourse is necessary, building instead something much 
more from within social work itself. 
Of course, for there is a measure of indebted reciprocity between the two, some of 
what is mentioned here might connect across from social work to feminism, lending 
some strategic advantage to those who would argue for practice which is 
simultaneOUSly temmist and legItImate SOCIal work. There may be just some points of 
intersection where the politico-ethical project of these two discourses coincide, and 
insofar as there are, the linking theme should be the 'supra-content concept' of critical 
consciousness. 
Social Work and Communicative Competence 
A whole range of practices have seen will and consciousness as means to 
emancipation; from knowledge flows the grasp on experience and the chance thereby 
to reorder practical events. This underpins the uncovering of repression that is the 
object of psychoanalysis as much as it does the philosophical pragmatism which lent 
such hopeful force -to American social work thinking and its pursuit of the free 
individual. The impediments to knowing reality are the myths that envelop it, myths 
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which are shrouded from cognition qecause, in large measure, of the way in which 
language is as socially distributed as are the material fruits of labour. 30 
This sort of cognitive relativism maintains that knowing and perceiving are 
rendered variabiy, depending upon the code \\'hi,ch we employ to map the plethora of 
objects, ,emotions or social relationships which we 'encounter. "Reality" does not 
)peak for itself but is revealed (or refracted) through the ordering processes at our 
disposal. And, of course, language is paramount amongst these, but it is n<,:>t equally 
accessible to.everyone: ' .. , the form of the social relation, or more generally the social 
structure, generates distinctive linguistic frames or codes, and these codes essentially 
transmit the culture and so constrain behaviour. '31 •. 
What is made possible, or rather not made possibIe"by these codes or frames is part 
of what critical consciousness addresses, for it is through language that an organised 
system of meaning is produced by the subject in order to render intelligible the 
disorder of being-in-the-world. 
Because social work is much involved with talk, in the communication of values 
which arc affirmed, repudiated or ignored in the course of innumerable encounters it 
can be readily charged with reproducing social relations. Language par excellence is 
the means by which these organised structures of belief are shored up - as feminists 
have consistently reminded us.J~ And for Marxists of a subjectivist, humanist 
persuasion. the corruption of the individual's consciousness and experience in the 
'specific historical period of late capitalism' is what lends a complementary note of 
moral socialism to analysis, critique and remedyY There is a sense conveyed of anger 
at the thwarting of the species-being, of hindered realisation/~ and it is because of this 
that 'the opposition to capitalism (is) not only a power contest against an external 
system but against its inner hold'. 35 The terrain for the worker concerned with the well 
being of others is therefore legitimately that occupied by consciousness; it may once 
have been called casework, though now, refreshed, it might stand as the cultural 
interrogation of the categories of thought employed to order the world. Not 
surprisingly, people's right to knowledge of their predicament is a sine qua non of 
emancipation and is behind much of the thrust of critical theory. As Held observes ' ... 
by disclosing deformations of communication they attempt to restore to men and 
women a true awareness of their position in history'.36 
The dialectical interplay between the politicisation of the personal and the 
personalisation of the political creates the space which critical consciousness seeks to 
fill. It is surely significant that the caution and scepticism of the profoundly orthodox 
Paul Halmos toward the politicisation of personal troubles sees him much less able to 
deal with conscientisation than less subtle, more strident and more didactic 
approaches to 'politics in social work')7. In some way this might be precisely because 
of the successful fashion in which critical consciousness looks to the person-in-
situation --- that irreducible core of social work enquiry. Conscientisation seeks to 
overarch the discrete and reified circles which are society and the person; or as 
Longres and McLeod 'express it, 'consciousness raising presupposes a simultaneous 
concern for troubles and issues. but gives primaryatt.ention to the way in which public 
issues penetrate private troubles' 38 • 
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The mood which informs conscientisation as an ethical enterprise is that no 
individuals should think of themselves as less than full persons simply because they 
happen to occupy a subordinate position which deforms their sense of self. Held agai~ 
conveys the contribution which critical theory can make to this, since 'the goal of the 
critical sciences is to dissolve barriers to the self conscious development of life'39. 
The Reconstruction of Consciousness 
In arguing for a social work which is prepared to move beyond superficiality and 
commonsense accounts of things to embracing the 'deep structures' of relationships 
and social existence, George Gammack sees the enterprise as one of, above all, 
clarification. He notes that people often find it difficult to reflect on 'anything other 
than that which is already manifest', and that this can contribute to their sense of 
stalemate or destructiveness. The task of the social worker is 'to take that which is for 
people latent, and to return it to them in some new form'.4o Though bounded by an 
exclusively 'therapeutic' concern, Gammack says enough to offer further reminders 
that there is a unity with critical consciousness in which reflection, transformation and 
clarification are central moral (as well as operational) imperatives. There are other 
clear echoes, too: critical theory, like the social theory behind conscientisation, holds 
that 
"a great many of the actions people perform are caused hy social 
conditions over which they have no control. and that a great deal of what 
people do to one another is not the result of conscious knowledge and 
choice. The critical model ... requires ... its practitioners to seek to 
discover quasi-causal and functional laws of social behaviour in particular 
social contexts,41 . 
These quasi-causal laws are the context within which a knowledge of the individual 
is established, perhaps through a process of interpretative empathy4~. The method is 
to 'reveal the universal in the particular', in Adorno's phrase; to eschew a false or 
disingenuous 'respect for the person', but instead to see in the individual an instance 
or exemplification of what we know to be 'particular quasi-causal relationships 
(which) determine that their social situation be repressive'43. The task of critical 
consciousness is to 'situate' the person - and to share this with them - in order to 
liberate them from the kind of debilitating individualism which causes a shut down in 
autonomy and an introjection of helplessness . 
. Critical consciousness sees oppression or 'troubles' as expressions of communal 
distress. Its structured rather than idiographjc presence is what fires people looking to 
encourage critical consciousness amongst those with whom they are working. Because 
people are obliged to enter into given economic and social relationships often marked 
by an absence of mutuality, then these lived relations generate a particular attitude t~ 
the world. Through material or emotional vulnerability their self is deformed as. It 
becomes locked into the particularities of place, unable to comprehend what lies 
behind and beyond the immediacy of experience; the racist white youth who 'sees' 
'immigrants' taking Jobs IS a depressingly apposite example. 
Part moral outrage, part critique, the manner ~n which 'living in capitalism' (or 
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racism or patriachy) limits the individual's range of thinking about the sources of both 
psychological and material domination becomes a point for grasping people's 
response both to themselves and to the world they inhabit, or what Leonard has 
referred to as the dialectical relationship between consciousness and material 
existence44 • 
The communication of values and ways of thinking are, as I have earlier suggested, 
important elements in many social work encounters, both prosaic and 'therapeutic'. 
Helping people gain a particular 'personness' is perhaps one way in which social work 
can challenge the conventional categories into which people order their cognitive 
worlds. Now all this is decidedly unlike that kind of'help' advocated by those who would 
wish to remove from social work (or its kindred activity of probation) anything tainted 
with the therapeutic brush which reconstructing consciousness implies here. But equally 
what is being discussed is not and should not be arcane, for critical consciousness seeks 
to build upon the perhaps fractured or even 'imaginary' grasp of their own predicament 
which people hold. As Freire has argued, conscientisation involves a pedagogy which 
is not didactic, but rather works towards illuminating understandings currently held 
and revealing them as partial truths only. This is what from a more conventional 
perspect"ive might be called the nameless dread which for a multitude of reasons is not 
admitted to our consciousness45 • It is the stage of awareness that Alschuler calls 
'magical'. because people feel powerless before an awful reality and an awe-inspiring 
'irresistable force which changes or maintains things according to its will'4~. It is. in 
other words a mood offatalism, of things beyond our control yet which controls. It is 
this approprialion oflhe \l'iII that so contracts consciousness that it reflects the material 
experiences of subordination; consciousness is ideology in this account of things. 
Critical consciousness undertakes to break through this mythologising edifice of 
ideology by way of the process of naming - putting anxieties and feelings, barely 
acknowledged possibilities, into words. What has previously been unconscious is 
made consciou~ so transcending the structures of communication which distort access 
to understanding. Critical or renewed consciousness accordingly lends linguistic and 
cognitive coherence to those scarcely discernable sentiments which are contained so 
effectively by the systematic failure to 'name things otherwise'. 'Naming' moves a 
person's grasp of his or her situation on from where it is at present, beyond the purely 
immediate and experiential to the reflexive and 'theoretical'. There is a quizzing of 
what is given to the individual by lived experience, for this reflects not only the extant 
(and often oppressive) social arrangements, but also the impact of ideologies which 
socially construct the ordering of that experience. 
Critical consciousness obviously rests on a view that we can move from the 
distorted to the accurate representation of how things really are; it implies too a 
Kantian notion of truth wherein there is a correspondence of thought to reality. It 
means the person charged with 'directing' the emergence of this revivified 
consciousness has a clear grasp of the greater adequacy of his or her ~no~le~ge 
compared with everyday recipe understandings. This is crucial because conSClentISatlOn 
seeks a cognitive accord between the subject and the objective circumstances they 
occupy, so it is important to know what that objectivity might be. This is a pro~lem ~or 
any doctrine of liberation, whether individual (like psychoanalysis) or collectIve (like 
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Marxism), since 'we' know a priori the condItions which thwart that emancipation. 
Nonetheless, both critical theory and conscientisation remain, I think, more agnostic 
about the nature of truth (or reality) which might be attained than thev do about the 
nature of the present consciousness which should be set aside: a pro'gression away 
from a state which isJalse, to something which, ifnot true, is moving in that directio~. 
Both are concerned with the process of interrogating present impediments to 
knowing, with the process of reconstructing consciousness anew rather than with 
achieving some ultimate state of 'grace' per se. 
Hence it is that Freire talks about penetrating the phenomenological essence of the 
object one has in front of oneself in order to analyse it thereby offering up a 'test to 
reality'47. The materialism that speaks of the quasi-causal nature of the social world, 
then, suggests that what people 'see' depends on how life is produced and interpreted, 
but movement towards what the essential truth might be is attained more by the 
struggle of reflection on the present and its inadequacies than by a revelatory 'falling 
of the scales'. Social work in this sense is akin to the kind of social scientific enterprise 
described by Outhwaite, neither arrogating each and every understanding held by 
members, nor refraining from interrogating them either out of ethnomethodological 
purity. 'The social scientist', writes Outhwaite, 
"must begin with data which are already partially interpreted in the 
ordinary language of everyday life. Moreover, social scientists cannot 
coherently aim to provide a natural science of human life, but rather to 
deepen, systematise and often qualify, by means of empirical and 
conceptual investigation, an understanding which is already present'48. 
New knowing emerges from within the old as this becomes progressively more 
bankrupt in its capacity to deal with lived reality (the doctrine in a romantic ideology 
for a woman whose experience of marriage is marked by financial and emotional 
subordination for example). It does not come from the imposition of irrelevant 
criteria or catagories. The old axiom of starting where the client is is all well and good 
in one respect, though it is not so helpful in saying where we might be going, about 
which social work, at least in its popular everyday voice, remains coy. Critical 
consciousness is at least explicit about the direction of that change, but it does share 
with the nonjudgemental maxim of orthodox social work a sense of an unfolding of 
. consciousness, of a striving towards 'perfect knowledge'. Both conventional social 
work and critical theory are, somewhat surprisingly, dialectical, sensitive to past 
certainties and future possibilities. As Adorno (cited in Held) states. 'only an 
essentially undialectlcal philosophy ... could maintain that the old problems could 
simply be removed by forgetting them and starting fresh from the beginning'49. 
Freire is adamant that critical consciousness emerges out of what he caBs dialogical 
relationships between teacher and taught, and that in this reciprocating process both 
learn. But of cours~, however democratic or non-hierarchical, however non-didactic, 
it cannot be anything other than the teacher having an agenda, a path, w~ich is th.e 
preferred one to follow. Unless Freire is in favour of solipsism - which he IS not-It 
is difficult to see how conscientisation as an invitation to 'the people to grasp with 
their minds the truth ot their reality'~o can avoid issues of ontology ('reality') and 
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epistemology ('truth') raised by such a definition. Of course, conscientisation does 
have a priori categories with which it explains the human condition and in this sense it 
is the same as any other coherent body of theory and knowledge. It is impossible to 
der.y the directionality behind critical consciousness; since it regards consciousness as 
a human capacity which should be developed it can only do this if it breaks from 
solipsism. Critical consciousness is accordingly an attempt directly to confront 
ideological (and hence 'distorted') knowledge and the associated limitations on 
consciousness. Because it accepts the material basis of personal troubles, 
conscientisation inevitably accords an epistemologically privileged status to certain 
kinds of causal accounts of those troubles. 
In establishing the merit of'naming' problems in terms of the communality of many 
misfortunes - the universal in the particular once again - we can strengthen and give 
substance to often tentative and inchoate 'feelings' of ill ease. Through continued 
criticism and reconstruction, the partiality of perspectives can be progressively 
overcome. 
The Burden of Knowing 
Somewhere Freud says that the objective of therapy is not to create a euphoric cure, 
but merely to render neurosis as everyday unhappiness. The charge that might be 
levelled at critical consciousness is that it too expands the linguistic and cognitive 
horizons to the extent that it raises dilemmas or moral imperatives for action which 
were hitherto shrouded. The oppressed are now aware of the circumstances which 
bring about their oppression, and this, it might be argued, merely compounds their 
misery. Ignorance, If not exactly bliss, is at least comforting. 
Two objections might be made here: one is that ignorance is often miserable and 
that many conditions of distress arise from a dissonance between what is felt and 
what is capable of linguistic articulation. Secondly, the process of knowing might 
itself offer the prospect of action designed to solve the problem not previously 
recognised. Critical consciousness clarifies issues for the actor, even if it expands the 
existential burden. There is also something faintly sinister, or at least rather arrogant, 
about keeping people in ignorance of what has befallen them, though this, of course, is 
not to deny that the matter should be handled with sensitivity and an awareness of the 
'teachable moment'. Critical consciousness opens up the prospect of corrective (and 
ethical) action for those who hitherto regarded themselves (and were seen by others) 
. as crudely determined automata. As with Socrates (and more prosaically with 
psychodynamic psychology) such an approach cries out that the unexamined life is 
not worth living. There just might be, then, a moral imperative which speaks of 
supplanting mere being-in-the-world with a more reflexive awareness of that world. 51 
That \I.'hich is hidden can more easily mystify, breaking through the veneer of 
'adjustment', 'civilisation' or 'contentment'. It constitutes the nameless dread which 
rules the person. 
Social work's pursuit of subjectivity and its commitment to life enhancement 
should therefore suggest that involvement with cO!1sciousness could figure more 
explicitly in how 'intervention' is approached. A technicist concern with service 
delivery, whilst eminently rational, effectively shifts social work from a moral-
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humanist discourse to one which is concerned with instrumental reason, with 
allocation, regulation and, all too often, client-objectification. The cultural tradition 
wherein moral-practical insight serves as a clarification of ho\\' the subject might act 
rationally to solve particular problems has been supplanted by a more empirical, 
objectivist approach52. And this is not just the province of the 'technicist right', with 
its mania for 'efficiency'. It has a broader cultural momentum than political allegiance 
alone allows: one has only to reflect (perhaps with embarrassment) on the way in 
which, not so very long ago, Case-Con ridiculed 'case work', crudely substituting the 
discourse of subjectivity for that of materialism, economism and superficiality. 
superficiality. 
Conclusion 
I have here concentrated more upon the linguistic and cognitive focus of 
conscientIsation than upon the means of testing the adequacy of the new knowledge 
arising from critical consciousness. And of course, 'linguistic formulation' may not be 
enough, it needs to be accompanied by reoeated corrective experience, (the equivalent 
of 'working through ,)53. Systematic evaluations of this process are not yet available, 
though there are accounts of the related consciousness raising employed by feminist 
social workers54 . But - in defence of 'speculative contemplation' - what has been 
outlined here is a pedagogic device as much as a theory of practice. My concern has 
been to show the fundamental place that critical consciousness might have within the 
purposes of social work - admittedly conceived in somewhat abstract essence rather 
than in agency practice, but offering nonetheless at least a snippet on how the activity 
might be constituted as an occupational and ethical project for students and clients 
alike. Conscientisation shares with social work 'proper' a humanising, actualising, 
problem solving and emancipatory concern. lfsocial work is about these processes, 
then there is no reason why critical consciousness should not be admitted to the fold. 
I have tried then to set out some of the principles behind conscientisation and the 
way in which it arguably addresses a fundamentalist constituency within social work 
as well as a more self consciously radical one. Its application - its morality if you like 
- also resonates with a principled commitment to the individual's right to an 
authentic rather than deformed sense of self. The goal of the critical sciences (into 
which one might place at least 'my' version of social work) is to dissolve barriers to the 
self-conscious development oflife. Critical consciousness is not a fancy meta-method 
that subsumes all within it~ it does not claim to summarise practice, but rather to 
'radiate througn me work we do in whatever ways that are pOSSible' in such a way as 
to infuse what generally occurs in everyday social work. 
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4 The mezzo level: conduits of care 
- welfare organizations and the 
supervisory State 
'Whilst [social services] departments are not simply outcrop's of 
some universal self-generating bureaucracy neither are they 
assocIatIOns of uncontrolled self-supporting "professionals". 
Whilst they are not simple obedient agents of sotial control, neither 
are they unrestrained instigators of social change.' 
(Brunel Institute of Organization and Social Studies 1974: 19) 
'Probation work is a clear example of a marginal occupation. 
Probation officers are in an ambiguous position with regard to two 
systems of control: the legal and the social services ... The pro-
bation officer is frequently caught among the wishes and demands 
of probationer, judge, department administrators, police, social 
service agencies, and influential members of the community.' 
(Thomson 1984: 111) 
The deviant, disadvantaged, or distressed may experience welfare 
work through particular encounters with specific workers which they 
may characterize as helpful or not, useful or not, and so on. But the 
nature and content of these encounters emerge not only from the 
personal characteristics of the workers, but also from the policies, 
practices, priorities, resources, and culture of the bureaucracies which 
employ them. Organizations variously constrained to meet need, 
censure the wayward, and contain the disagreeable will formulate 
workload priorities for their staff in ways which most readily show 
them to be discharging their mandate in a manner pleasing not only 
to employees and clients but also to the various outside interests which 
influence their activities. The time to be spent on particular problems, 
the interpretation of permissive legislation, the procedures to be 
followed in specific instances, the resources available for various 
provisions - home helps, meals on wheels, intermediate treatment, 
day centres - all reflect policies which, though possibly influenced by 
the professional staff, are by no means determined by them. Yet 
decisions of this kind impact profoundly on the nature of the 
experiences of the clients as they sit, in the interviewing room or at 
home, with their welfare workers. 
Equally, as employing agencies the organizations exercise different 
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levels of control over their st~ff acco~ding t~ the n~ture ?r politicality 
of the work they may be domg. QUite obvIOusly m child protection 
cases all social services departments have procedures, manuals and 
. . , 
close momtonng arrangements at both inter- and intra-organizational 
levels, and the matter is also very seriously addressed in probation 
offices. That such prioritization reflects principally external pressure 
need hardly be emphasized: children who may be at risk of violence, 
after all, receive so much more urgent attention than, say, elderly· 
people who may be at equal or greater risk of self-injury that simple 
humanitarian concern cannot be an adequate explanation. This 
vulnerability to outside pressure of welfare organizations - social 
services departments in particular - is the central theme of this 
chapter. It is a matter which extends beyond the area of child abuse 
to permeate also the agencies' responses to a wide range of duties, 
among them the supervision of young offenders. 
As David Howe has observed, then, we cannot decontextualize 
professional practice from the organizations within which it takes 
place: it does not have a separate life of its own (Howe 1986). A similar 
point can be made about the impact of the agencies on the supervision 
orders made by the court, and which their staff have to manage. A 
supervision order, though it originates in the juvenile court, takes its 
meaning from the organizational processes which turn it into reality: 
it is not only what the court orders but also .what the supervisors do. 
It is an almost universal experience for tensions to emerge, covert 
practices to develop in relation to the management of the orders, and 
various forms of occupational deviance to occur (Pearson 1975a, 
1975b). Although some of the deviance may reflect private activities 
by the front-liners who supervise the orders, it would be naive to 
assume that the non-reporting of undetected offences and the failure 
to return to court recalcitrant clients, for example, are anything but 
implicitly if not explicitly sanctioned activities within the agencies 
themselves. 
But the matter is not simple. The organization does have its 
differences with the court, which mean that the latter frequently fails 
to get what it wants from the supervision order. At the level of 
practice, the organization makes particular demands of its front-line 
workers. But different and contradictory processes also occur which 
undercut the transformational impact of the organization itself. First, 
in relation to the courts, though squabbles and manipulations of the 
kind we have been describing are indeed everyday occurrences, 
behind them lies a broad consensus which ensures that the disputes 
take place against a background of shared assumptions about the very 
nature of delinquency. More precisely, courts and agencies are the 
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products of those assumptions, their very existence and meaning 
being framed within a discourse which, for example, takes delin-
quency to be an individual act requiring individualized treatment. It 
is in this sense that the agencies convey as well as transform ideology, and we 
explore the issue as the first of two themes to be developed in the next 
section. 
The second of these themes involves the analysis of the organiza-
tions themselves, sui generis, as open systems variably vulnerable to 
pressures from different external sources, but also containing within 
themselves a conflict of traditions - notably between the Poor Law 
and autonomous professionalism - which is worked out in practice 
between competing operational models of agency service and 
independent practice. By separately discussing social services depart-
ments and the probation service we shall show that whereas the latter 
has effected a feasible resolution of this problem, social services 
departments remain vulnerable both to attack from without and to 
dissension from within. 
The welfare organization, then, is neither a passive container of 
active professionals nor a force which destroys professionalism itself. 
If, as Maurice Kogan and James Terry have observed, one does not 
want (we would say need) professionals to act as professionals, one 
would hardly go to the trouble of employing them (Kogan and Terry 
1971); hence David Howe overstates the matter when he suggests that 
the organization 'determines' practice (Howe 1986); it clearly 
emerges from the organization but exists in a dynamic relationship 
with the demands of managers. In this chapter we trace the line 
through court mandate, organizational imperative, and agency prac-
tice as a means of accounting for the nature of the supervisory prac-
tices we observed in our study. 
At this point, however, we must confront a particular linguistic 
problem. We have been speaking, and shall continue to speak, of 'the 
organization', or 'the agency' as though to imply both that it 
represents an homogeneous, even organic, whole, and that the front-
line worker is somehow outside of it. This is not our intention: any 
complex organization contains conflicts both among different levels of 
staff and different categories of staff - between senior and middle 
management, for example, and between the professionals and the 
administrators. Equally, to address the front-liner, the person is within 
this melee, both influencing and influenced by it. When in this book 
we speak of 'the organization' we shall be referring to the formal 
policies and less formal official expectations which emerge from it and 
which may be subverted at any level. This, we know, is unsatisfactory 
to the organizational theorist, but we can only plead that one has to 
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draw the boundary somewhere, and our boundary reflects the fact 
that our main interest in welfare organizations is in the extent to which 
their policies and norms have a transformational effect on the court 
order, and the ways in which thos~ policies and norms are passed on 
to and further transformed by the front-liners~ Readers with a more 
detailed interest in welfare organizations will doubtless look elsewhere 
for fuller discussion (see, for example, Billis 1984; Blau and Scott 
1963; Brager and Holloway 1978; Hardiker and Barker 1981: ch. 4; 
Hasenfeld and English 1974; Kakabadse 1982). 
Welfare organizations: two themes 
Welfare organizations as carriers oj ideology: when the juvenile court makes 
an order transferring responsibility for the management of a youngster 
to a welfare agency, it effectively removes that youngster's social label 
of 'defendant', replacing it with a new label, 'client'. We know that 
to the already stigmatized the process of 'becoming a client' is 
typically further stigmatizing (Rees 1978; Page 1984), and that the 
positive professional ideologies of 'respect' and 'confidentiality', for 
example, are constantly undermined by the status, history, and 
function of the agencies of which the professionals are a part. Clients 
bring expectations to their encounter with the agency which reflect 
their folk-knowledge of that agency, its predecessors, its existing 
clientele, even the building in which it is housed - the spectre of the 
'Bastille', for example, has repeatedly haunted former workhouses to 
whatever subsequent use they may have been put. As a general 
principle, the more stigmatized, the closer to the residuum, a 
particular client is, the more he or she is likely to perceive the agencies 
in negative, censorious terms. 
Stereotypes are not, of course, immune to change, and are 
repeatedly modified or confirmed by the day-to-day practices which 
occur within those parts of the organization which the new client 
encounters (see, for example, Hall 1974). But a folk history of stigma, 
back through national assistance to public assistance and the 'means 
test man', is not easily erased, and nor, given the residual income 
maintenance functions which the social services department at least 
has assumed, is there strong reason why it should be (Handler 1973). 
To develop this point somewhat we return to the Charity Organiz-
ation Society, whose rationalism we mentioned in Chapter 2, as a case 
study in the developing culture of the welfare agency. 
The Charity Organization Society (COS), founded in 1869, 
represented a point of convergence of two contradictory trends .in 
Victorian thinking: the concern to give alms to the poor for the relief 
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of distress, and the belief that to do so undermined the moral qualities 
necessary for personal success (Stedman-Jones 1971). The COS was 
in part t~e philosophi~~ c~il~ of the revisionist philosophy of John 
Stuart Mlll, whose Utz!ztananzsm had been published in 1861, and to 
whom the Greatest Happiness Principle was no private psychology 
but encapsulated higher social duties which included charity: 
'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; 
better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the 
fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only 
know their own side of the question. The other party to the 
comparison knows both sides.' (Mill 1861: ch. 2) 
But of at least equal influence on the society were those thinkers such 
as Barnett and Lock, whose acceptance of the more stringent tenets 
of classical Utilitarianism remained generally firm. Indeed the 
society's early years and predominant influence coincided precisely 
with the popularity of Samuel Smiles, whose Self-Help had first 
appeared in 1859, but whose later books, Character (1871), Thrift 
(1875), and Duty (1887) were yet to come. The society, in short, 
operated within a profoundly individualistic frame of reference. 
But the danger remained that, corrupted by the example of the 
clever pauper ingeniously extracting funds from the emotionally 
vulnerable wealthy, the labouring classes would become demoralized 
and diverted from life's stern disciplining. To give, according to this 
ascetic approach, required not an emotional response to the 
apparently simple property of destitution, but a 'scientific' reaching 
beyond the observable, to assess the person beyond the facade, to 
judge the genuineness and character of the supplicant. This was 
revealed best by a historical or biographical account of the person's 
pathway to the present: how past vicissitudes had been conquered; 
how far previous moral fecklessness had contributed to present misfor-
tune; what balance existed between catastrophe and complicity in this 
person's impecuniousness. Biography became essential to assess 
character and evaluate signs of progress or resolve. Where such signs 
were apparent the reward was a charity which, unlike admission to the 
workhouse, left relatively intact the supplicant's civil and citizenship 
rights. 
Hence in that private forerunner of State welfare provision, a 
system of files, records, and documentation emerged not for either 
benign professional or neutral administrative reasons so much as with 
a view to moral accountancy. The evaluation of a claim needed no 
longer to depend upon the moment of contact with the agency - the 
nature of the problem, the appearance of the supplicant - but 
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extended into a cumulative picture of this person's achievements 
previo~s disbursements received, and so on. The power of the agenc; 
hence Incorporated past as :vel~ as p~e~ent mor~ity, and a morality 
exhumed by personal questIOnIng, VISIts, enqUIries of relatives and 
neighbours. But even though knowledge of claimants was central to 
the application of professional power, it was but the other side of the 
coin from the agency's concern for the acuity of its staff, so that what 
was known and recorded reflected an 'objective' truth, not some 
personal idiosyncracy of the person who knew and recorded it. 
Emphasis upon functional roles rather than the individuals occupying 
them marked the bureaucratization of welfare. . 
The Charity Organization Society represents an ideal type of the 
transformation of charitable or philanthropic endeavour into a 
tutelary process. The regulation of the lives of the poor by monitoring 
and the giving or withholding of alms reflected not only the penetra-
tion of bourgeois values into the lives of the residuum but also, more 
subtly, a recognition of the fact that those values already existed 
among the respectable working class, and had to be inculcated in the 
undeserving poor: 
'it is a serious overestimation of the role of the state to assume that 
its sanctioning powers were the exclusive source of the social 
division between criminal and respectable. The strategy of mass 
imprisonment is better understood in class terms as an attempt by 
the authorities to lend symbolic reinforcement to values of personal 
honour which they themselves knew were indigenous to the poor.' 
(Ignatieff 1981: 174) 
Hence the COS involved not only colonizing the poor but also 
buttressing the honour of the respectable by delineating boundaries 
between them and the disreputable; a process, in short, of classific-
ation. But it is by studying the form rather than the content of the 
society's activities that we can glean a better understanding of 
contemporary welfare organizations - the accumulation of knowledge 
by, and its transmission among, people who are functionally inter-
changeable; the creation thereby ofthe reification or objectification of 
that knowledge; the link between knowledge and power; knowledge 
which is 'special', or expertly processed, remote somewhat from the 
discourse of the laity. 
In spite of the COS's eclipse by the collectivist responses to social 
need of the twentieth century, there remain sufficient numbers of 
'residual' problems to justify the continued individualization of 
supplicants. So the COS's legacy is principally that of method: the 
holding of information on individuals, the establishing of files and 
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cases, the s~cial histo:r all continue, and testify to the Society's role 
as a progemtor of ratIOnal and bureaucratic welfarism. The individ-
ualism and uniqueness of each case were established through the 
mechanisms of assessment and classification; the eschewing of the 
impressionistic and the endorsement of privileged knowledge 
prefigured the later experts, even if arcane psyknowledge (Donzelot 
1980) had not yet taken the place of the moral certainties of 
characterology . 
But the reality of the COS's power lay not so much in its vaunted 
rationality as in the vast gap which existed between rational theory 
and capricious practice. Certainly to its supplicants, .'cringe or starve' 
seemed the choice, a phrase which itself encapsulates a view of a 
disjunction between rational and fair ideal and moralistic and 
arbitrary reality. The COS's agents seldom if ever attained the 
wisdom of Solomon, and such wisdom, such omnicompetence, would 
have been essential were they to have made correctly the kind of 
judgements which they claimed the legitimacy to make. Rather, the 
very capriciousness of the almsgiving heightened the power of the 
donor and weakened that of the recipient. Capriciousness destroys 
certainty, the linearity of cause and effect, the process by which all the 
players know the rules. Capriciousness meant that the only option 
open to the poor was to apologize, to assume they had erred, to repent 
- in short, to cringe. 
Now the purpose of this case study is not to suggest in some simple 
way that no 'progress' has been made; that the moralism of the society 
permeates the professionals oftoday. But nor can the agencies of today 
quite divest themselves of either the method or the purpose of the 
COS. In method, as we have seen, they replicate and extend the 
doctrine of individualization in terms both of professional practice 
(collecting social histories, noting detailed explanations of events) and 
of organizational procedures (caseloads, allocations, flies which 
render the professionals interchangeable, which make knowledge the 
property of the agency). In purpose they classify, process, judge, and 
act upon judgements to the extent that any professional ideology of 
'non-judgementalism' is circumscribed almost out of existence into 
philosophical approaches barely sustainable in practice (see, for 
example, Stalley 1978). Of course judgements must be made, and 
they must have social consequences: how could it be otherwise when 
resources have to be allocated responsibly and accountably; when 
private information innocently given may form the basis of a report 
to a court? How can knowledge not be power, and how, converse.l~, 
can the possession of power not lead to the demand for, and acqUlsI-
tion of, knowledge? That the practice is carried out courteously and 
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COS. In method, as we have seen, they replicate and extend the 
doctrine of individualization in terms both of professional practice 
(collecting social histories, noting detailed explanations of events) and 
of organizational procedures (caseloads, allocations, flies which 
render the professionals interchangeable, which make knowledge the 
property of the agency). In purpose they classify, process, judge, and 
act upon judgements to the extent that any professional ideology of 
'non-judgementalism' is circumscribed almost out of existence into 
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to a court? How can knowledge not be power, and how, converse.l~, 
can the possession of power not lead to the demand for, and acqUIsl-
tion of, knowledge? That the practice is carried out courteously and 
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in a friendly manner is of itself desirable; but the means by which it is 
done cannot deflect the reason why it is done. 
The agencies constitute a process of bureaucratizing their clients' 
lives consistently with these methods and purposes. Problems, needs 
~ri~~phs,. failures .become translated. into 'file' knowledge: 
mdividualIzed and dIslocated from the wIder social and economic 
processes which generate them. It is in this sense that the agencies 
regulate disruptions in public order, that they transfer the ideology of 
delinquency from courtroom back into society, where by processes of 
monitoring, befriending, cajoling, and generally making work for idle 
hands they seek to impose good behaviour on that minute proportion 
of young offenders who come their way. But the irony of this 
individualization is that it is itself an organizational routine: when 
everybody is individualized, nobody is individualized, and the 
ultimate logic of file-knowledge is the identical processing of 
innumerable cases: interchangeable clients dealt with by inter-
changeable professionals. 
There is also a sense in which the internal structure of the organiz-
ation can reproduce, legitimize, and consolidate the allocation of 
more general social roles. One of these is the issue of gender. A 
majority of front-liners are women, subordinated to male managers, 
but also, by virtue of their necessary contact with clients, conveying 
a particular imagery of what women 'do'. The imagery is ambiguous; 
at one moment women may be seen as responsible for this part of the 
apparatus of control, at another as softening the control itself by being 
interposed between it and the people being so controlled (Heidensohn 
1985: 172-73). The ambiguity reflects, "therefore, not only the 
paradoxes of welfare which we have discussed, but also broader 
paradoxes to do with the dualisms embedded in women's social roles. 
It is in these ways that welfare organizations are conduits of care. 
They share the court's individualistic perception of delinquency; they 
reflect that perception in their own structure and practices; and the 
historical tradition in which they are located is predominantly (though 
not exclusively) negative: the Poor Law and police court heritages of 
the two agencies have been too little acknowledged by commentators. 
The agencies' procedures operate too at a level of irony: as we have 
seen, to individualize the person behind each face queuing up in the 
waiting room is such a routine procedure that its consequence is to 
individualize no one. 
Within the organization, however, exist two contradictory elements 
which modulate this function of conveying ideology. First, although 
the ideologies of individualism held by the court are indeed ~arried 
into the supervisory process, at an operational level there eXIst the 
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conflicts and jealousies, the suspicions, to which we have earlier 
alluded and which militate against the possibility of a closely collusive 
relationship between court and agency. The practicalities of the day-
to-day management of a statutory order differ markedly from the 
practicalities of passing sentence and having done with it, and almost 
inevitably lead to elements of concealment and minor deviance. , 
equally the role of the organization differs from and is in some respects 
more restricted than that of the juvenile court: the former has no 
deterrent or prophylactic mandate, for example, and the exercise by 
the court of its powers in a punitive way not infrequently engenders 
hostility within the agencies. Further, the agencies are even less 
concerned with what the offender has done than with what he or she 
is. So embedded in the juvenile justice system is the welfare agency, 
of course, that this is no qualitative shift: that comes earlier in the 
process, usually at the moment the police decide to take action and a 
kindly, concerned juvenile bureau officer knocks on the front door. 
But though at this later stage the sentencing act which creates a 
tutelary process is a quantitative not a qualitative shift, a shift it never-
theless is, as the court's action becomes a springboard for further 
interventions of a kind which, as we shall later see, are somewhat 
un predictable. 
The second conflict is that between the negative stereotyping and 
the professional value and aspiration of the front-liners. The organiz-
ations, it will be recalled, are not simple successors of poor law 
provisions, but contain within them different, contradictory traditions 
based on professional counselling and quasi-therapeutic child care 
theories. These traditions are embedded in -the professional ideologies 
of the front-liners themselves and reinforced in their training (which, 
to make the point even more explicitly, is usually studiously referred 
to as 'education and training'). The struggle of the professionals, 
whose motivation is on the whole benign and ameliorative rather than 
controlling, to carve for themselves a 'space to care' in an organization 
which all too often seems antithetical to such an objective (Hardiker 
and Barker 1981) is a matter to which we shall return later . Welfare 
work is, however, an 'interstitial profession which serves both the 
client in need and society at large' (Compton and Galaway 1975: 
472), and, in that it serves the former only to the extent permitted it 
and in the manner laid down for it by those representatives of the latter 
who employ its practitioners, its capacity to provide for its clients in 
the way those practitioners might wish is considerably restricted. 
Welfare organizations as open systems: if the Charity Organization Society 
represents for us a paradigmatic instance of the links between 
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organizations, ideologies, and the social structure, it will be obvious 
that similar links exist today. Welfare organizations are part of a 
broader social context and penetrated by a range of external 
~nfluences (E. Ro~erts 1~82~ Ha~diker and Barker 1981). These 
mfluences affect thelr functlOnmg at levels both of policy and practice, 
and though they cannot be said to determine all such policies and prac-
tices (complex human organizations being notoriously immune to any 
such certainties), they do impact upon them profoundly: . 
'An open system exists, and can only exist, by exchanging materials 
with its environment. It imports materials, trans.forms them by 
means of conversion processes, consumes some of the products of 
conversion for internal maintenance, and exports the rest. Directly 
or indirectly, it exchanges its outputs for further intakes, including 
further resources to maintain itself. These import-conversion-
export processes are the work the enterprise has to do if it is to live. ' 
(Miller and Rice 1967: 3) 
So while to the professional supervising the delinquent, the desired 
output might be either the psychically adjusted or the materially 
better-off client, with a reduction in delinquency having less 
centrality, to the impinging systems the desired export is reformed ex-
delinquents. That such a demand is unrealistic will be obvious; 
equally obvious from our own argument thus far will be that, unlike 
the manufacturing system which produces commodities attuned to the 
demands of the environment or it perishes, the welfare organization 
is not dependent on this kind of 'success' for survival, because it fulfUs 
certain social functions by its very failure: it intrudes, classifies, 
monitors. But surviving by failing is an uncomfortable way of earning 
a living and leads to a range of strategies which we begin to describe 
in our next section. For the moment, however, our concern is with the 
nature and level of the demands of the environment on the organiz-
ations. They exist at two levels - the level of broad socio-political realities 
and precise legislative sanction. The relationship between the two is a 
complex matter beyond our present scope, and details of the agency 
sanction afforded both social services departments and the probation 
service are available elsewhere (see, for example, Jarvis 1974; G. 
Roberts 1981). Our concern here is with the nature of the relationship 
between the welfare organizations and the broader socio-political 
realities which impinge upon them. 
At this point we introduce two illuminatory concepts. First, 
Dingwall, Eekelaar, and Murray have helpfully presented the 
organizational task as a charter, a notion embodying a fusion of the 
legislative and the interpretive: 
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'By establishing governing charters under the control of the public 
or their elected representatives, state intrusion into citizen's [sic] 
homes may be legitimated. The chain of moral accountability is the 
essential corollary of the preservation ofliberal ideals. Inasmuch as 
it is broken or eroded, surveillance becomes oppressive rather than 
facilitative, coercive rather than regulatory .... While the profes-
sional has only to square his or her conscience, the bureaucrat or 
bureau-professional must attend to a line of external constraint. 
(Dingwall, Eekelaar, and Murray 1983: 120-21) 
The charter defines not only the framework of rights and duties which 
constitute agencies' sanction, but also a set of roles they must play and 
judgements they must make. It will be recalled that of their essence 
these judgements are not always amenable to rule-making, nor can 
they be in some rationalist way value-free. The essence of a child 
abuse scandal may well not be simply incompetence (though that is 
not to deny its existence) but a different interpretation of the charter 
between members of the organization and its environment: it is, after 
all, one thing to export an unreformed and unrepentant delinquent, 
quite another to export a dead child. But when, as in such an instance, 
a charter embodies the necessity of a judgement being made among 
competing values or conflicting rights, in the absence of clear and 
broadly accepted operational guidelines the outcome must be 
acrimony, uncertainty, and variant decision-making. Jasmine 
Beckford may have been a child in trust (Elom-Cooper 1985), but the 
balance in a charter between the child protective duty and the duty 
to respect family rights is easier determin~d with the benefit of hind-
sight than at the time. Hence this comment: 
'While our personal conclusion must be that agency staff are over-
respectful of parental liberties and that "justice for children" may 
require more rather than less state intervention, we recognise that 
these deficiencies, by our standard, do not represent failings by the 
individual agencies so much as the inherent limitations of the 
licences and charters which we, as citizens, have granted to them. ' 
(Dingwall, Eekelaar, and Murray 1983: 207) 
But the idea of a charter means that individual welfare workers cannot 
legitimately shirk the controlling functions mandated to their agency, 
whether they involve child protection, the management of community 
service orders, or the supervision of young offenders. They may, of 
course, lobby to change the charter, but pending change, or if they are 
unsuccessful, they are obliged to do their duty. It is in this se~se ~~t 
welfare work exists within a preordained discourse out of whIch It IS 
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an idealist illusion to pretend there is a path (Webb 1981; and from 
a different perspective, Davies 1985). 
The se.con.d concept is that of organizational resolve. The charter given 
to orgamzauons does not represent any broad social consensus, nor 
is it always clear. Both probation 'and social services agencies are 
subject to conflicting pressures and demands - the latter, as we shall 
show, very much more than the former - and out of the plethora of 
external pressures and internal conflicts not only about specifics but 
also, existentially, about the entire nature of the enterprise of welfare, 
the mass of people who ultimately comprise the organization have by 
some means to determine, negotiate, or have imposed upon them a 
set of operational policies and practices by means of which to tackle 
the tasks and fulfil the roles embodied in their charter. The extent to 
which this is done we term organizational resolve: it is that which 
brings an organization to approach a particular problem in a 
particular way, which determines how far the different levels and 
types of workers who make up the organization agree about the 
purpose and method of an intervention; how far conflicts can be 
contained; how far there is goodness of fit between the organizational 
practices and the demands of the environment which receives the 
organization's exports (Kakabadse 1982). In looking at, successively, 
probation and social services agencies, we shall show that organiz-
ational resolve is a useful vehicle by which to analyse certain 
similarities and differences between them. 
So all welfare organizations contain conflicting models of service 
delivery, and it is preferable to analyse what might otherwise, and 
more individualistically have to be interpreted as coincidental mass 
incompetence in terms of organizational or structural factors of this 
kind, For example, in our study of supervision orders (Harris and 
Webb 1983; Webb and Harris 1984) we saw on the part of social 
workers in particular an apparent abdication of control which 
reflected more than anything a conflict between the preconstituted 
role of welfare work which we described in the last section and the 
'professional' ideology of practice of the front-liners; a disjunction, 
that is to say, between an agency service and an independent practice model 
of service delivery, the one reflecting hierarchical models of account-
ability, the other autonomous social workers acting in a client-centred 
way on the basis of professional values and knowledge. Although i~ 
the day-to-day world a truce can often be sustained between them, It 
is by definition at points of difficulty that the cracks appear, and stark 
choices are presented to workers between what should be done (for 
which knowledge they might draw on books of practical ethics, such 
as Leighton, Stalley, and Watson 1982, or Rhodes 1986), and what 
98 
The mezzo level: conduits of care 
the agency's charter decrees must be done. This conflict accounts in 
part for the sense of alienation among social workers in particular 
detected by researchers (DHSS 1978; Hadley and Hatch 1981; 
Glastonbury 1982). . 
I~ orga?izatio~al resolve is vulnerable to th~se conflicting ideologies 
(whIch hIde behmd them fundamental questions such as 'what kind 
of social worker am I? ') it is vulnerable also to two further and related 
matters. The first lies in the very answer to the question just posed: 
'what kind of social worker am I?' has numerous possible answers 
which range from community activist to overt social controller. Hence 
the diversity of answer which can be given - and justifiably given as 
well as theoretically defended given welfare work's abundant 
pluralism - leads to yet further questioning, an overarching Angst 
which finds its expression in occupational uncertainty and an acute 
awareness of the paradox involved in working for a profession which 
is so singularly unable even to define what it does. 
Then also comes the matter of professional knowledge, which 
contributes to welfare work's relatively low insulation from lay 
opinion. Seen by some as censorious interlopers and by others as paid 
excusers of moral failure, welfare workers are ready scapegoats for 
numerous ills. Those who claim expertise in the intangible domains 
of relationships, parenting, and delinquency will inevitably clash with 
a culture which expects of its experts certainty and specific output. 
'Everybody' knows something of the concerns of welfare work, and, 
as we remarked before, sometimes claims greater prescriptive 
certainty than the experts themselves. There is no barrier of arcane 
knowledge, no agreed expertise. 
Such realities impinge variously on the two agencies. For the pro-
bation service the matter, though not simple, is the less fraught. Linked 
as it is through employing committees dominated by local magistrates 
to the Home Office of central government, the service stands largely 
outside of the more volatile politics of local government. As that arm 
of the criminal justice and penal systems which reaches out to the 
world of reformation and community control it does, of course, have 
acute and painful dilemmas with which its practitioners grapple 
(Harris 1977), and the dilemmas have their echoes in equivalent 
services overseas: hence Fogel notes that 'The struggle to disentangle 
help from control is ubiquitous in Western Europe' (Fogel 1984), and 
Conrad that 'no one person should attempt to combine surveillance 
and service ... these two functions must not be assigned to the same 
agency' (Conrad 1984). But of course such a move - however concep-
tually neat or professionally desirable one might think it to be - woul~ 
leave probation with the need to be given a new charter; and as It 
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happens, the 1980s have seen the English and Welsh probation service 
resolve its conflicts n.ot by. separation ~f functi~n but by the develop-
ment of a new operatlOnalideology whIch has sIgnificantly heightened 
its org.anizational resolve. T~e devel?p~ent, described in Chapter 2, 
of the Ideology of decarceratlOn has provIded a common denominator 
between the professionals and the managers (Boswell 1985). Though 
there remain pressures from many probation officers to reven to a 
more 'caring' service, these now appear to have little political· 
influence in the face of pressure and resource allocation which are 
designed to further the objective of decarceration (Haxby 1978). The 
controlling probation service sought in the mid-1970s·by the revolu-
tionary tactics of the Younger Report has, then, arrived more 
gradually, encouraged by the selective allocation of resources. Hence 
the service's general adherence to the demands of the Statement of 
National Objectives and Priorities (Home Office 1984) has ensured a 
relative lack of conflict with the Home Office. At a more local level, 
though relations with courts vary, and there is a particular problem 
to do with the use of recommendations in social enquiry reports, the 
service generally has come to be seen as providing a useful resource 
for courts. It has, therefore, been able to secure substantially more 
organizational resolve than has generally been the case with the social 
services departments. 
Social services departments, unlike the probation service, are not deeply 
penetrated by a single system, but rather encounter an abundance of 
demands, many of them conflicting - from elected members of the 
local authority, members of the public, community activists, the local 
Press, and voluntary organizations in particular. Their position, as 
bureau-professional organizations within the local authority sector 
dealing with politically fraught issues of rights and duties makes them 
highly visible. Whereas the Home Office is nothing if not cautiously 
conservative, local government can be volatile. Elected members may 
take a back seat in professional matters but they may lead from the 
front; they may see the department as a vehicle for a front-line attack 
on racism, sexism, capitalism, or the nuclear arms race (for examples 
of some of these hopes for it see Jordan and Parton 1983); or they may 
regard it as a necessary evil, to be starved of resources in order to 
facilitate fixing a low rate. They may have views on residential care, 
trans-racial fostering and adoption, the involvement of the 
community in the care of the elderly; they may initiate or opposejo~t­
funded projects with the National Health Service; they may det~rmme 
research and training priorities for their staff as well as recrUltment 
policies. 
This vulnerability reflects two issues, not only the politicality of the 
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location of social services, but also the weakness of the framing of 
welfare as a professional activity. Since, as we have already observed 
boundaries do not blur in one direction only, the lack of definitio~ 
within the sphere of the ~ocial (Donzelot 1980) which encourages 
ma~ y welfare workers not Just to help the poor bu t to attack poverty, 
notJust to protect but to seek to extend clients' 'rights', equally leaves 
welfare work vulnerable to penetration from outside. And the social 
services department is particularly well placed (a privilege it increas-
ingly shares with the education department) to become a political foot-
ball. The issue of community social work is a case in point: 
'First, there are those who believe that it could ·be mobilised into 
political pressure groups to obtain a massive increase in statutory 
resources. Secondly, there are those who believe that the 
community model would generate a sufficient volume of informal 
care services to justify drastic cuts in statutory funding.' 
(Pinker 1982: 261) 
These conflicting pulls, this politicality, are both cause and conse-
quence of a lack of organizational resolve within the departments 
themselves. 
But in addition to being, by their nature and location, thus 
permeable to multiple influences from without, social services depart-
ments face uncertainty and dissension from within. One source of 
uncertainty is the very multiplicity of the duties enshrined in the 
charter. There is a plethora of goals, of competing demands, and the 
combination of infinite need and finite resources can become 
organizationally debilitating to the extent thai: the work is never done; 
further, the fact that to address one need is to set aside another leads 
to yet more pressure from the set-aside clients. Such is the nature of 
social workers' own commitment to ideals, that the pressure is quite 
liable to be orchestrated from within the departments themselves by 
those front-liners who seek to champion the cause of the neglected 
clientele. 
It is aspects of this nature of social work which lead to the second 
source of dissension from within. Drawing as they do on the 
American-influenced model of independent professionalism, social 
workers typically take on their clients' battles as their own, sometimes 
to the extent of seeing themselves actually penetrating their own 
employing agency as emissaries on their clients' behalf. Though all 
professionals will seek to influence some aspects of their activities, the 
impact of social workers' attempts to do so is considerable. This is 
partly, of course, because of the extent of it, but that is an effect more 
than a cause of the agency's vulnerability. The problem of knowledge-
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status is more central. Such is the competing range of theories abo t 
say, mental illness (all of them passed to social workers in simplifi~d 
form) that any debate about it will include one set of arguments in 
support of anti-psychiatry, another in support of the value of 
psychiatric symptomatology. Although neither side ever actually wins 
t~e argument, ~a.ch one pursues the case as though it is not only a 
dlfference of opmlOn but also a personal credo which is at stake. When 
the organizational charter includes an obligation to enforce sanctions· 
alongside an occupational disinclination to do so; when the status of 
the knowledge on which an instruction from a senior to a junior 
professional might be based is so doubtful; when theoretical debates 
are frequently mere metaphors for the expression of deep-seated 
ideological conflicts; when the most junior members of the organ-
ization claim autonomy for 'professional opinions', the potential for 
the convincing exercise of organizational resolve is not especially 
great. 
Conclusion 
As a conduit, the welfare organization represents the locus of a 
convergence of different and conflicting traditions; it embodies both 
conflict and consensus with the court. It effectively provides the means 
by which the logic of the individualization of criminality is taken to 
its natural conclusion - a form of supervision and control. But in 
carrying that ideology it in effect transforms it. This transformation 
is in part a reflection of the practicalities of managing people who have 
already proved to be unmanageable, and involves a series of accom-
modations to a reality which it would be beyond the court's sphere of 
knowledge to comprehend. But also it transforms as a result of a 
number of separate pressures to which it is subject - pressures both 
from outside the system and from its own professional staff. These 
external pressures impinge differently in kind and degree on the two 
welfare agencies, but create a situation of considerable instability for 
the social services department in particular. Internal stresses for the 
organization result from the clash oftraditions, the organizational and 
the professional, which, we have argued, take on different mani-
festations in the two agencies. In probation the conflict has been in 
good part resolved around the common objective of decarceration, an 
objective which simultaneously ensures the growth of the organization 
and provides a professional legitimation for probation offi<:ers 
themselves. But in social services departments there is no such devlce, 
and this lack, combined with the vastly larger and more complex 
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charter to which the organization works, creates a distinct lack of 
organizational resolve. That this problem presents acute difficulties 
not only for the organization, but also for the front-liners will become 
apparent in the next chapter. 
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5 The mIcro level: the experts at 
work 
'But, at the outset, we encounter this difficulty: Ought the mo~al 
reform to exclude the physical suffering and the shame which 
accompany punishment? If so, is the penal sanction to consist, not 
in the menace of an evil, but in the promise of a"good? The effect 
of such a proceeding, it is evident, would be completely to overturn 
the motives of conduct, since the worst part of conduct would be 
rewarded by especial care on the part of the State; untouched by 
any agency of physical suffering, the criminal would receive as the 
sole consequence of his crime, the privilege of gratuitous instruc-
tion.' (Garofalo 1914: 256) 
This chapter completes our conceptual analysis of the supervisory 
process by examining just what it is that the experts themselves do in 
their day-to-day encounters with their clientele. The chapter as a 
whole falls into two main parts: first we complement the argument in 
Chapter 4 that the intra-organizational conflicts within welfare 
agencies cause particular difficulties for the experts themselves, by 
exploring some of the ways in which the professionals experience and 
cope with what we term 'occupational uncertainty' (Webb and Harris 
1984). We then report empirical findings" which are relevant to our 
theme in this book. First we shall describe the clients themselves -
their class membership, offence behaviour, family patterns, school 
conduct, and the like - to defend empirically the argument that many 
of the people subject to supervision orders are really remarkably 
ordinary; and secondly we shall describe the rather different super-
visory practices of the two agencies responsible for managing the 
orders to illustrate just how capricious are the demands made of the 
youngsters themselves, how dependent not on their behaviour or 
needs, but on chance, the agency to which they have been allocated, 
and doubtless, within the agency the particular supervisor. 
By this means the empirical study parallels the theoretical exegesis 
of Chapters 3 and 4. Just as Chapter 3 demonstrated the imposition 
of arbitrary power over more and more offenders, so does the first part 
of the empirical report indicate the apparent, albeit implicit, 
censoriousness to which the supervisees are subject; and just as 
Chapter 4 showed how in practice that power was variably and 
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spasmodically implemented, how it was refracted through the filter of 
the agency to the extent that its reality was almost unrecognizable 
from the Foucaultesque theory of the matter, so do we see the objects of 
supervision by the two agencies subjected to significantly different 
expectations. . 
This chapter's empirical component relates to the boy offenders in 
our main sample; the subsample of girls, in relation to whom there are 
additional matters which also require addressing, is the subject matter 
of Chapter 6. 
Occupational uncertainty 
Welfare workers are subject to a cruel irony: what for many of them 
are the very reasons for their occupational existence - the alleviation 
of problems, the expression of altruism, a commitment to social justice 
- have been denounced as a sham, with welfare work itself held to be 
covert coercion, an ideological practice individualizing structural 
problems and blaming their victims. 
In the academic establishments where they are formulated, these 
criticisms are seldom that bald, but in the vulgarized form in which 
they are received by welfare workers they can easily appear destruc-
tive and demoralizing. Even community care, the epitome of 
deprofessionalization, returning power and responsibility to the 
people, becomes in this analysis a mere exercise in the extraction of 
yet more unwaged work from women. 
Nor, of course, is the political right any friend of welfare workers; 
indeed such is the revolutionary fervour "rhetorically attributed to 
them by some demagogues of the right that one might be forgiven for 
believing that the phrase 'social worker' has been inadvertently 
inserted in a speech intended to refer to the 'socialist worker'. But 
welfare work has also been arraigned not just on these moral and 
economic grounds but also as empirically ineffective and profession-
ally spurious (Brewer and Lait 1980). 
To neither set of criticisms can welfare workers make a confident 
reply; indeed the experience oflistening to them trying to explain and 
justify their existence to those outside their own professional and 
assumptive worlds is typically a dispiriting one. Doctors and lawyers 
find it, obviously enough, much simpler to say what they do - indeed 
everybody knows what they do; but beyond that they manage more 
straightforwardly to deal appropriately with the various conflicts of 
loyalty or crises of conscience which they encounter. Doctors have to 
deal individually with structurally caused diseases; lawyers have to 
prosecute defendants with whose position they are in personal or 
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political sympathy. But in these cases the professionals concerned 
develop coherent practices for dealing with such problems, and seem 
better able than welfare workers to separate the individual action from 
the issue to be raised with the professional association or in the 
correspondence columns of The Times. 
Welfare work is a more weakly framed activity, characterized less 
by coherence than by the necessary but conceptually unclear function 
of plugging gaps left by the more strongly framed activities of other 
professionals. Teachers, doctors, housing officials, and policemen all 
have relatively clear job descriptions but encounter problems in the 
lives of the people with whom they deal which, severe as they may be, 
fall outside that description: professionals should not normally, after 
all, become embroiled in matters outside either their competence or 
their jurisdiction. But welfare workers have no such circumscription: 
in particular cases they may be adjuncts to almost any of these 
professionals because their role may impinge on the functions of all of 
them. They may be interpreting what the other professionals are 
saying or exerting pressure on the professionals themselves to do 
something different; and they may be collecting evidence from others 
to take action consistent with their own statutory powers. They 
provide homes for the old and for children, they have to authorize 
compulsory admissions to mental hospitals; but they are not experts 
in gerontology, child development, or mental illness. They have a 
nodding acquaintance with all these areas and much more besides, 
but their role remains nebulous, their niche hard to define. 
How, then, do welfare workers respond to these assaults from 
outside which can so devastatingly fuel-their own existential uncer-
tainties? Both the meaning of the question and its answer lie in the 
nature of the social, that sphere within which we have seen them to 
operate. In the amorphousness of the social lie far more possible 
actions than there do clear rules for selecting among them. Though 
this is true for social professionals other than welfare workers - health 
workers are an obvious case in point - the flaccidity of the welfare 
workers' knowledge combined with the nature of their task and the 
power they exercise create particular problems for them, and of course 
a high degree of unpredictability and vulnerability for their clients 
(Howe 1980; Sheldon 1978). The rules to which these experts are 
subject come from legislation and agency policy; but except in 
particular and controversial areas these are blunt instruments: they 
confine the discretion of the experts in that they set certain boundaries 
around their rights and duties, it is true; but they do relatively !i~tle 
to govern the way the experts structure their day-to-day declslo? 
making. As we have already observed, their capacity to do so IS 
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strictly limited: if rules could be made, the experts would be both 
unnecessary and undesirable. 
Faced with these uncertainties (and their concomitant opportunities 
for diversity and idiosyncracy) the ~xperts naturally enough present 
a fragmented and internally inconsistent set of ideas about what their 
work is and about how best to go about doing it. Of course diversity 
and informed debate are appropriate attributes of any profession, and 
we take for granted that they will exist among welfare workers too. But 
such variations are not quite what we have in mind. The nature and 
degree of fragmentation seem sometimes to leave unclear quite what 
is the core activity against which these deviations are to be measured, 
as the experts create for themselves a private coherence, a cognitive 
and assumptive structure by which and through which to identify their 
own professional selves. Such fragmentation, though we think it 
especially characteristic of social services departments (for reasons 
which will by now be obvious), is not a matter from which the 
probation service is immune either. 
Fragmentation takes many forms: it may be principally profes-
sional or political (an unsatisfactory distinction we know, for how, in 
the sphere of the social, can we separate the two?) But some experts 
will find their occupational coherence through a flight into crypto-
therapeutics, as though a thorough grasp of the Milan Method of 
Family Therapy or Transactional Analysis could truly provide it; 
others, ironically, have embraced the idea of retributive sentencing (to 
the inadequacy of which one might have thought their very presence 
stood eloquent testimony) and due process, becoming adherents ofthe 
'back to justice' movement. Others gain their gratification from an 
association with more prestigious professionals such as consultants 
and judges, basking thereby in a modest quantity of reflected glory; 
others again busy themselves by becoming aligned with members of 
the oppressed classes. 
So there are probation managers who argue that the job is to control 
offenders on behalf of the community (Griffiths 1982) and involves the 
unquestioning acceptance of authority (Bibby 1976); there are 
conservative or liberal academics attacking the role of critical theory 
in welfare work training (Davies 1985) and advocating the selection 
ofless questioning students by courses (Munday 1972). And there are 
probation officers who say this: 
'It is through the union that probation officers can make links w~th 
other workers and with wider struggles within the state. Orgamz-
ation in the working-class form of the trade union facilitates the~e 
links. It also helps probation officer escapes from an esotenc 
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identity as "the neutral professional" to a recognition of their status 
as sellers of labour power, having common cause with members of 
the working class. These links enable us to connect with, and 
contribute to, broad and fundamental struggles over social justice 
distribution of wealth, eradication of poverty and provision of 
welfare services.' (Walker and Beaumont 1981: 194-95) 
This might seem a relatively ambitious mandate for the humble 
probation officer, but the strategies for achieving such laudable goais 
seem designed less to bring about these transformations than to excite 
the maximum hostility among managers and magistrates. Indeed 
perhaps a more discreet revolutionary would have disseminated them 
to the faithful by word of mouth rather than committing them to print: 
'It is wise to guard against unnecessary criticism. Management 
scrutiny tends to concentrate on written records and the keeping of 
up-to-date minimal records is an important safeguard. Often work 
with clients will have to be justified in the sort oflanguage manage-
ment prefers - references to esoteric social work theories, the needs 
of the relationship and professional judgement will prove useful.' 
(Walker and Beaumont 1981: 186) 
In short, business as usual, albeit justified conspiratorially. One 
would expect nothing else given the discourse within which probation 
work is located: the central irony of attempting to insert a praxis 
rooted in Marxist materialism into probation practice is that the very 
notion of so inserting it is quite irredeemably idealist given the specific 
and subordinate place occupied by welfare.work generally within the 
social formation (Webb 1981). 
But the sum effect of all these fragmented interpretations, these 
personal syntheses, is paradoxically to create yet further uncertain-
ties: the professional co-existence of such incompatible beliefs and 
purposes, lacking as some of them do even the most basic agreement 
about the core of the job can have no other effect. But its cause is 
explicable hardly at all in terms of the private psychopathologies of the 
individuals concerned and for academic social scientists to believe , 
that the answer lies in selecting a different kind of person is clearly 
absurd: people are moulded by the processes of which they become a 
part, and where those processes are themselves unclear, where there 
are multiple paths to heaven, none, in the relativisitic extremes of 
welfare talk preferable to another diversity will inevitably occur. , , , 
The diversity, then, emerges from aspects of the welfare workers 
role, task, history, and knowledge; it is inseparable too, as we argued 
in Chapter 4, from the traditions of which they are a part. 
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'No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His 
significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to 
the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must 
set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead .... The 
existing order is complete before 'the new work arrives; for order to 
persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order 
must be, if ever so slightly, altered.' (Eliot 1951: 15) 
The more secure the tradition, the more it can accommodate and 
respond to change and diversity. Probation, hence, manages better to 
retain its central meaning while incorporating a. wide range of 
differences of perspective within it. With a secure base, diversity and 
debate challenge, stimulate, and are essential for development. 
Without such a base - and the reader will recall the multiple and 
conflicting traditions of the social services department - diversity can 
all too easily become dysfunctional: either the enterprise is diverted 
into putting into operation some new fad - whether of organization 
or professional activity - or it is impugned for failing to address 
competently some new and pressing social necessity. But it is 
simultaneously insufficiently secure to incorporate this new exigency 
and insufficiently confident to decline to do so. Its practitioners, 
therefore, are vulnerable to prolonged and repeated states of self-
recrimination, which cause them to doubt ever more centrally the 
value of their professional work. 
The consequence of all this is occupational uncertainty, its practice, 
once the specialisms and the fragmented commitments and the 
conflicts with agency expectations have been allowed to run their 
course, is that paradoxical process of routine individualization which we 
mentioned in Chapter 4, whereby simultaneously everybody and 
nobody is individualized. Routine individualization exists as the very 
child of the social, between, at the one extreme, the non-discretionary 
application of specified rules, and at the other, the truly individualized 
response to every problem, the flexible, creative practice which, 
though part of welfare work's professional persona, is altogether 
unrealistic among bureau -professionals whose lives are measured out 
in flies and cases, and who have little option, at least after the first 
flush of enthusiasm has worn off, other than to approach each new 
client with the question: 'what type of case is this?' (Giller and Morris 
1981). 
By 'routine individualization' we mean the application of 
individual or organizational procedures which, though perfectly 
sensible to those who apply them, are typically less so to those who ~re 
subject to them. The considerable differences between the routme 
individualizations of the two welfare agencies illustrate clearly that 
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the.se p:acti~es have .their ongms in factors other than logic or 
ratlOnalIty, m the pnvate and unpredictable cultures which have 
emerged i~ t~e agenc.i~s themselvc:s, a~ th~ unstable heirs of disparate 
and confhctmg tradmons. Routme mdividualization, as we shall 
demo.nstrate in the ~ext section,. finds its way into social enquiry 
practice. We found m our study that recommendations for super-
VISlOn orders were rarely amplified by reference to what would 
actually be done if an order were made; nor did courts blanch from 
making orders without such justifications. But the significance of this 
is that 74 per cent of our sample of boys were trivial or medium 
offenders with no more than two previous conviction~, and 46 per cent 
were first offenders of whom fewer than one in five had committed a 
serious offence. The very free-floatingness of the supervision order, 
then, links with the uncertain processes by which it comes to be 
recommended to make it an aspect of the tutelary process. In the next 
chapter we shall show how this tendency is especially manifest in the 
case of girls, but in that of boys too variety of purpose and method, 
wide-ranging power, lack of coherent tradition, theoretical flaccidity 
and the experts' simultaneous vulnerability to generalized criticism 
and imperviousness to precise accountability, combine to make the 
supervision order just such a form of surveillance. 
Now all these uncertainties make of the order too a disposal suspen-
sive not only in its imposition but also in its implementation. Two 
separate processes are at work here. The court, in making the order, 
has in mind that non-cooperation will lead to a return to court and a 
more punitive response. But the uncertainties of the supervisory role 
mean that this very seldom occurs in spite-of the widespread failures 
among a majority of clients to conform to the letter of their orders. 
Indeed, in our study the most conforming clients were generally those 
of whom least was demanded. 
This may seem a curious point to make: after all, does not the 
potency of power itself exist in its application, either in its subduing 
of opposition or, in Foucaultesque ironic vein, in failing to do so and 
hence justifying more of it? How can the failure to report a recalcitrant 
supervisee to the court constitute a further form of power? 
The answer to these questions must itself be equivocal: after all it 
is perfectly obvious that to return every offender to court on ever: 
minor infraction would indeed constitute power manifest. But such IS 
not the only kind of power. The effect of the simultaneous sabotaging 
and sustaining of the process of which they are a part by the:: ex~erts 
is to transform rather than diminish the power to which theIr clients 
are subjected. It is to add a second layer of suspensiveness to an 
already suspensive order, to suspend suspensiveness itself, and to 
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create of the experts themselves a filter through which decisions are 
to be made as to whether the power of the courts is to be invoked. This 
is itself a form of power: as any schoolboy once knew, while to be 
caned was painful, it was hardly more so than the daily rough and 
tumble of the playground or the rugby field; and in a curious sense 
to be caned was a relief: one had experienced, survived, and so, oddly, 
triumphed over the worst that could be done to one, and certainly no 
second caning would be so fearsome. But never to have been caned was 
to be subjected to a fear of the unknown - a terrible threat and the 
most cogent of reasons for generally behaving oneself. Much the same 
applies with the supervision order. The powers of course in respect of 
breaches of supervision are less than awesome: a fine or an attendance 
centre order is a mere pin-prick, after all. But to have the unrealized 
possibility of a return to court hanging over one's head is likely to be 
a rather greater inducement to conformity. 
The power of the supervision order, then, lies not in some efficient 
policing practice whereby the least deviance is brutally avenged; we 
have no stories of children being incarcerated for being ten minutes 
late for an appointment. On the contrary, so far as we can tell with 
some offenders missed appointments are so common that they are 
hardly even commented upon by the supervisors: and every excuse is 
doubtless accepted. There are analogies with a study of the manage-
ment of child abuse: 
'the structures of the organizations involved and the practical 
reasoning of their members have the effect of creating a preference 
for the least stigmatizing interpretation. of available data and the 
least overtly coercive possible disposition. Officially-labelled cases 
of mistreatment are, quite literally, only those for which no excuse 
or justification can be found.' 
(Dingwall, Eekelaar and Murray 1983: 207) 
This is occupational uncertainty epitomized; but it is, nevertheless, 
the application of a peculiar, paradoxical form of power, not quite its 
abdication. For the power is not something which the experts can 
abdicate: it is there not because they have taken it, but because its 
exercise is, in turn, imposed upon them. Studies suggest that however 
the experts may conceptualize their activities in terms of 'care', this 
reality of power, this sense of control is an ever present one for many 
clients (Morris and Giller 1977· Morris and McIsaac 1978; Parker, 
Casburn, and Turnbull 1981)~ As the agents of somebody else~s 
power, the experts' capacity to negotiate its exercise, though re~, IS 
by no means uncircumscribed. There are, of course, good profeSSIOnal 
practices for making sense of this negotiating potential: it is 
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certainly neither our intention to belie the value of openness and 
clarity (of the kind advocated in, for example, the expens' own 
literature on '.co.ntracts': see, for example, Cordon 1980) nor to 
suggest by omISSIon that some expens ~o not handle their role very 
much better than others: everyday experIence of welfare professionals 
co~firms one's. impression that vast differences in skill and ability 
eXISt. But the lIterature of the experts, or their 'value talk' (Timms 
1986) would lead one to believe that such professional strategies are 
enough. This cannot be. 
Clients on supervision orders exist in the space between what has 
been done and what is able to be done to them. A simple, if somewhat 
defective, analogy demonstrates the meaning of this. Most of us who 
drive motor cars at some stage commit minor infractions, normally 
matters of parking or speeding. That we are so seldom apprehended 
is a consequence both of the near ubiquitousness of the deviance and 
of police decisions to concentrate their resources elsewhere. We 
offenders at large are vulnerable, therefore, not only to bad luck but 
also to a change in policing which (doubtless for some internal, and 
hence obscure, reason) leads the police to wish to punish drivers 
speeding through the town in which we live. When we are caught and 
fined, seemingly arbitrarily, for an offence which we and millions of 
others have previously committed with impunity, we cannot, accord-
ing to the principles either of strict logic or strict morality, complain 
at our lot, but unless we are extraordinarily phlegmatic we are likely 
to rail at the gods notwithstanding. 
Motoring offenders are not, of course, alone in being thus vulner-
able: Young has shown a similar phenomenon amongst marijuana 
users (Young 1971); prostitutes, shoplifters, importuners for immoral 
purposes, and the like, as offenders whose crimes are not only grossly 
underreported but also easily detected, are equally liable to be dealt 
with thus. A supervision order which imposes on youngsters who are 
already known to have broken the rule oflaw further rules to which the 
rest of us are not subject - to keep appointments with a supervisor, 
to attend school, to lead an honest and industrious life for example, 
and for a period generally as long as two years - precisely ensures that 
at some stage they will fail. This in turn creates amongst the super-
vi sees a dependence for their continued freedom on the expen. No 
strict injustice occurs: the offenders should keep appointments just as 
motorists should obey speed limits. But the vulnerability remains. and 
is in no way abolished by the relative unlikelihood of Supe:n:Isees 
actually being called to account for their omissions and commISSIons. 
Occupational uncertainty, then, has implications for workers and 
clients. In this section we have traced the origins and processes of the 
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vulnerability: in the intra-organizational conflicts of which the experts 
are a part, in the unpopularity with others (including those radicals 
whom the experts might have expected to be their supporters) of 
welfare work, in welfare workers' own anxieties and indecisions and 
so on. But these uncertainties have implications not only for the 
psychic equilibrium of the experts themselves but also, as we have 
gradually moved on to see, for the fate of their clients. We have offered 
a model in which we see power over the clients exercised by people 
who feel uncertain, even resentful, about having to exercise it, but 
people also who are vulnerable to pressure from outside and who may 
operate within a cluster of differing and sometimes competing profes-
sional ideologies (see, for a further discussion of this issue, Hardiker 
1977; Hardiker and Webb 1979). The rules which govern the exercise 
of supervision are unclear to the clients, however comprehensible they 
may be to the supervisors in terms of organizational routine and 
culture. But because that routine and culture are themselves 
vulnerable to attack from without or within, they may change; and 
this uncertainty increases the powerlessness of the clients still further. 
Even the non-exercise of power is, as we have argued in this section, 
an application of power; and when that non-exercise is itself perhaps 
subject to a policy change, a directive from government, a complaint 
from a judge or a shift in the interests of the experts themselves, the 
uncertainty of the experts and the discomforture of the clients are 
further augmented. 
Supervising freedom 
'A departmental committee found that some boys had been 
placed on probation with a condition that for two years they should 
not enter a cinema; also that a young offender of 18 was directed 
not to smoke for the year of his probation and during that time was 
to remain indoors every night after nine o'clock. He was also 
directed to attend church once every Sunday. Another case was 
discovered in which a man and a woman found guilty of a joint 
crime, were directed not to speak to one another. Within a month 
of their probation they were married and how this tangle was sorted 
out is not reported.' (Mullins 1957: 27) 
This section is divided into two parts. The two together comprise a 
compressed summary of part of our empirical data on boys; data on 
girls are included in Chapter 6. Since the book is not intended to be 
a research report, the section is relatively brief, an.d se1?cted to 
illustrate empirically the themes which we have been dlscussmg thus 
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far. The methodology of the study is included in Appendix B. It will 
b: .recalled that the total sample i~ 971 boys aged 14 to 16 on super-
VISIon for an offence for the first tIme; 701 of the boys are supervised 
by probation and 270 by social services. Because, however, the source 
of our data was the welfare records of the youngsters, there are a 
number of omissions. Where records are incomplete or in some other 
way doubtful in relation to particular issues, we have discarded 
dubious material, and are reasonably confident of the accuracy of 
those data included. We were fortunate to have such a large sample; 
even with discarded files, our database for anyone question never 
dropped below 700, which makes the study by a very long way the 
largest ever undertaken on the supervision order. 
The first part of this section focuses on the supervised population 
itself, giving details of the kind of person who was placed on super-
vision; the second offers an analysis by agency of the supervisory 
process. The thrust of the first part will be that the population is 
remarkably ordinary, that many of the sample are supervised almost 
be default, that few demonstrate great need or present great risk. In 
the second part we shall demonstrate empirically some of our earlier 
theoretical and conceptual points about the differences between the 
agenCIes. 
The supervised population: in our theoretical exegesis thus far we have 
painted a curious picture of an almost dilatory exercise of power by 
experts over very considerable numbers of the working-class young. 
We have described as the social the realm within which the supervision 
takes place, and have portrayed it as a norm-distributing sector, but 
as being itself characterized by a host of conflicting and competing 
norms. We have also shown how it is that this conflict of norms, of 
which the flaccid knowledge-base of the experts who inhabit the social 
is a part, has created an unpredictability, even capriciousness, which 
renders the experts relatively impervious both to control from above 
and to accountability to their clients. 'Capriciousness' is perhaps the 
wrong word for that which we wish to convey, for it smacks a little too 
much of malicious whimsy, a kind of social Russian Roulette. The 
capriciousness of which we speak is more benign in intent than that, 
albeit that elements of the Russian Roulette - perhaps with plastic 
bullets, though - remain. Impressed upon us, as we survey the scene, 
is the Nietzschean axiom that 'the consequences of our actions take 
hold of us quite indifferent to our claim that meanwhile we have 
"improved'" (Nietzsche 1886). . 
The supervisees were certainly ordinary in their personal and SOCIal 
characteristics. Although a disproportionate number were from one-
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parent families (one in five, against a 1978 average of one in nine: 
Central Statistical Office 1980: 81), some 80 per cent of the youngsters 
were from complete families with two parents. Of those from one-
parent families the vast majority, as one would expect, had a father 
absent, and in. about half these cases 'the mothers were in waged work, 
most of them m unskilled jobs. For these families money was clearly 
likely to have been rather tight, and if we add to this 20 per cent of 
the total those other financially precarious units where the father; 
though present, was unemployed, we find that at the time the order 
was m<3:de about 40 per cent of the total sample had one parent either 
absent or unemployed. This figure would substantially underestimate 
the impecunious circumstances of the families, since quite clearly 
many more would have had, or would corne to have as the order 
continued, experience of parental unemployment. The overall 
economic tenor of the boys' homes was unskilled or, less frequently, 
semi-skilled. Fewer than 8 per cent of the boys (a total of 76) had one 
or both parents in 'white-collar' jobs, and it is likely (though not 
certain from the way we collected the figures) that a proportion even 
of these few cases would have had the other present in a lower-status 
occupation. Almost all the boys, then, carne from working-class 
homes, in many of which the work situation would have been 
characterized by subordination, and where there would have been a 
reasonably high degree of financial uncertainty brought about by low 
wages or unemployment. 
Being working class was the most marked characteristic of this 
group; within the class the sample was not especially atypical: 
certainly we uncovered no greater picture ·of social dislocation than 
one would expect to find among the working class more generally (see, 
for example, Townsend 1979). In short, with the exception of the 
single-parent indicator, the sample was of fairly 'typical' boys from 
fairly 'typical' working-class homes. The vast majority of the sample 
(78 per cent) were still at school, and almost all ofthe remainder were 
engaged in some form of employment or training, with only 3 per cent 
of the total sample being classified unemployed when their orders 
were made. This does seem a remarkably low figure, but it must be 
remembered that in 1978 the total unemployment figure was no more 
than 1,475,000 (Central Statistical Office 1980: Table 5.15). 
It is also possible that, aware of the fact that to be unempl~yed 
might be disadvantageous in court, a number of the boys obtamed 
some form of employment prior to going to court - though we ~ave 
no means of verifying this. Certainly as a group the sample eXls~ed 
almost entirely within the financial and emotional orbit of the fa.n: ily . 
Of those at school almost all were in normal secondary educauon, , 
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with only 10 per cent either in special schools or remedial streams. \Ve 
were able to inspect school reports in 759 cases of boys still at school' 
of these, as many as 54 per cent had good or average records of attend~ 
ance, w~th the remainder characterized by varying degrees of 
absenteeIsm. But when we undertook a further analysis of the poor 
attenders, we found them no more likely to have been involved in 
serious than in trivial infractions. Nor, in spite of the generally 
negative tone of the school reports in the files, did it seem that as a 
group they were deemed especially disruptive or aggressive by their 
teachers. 
This normality in education is worthy of brief note, since it has long 
been believed that some association exists between social failure and 
delinquency (see, for example, McDonald 1969; West 1969; \Vest and 
Farrington 1973; though for an indication that the nature of this 
relationship is unclear, see the research review in Rutter and Giller 
1983: 199 et seq). What we suspect has happened is this. The more 
disruptive or spectacularly unsuccessful pupils are likely to have come 
to the attention of the authorities at a younger age than our cohort, 
and to have been made subject at that time to either supervision or 
care orders. What may be interesting about our sample is that our 
selection procedure, by eliminating all but those offenders who are 
being supervised for the first time as young persons, has filtered out 
the more difficult youngsters and served to highlight the existence as 
supervisees of a large number of predominantly unproblematic 
adolescents. 
This ordinariness extends into their offending behaviour, where 
relatively few of the sample could be said to be either serious or 
recidivist delinquents. We dealt with the seriousness of the present offence 
by creating a tripartite division into trivial (property offences of less 
than £10 value and common assault were the main matters here); 
medium (property offences of £10 to £100 and assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm); and high seriousness (property offences of over 
£100, grievous bodily harm, and malicious wounding). We also had 
an aggregation system whereby multiples of trivial offences became 
'medium' or 'high' seriousness offences and so on. In this simple 
categorization, 30 per cent of the offenders had committed only trivial 
offences, 52 per cent medium; and only 18 per cent were high 
seriousness offenders. 
But perhaps this rather surprisingly modest criminality was 
balanced by previous records, and the more trivial offenders had the 
longest records? Perhaps the serious offenders were more likely to be 
first offenders? In fact neither of these hypotheses is borne out to any 
marked degree: the range of first offenders in all three categories was 
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42-9 ?er cent .with the highest number of first offenders corning into 
the mIddle senousness category and not, as one might have expected 
into the highs. There seems to be no significant additive influence i~ 
previous court appearances, and the range for recidivists (three or 
mo~e previous findi~gs of guilt) was onl! :-10 per cent. In short, only 
a mmuscule proportIon of these supervlslOn orders were in respect of 
persistent offenders. Quite clearly, therefore, as an 'alternative to 
custody' the supervision order in 1978 was almost completely irrele-
vant, and was rather drawing into the tutelary complex far larger 
numbers of marginal offenders who could almost certainly, as we are 
about to demonstrate, have been dealt with otherwise. There was no 
discernible proportionality about the orders, and this almost complete 
lack of tariff status means that they were being interpreted variously 
through the routine procedures of report writing and sentencing. 
When only 7 per cent of the serious offenders in our sample had three 
or more convictions, but 42 per cent of trivial offenders were also first 
offenders, there is presumably only one conclusion to be drawn. 
We did generate one significant relationship which indicated a 
modest proportionality: between criminal status and the length of the 
order. We isolated the rather large numbers of trivial first offenders 
from all other supervisees, generating a status of 'not serious' for the 
former and' serious' for the latter. On this very generous measure we 
did find that the former were rather more likely to receive one-year 
orders, but the two-year order remained modal for both groups: so 58 
per cent of 'not serious' and 70 per cent of 'serious' cases received 
two-year orders, apparently as a routine disposal. Interestingly, 
almost no use was made either of the six'-month order (which was 
newly available in 1978) or, at the other extreme, of the three-year 
order, which was clearly at this time going out of fashion. The lack 
of anything very specific to do in many cases, to which we refer later, 
may have gravitated against a six-month order, however, since if what 
was wanted was, as we believe, generalized supervision rather than 
the specific achievement of particular goals, then a two-year order 
would see all these youngsters out of school and into work; it would 
also involve their being subject to a court order as they went through 
the peak crime age of 15 to 16, though we do not suggest that this 
thought was specifically in the magistrates' minds. 
A substantial minority of the supervisees were previously known to 
one or other of the statutory agencies (22 per cent to social servi~es, 
16 per cent to probation, almost none to both). We could find lIttle 
reference in the flles to contact with voluntary organizations such as 
the Family Service Units, which proffer professional guidance to the 
poorest, most disorganized families; nor were there many references 
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to contact with the Child Guidance Service. We were keen to test 
whether previous contact with a welfare agency was associated with 
supervision orders being made, and here our finding was interesting 
and co:n plex. We tested for previous contact with one of the agencies 
by senousness of. th~ offence. There was a patterned relationship 
between then: whIch Involved 59 per cent of trivial offenders, 55 per 
cent of medIUm offenders, and 51 per cent of high seriousness 
offenders having had prior contact. . 
Now the possible explanations of this finding are, first, that the 
same objective need which brought the offender into contact with the 
agency also justified the making of an order at this stage; and secondly 
that the contact itself had an amplificatory impact: that once one was 
caught in the net, in the net one stayed. For the first possibility to be 
plausible, we should want to see a persuasively argued report setting 
out a range of problems, a set of strategies for dealing with them, and 
a reason why it was necessary to have a formal order for these 
strategies to be pursued. But when we came to look at the experts' 
reports written on the offenders whom they knew, not only did we not 
find such strategies spelt out, but also we found that the report writers 
were marginally less likely to have recommended supervision for them 
at all than they were for the offenders who came to them new. 
(Supervision was recommended in 69 per cent of cases where there 
was prior contact, and 73 per cent where there was not.) Though we 
make nothing of this difference, we can certainly claim that at the very 
least offenders known to welfare agencies were no more likely to be 
recommended for supervision than were others; yet clearly 
magistrates were still making the orders .. 
This in turn is partly explained by the fact that rather more reports 
on previously known offenders were written by social services 
departments whose 'strike rate' in our study was significantly lower 
than that of probation (only 60 per cent of social services' clients had 
been recommended for supervision compared with 74 per cent of 
probation clients). Now it might be thought from this that the social 
enquiry report itself, by revealing intimate family matters on the basis 
of information acquired in the course of the previous contact, raised 
such concern among magistrates as to encourage them to make an 
order. This may be so: we can neither prove nor disprove it. But that 
such a consideration is at most no more than a subsidiary one is 
revealed by our analysis of those reports where a supervision order 
was made but not recommended. Of these reports, almost 40 per cent 
made no recommendation at all. This figure was partly explained by 
an especially heavy tendency in one social services dep~ment to 
eschew recommendations; but when this agency was dIscounted 
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'no recommendation' remained the largest single conclusion (at 31 
per cent of the remaining total). Of the remaining unsuccessful recom-
mendations, almost all were for low tariff disposals, with only 6 per 
cent for care or custody. . 
But when we analysed the cases for which no recommendation was 
made, we found that quite contrary to our expectations, the experts 
were significantly less likely to make recommendations in the case of 
more serious offenders: recommendations were made in 90 per cent 
of trivial cases but only 75 per cent of serious ones (using our tri partite 
classification). Quite clearly the popular view that not to make a 
recommendation in a serious case is to consign the offender to custody 
is not entirely correct; equally the finding suggests that magistrates see 
in the supervision order a feasible and desirable means of community 
control, as well as - or rather than - a form of social welfare. 
When we add to this finding one which we shall further discuss 
below, to the effect that only a minority of reports which did recom-
mend supervision spelt out what would happen if an order was made 
- what professional strategies would be utilized to solve problems or 
ensure control - we do have a situation in which a large number of 
rather ordinary working-class youths are being subjected to super-
vision for (mainly) two-year periods either without having been 
recommended for it or, if recommended, without any indication being 
given as to what would happen to them or why. The youths gave no 
great sense of having personal needs (we amplify this point later), and 
many of them seem not to have committed any offence more serious 
than the kind admitted to in self-report studies by up to 90 per cent 
of adolescent boys (Belson 1975). Somehow, however, they worked 
their way through the vagaries of the police cautioning and input 
systems (Ditchfield 1976; Oliver 1978) to be placed on supervision. 
Yet the more serious their offences, the less enthusiastic the experts 
were about supervising them. It was matters of this kind which we had 
in mind when we talked about the supervised freedom of the working-
class young . We described the process as a kind of benign 
capriciousness, for in truth there is little or no malice about it. But 
therein lies the very source of power, for who could object to having 
a youngster overseen by a kindly probation officer or a youthful social 
worker in order to steer him through adolescence? Yet it is by these 
very means that the offending boy's world is penetrated, his fam~~­
and almost twice the national proportion of one-parent familIes 
appeared in our sample - worked with if it seems desirable to do so, 
the boy himself given, perhaps, compensatory 'treats', helped to .fin.d 
a job, guided to an adult life of contented conformity. ThIS IS 
supervised freedom indeed, but of a particular British kind. It has 
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been called a 'Micawber approach' to the matter, a process of 
monitoring, chatting, 'forming a relationship', and 'being around' 
sometimes predictably, sometimes unexpectedly, in the hope tha~ 
some time, some day, something which needs to be done will just turn 
up. 
The process of supervision: although this subsection of the chapter is 
structured around an analysis by agency of the supervisory practices 
of probation officers and social workers, in strict terms we are not 
offering a precise comparison between them. For example, in five of 
our six research areas the local agreement between. the two agencies 
was that the young person (aged 14 to 16) in our sample would 
normally be supervised by probation. Hence in all but that one 
'deviant' area, social services' clients comprised those who would 
normally have gone to probation; and conversely, of course, in the one 
area the same point applied to probation officers' supervisees. The 
main reason for the allocation of supervisees in this way was that the 
supervising agency had either had previous dealings with the client 
himself or with some members or members of his family. Accordingly 
it was not surprising to find that significantly more social services 
clients had had previous contact with their supervising agency than 
had probation clients (Harris and Webb 1983; Webb and Harris 
1984). This was so even though, as we previously remarked, we 
excluded all cases where the client had previously been subject to a 
su pervision order. 
This means that in looking at the practices of the two agencies we 
are not simply comparing like with like. There may be a greater 
distribution of social need among social services clients, though we 
have no reason to believe that there is any simple dichotomy here: 
probably more significant is that for a number of them intervention 
was already occurring in the family, and the making of a supervision 
order on a son was simply the provision of a different kind of 
legislative backing for work which was continuing anyway. 
These are real differences and mediate any firm conclusions. The 
existence of need within the family may, for example, go some way 
towards explaining the greater tendency to which we shall draw 
attention later for social workers to visit clients and families at home. , 
But two points suggest that the answer is not that simple. First, the 
tendency towards more home visiting must be placed in a conte~t 
whereby the contact between social worker supervisors and theIr 
clients of any kind is less than that between probation o!ficers ~nd 
their clients' and secondly it is only for a minority of SOCIal servIces 
cases that home visiting ~ould be considered to be anything like 
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intensive. Only 17 per cent of clients, for example, were visited at 
home on more than ten occasions on a two-year order, and while this 
was almost exactly twice the percentage of probation clients who 
received this degree of home visiting, the proportions remain small. 
However much young offenders supervised by social workers might 
have been regarded as candidates for the 'welfare' element extended 
by the supervision order, this was not apparently translated into 
practices designed to meet particular needs. 
It seems unlikely then that supervisory patterns are some simple 
and rational response to problems. If this were the case, we should 
expect some sense of urgency on the part of social workers to make 
contact after the order was made. On the contrary, though, Table 1 
shows that social workers allowed significantly more time to elapse 
between when the order was made and first seeing their clients than 
did probation officers, who themselves seldom demonstrated any 
great sense of urgency in the matter. No less than one-quarter of social 
services clients were not seen for thirty-six or more days after the order 
was made. Table 2 points also to a highly significant difference in the 
frequency of contact between worker and client with social workers 
involved in markedly less contact with their supervisees than were 
probation officers. 
Social workers' tardiness in this respect was extended to the first 
three-month period of the order. This three-month test is an import-
ant yardstick: welfare workers tend to say that it is the first few months 
of a statutory order which are crucial: the relationship is made or it 
is not, the tone of the proceedings is set. Accordingly we selected two 
levels of contact frequency over the first three-month period: a low one 
(three meetings) and a high one (eight meetings), and tested how 
many social workers and probation officers met their clients on three 
or fewer occasions (52 per cent of social workers and 26 per cent of 
probation officers) and eight or more occasions (13 per cent of social 
workers and 23 per cent of probation officers). In each case the 
difference was significant, especially strongly so on the low incidence 
test (p < 0.001). These figures are for two-year orders; when we tested 
for one-year orders we found a similar disparity, with 23 per cent of 
probation officers seeing their clients on three or fewer occasions, as 
against 48 per cent of social workers. 
The trend for social workers to have significantly less contact with 
their clients than probation officers continues throughout the order. 
For example, on two-year orders 69 per cent of social services clients 
were seen on fifteen or fewer occasions compared with 42 per cent of 
probation clients (x2 = 34.52, dj = 1, P < = 0.001), a pattern of 
difference reflected, though less markedly, in the case of one-year 
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Table 1 Number of days between order being made and first cont t b 
. . ac V agmcv oif 
supervIsIOn ~ J 
number of days 
0-7 
8 - 14 
15 - 21 
22 - 28 
29 - 35 
36 + 
total' 
x2 = 18.50; df = 5; P < 0.01 
probation 
% 
189 ( 30.9) 
135 ( 22.1) 
120 ( 19.6) 
53 ( 8.7) 
41 ( 6.7) 
73 ( 12.0) 
611 (100.0) 
social services 
% 
52 ( 25.0) 
48 ( 23.1) 
30 C 14.4) 
16 ( 7.7) 
13 ( 6.3) 
49 ( 23.5) 
208 (100.0) 
Note: 1 In all tables, 'totals' reflect the usable files for any panicular item, and for this 
reason are smaller than the sampled population. 
Table 2 Frequency of contact by agency of supervision 
frequency of contact probation social services 
% % 
0-5 69 (11.2) 51 (22.9) 
6 - 10 105 (16~9) 57 (29.9) 
11 - 15 128 (20.8) 49 (21.9) 
16 - 20 117 (18.9) 27 (12.1) 
21 - 25 83 (13 .. 4) 16 ( 7.2) 
26 - 30 40 ( 6.5) 14 ( 6.3) 
31 + 75 (12.1) 10 ( 4.5) 
total 617 (99.8) 224 (99.8) 
x
2 
= 41.39; df = 6; P < 0.001 
orders. Using here ten visits as the break between a high and low 
incidence of contact, 63 per cent of social workers' clients fell into the 
latter category compared with 35 per cent of those supervised by 
probation officers (x2 = 10.60, df = 1, P < = ·0.01). Of course 
contact alone is not enough to judge the adequacy of what takes place 
between worker and youngster and it would clearly be of limited use 
to make a fetish of this. However, when there is relatively little contact 
with the client or any member of his social world it is difficult to main-
tain that anything constructive at all is happening. The only possible 
exceptions to this are when although the welfare worker is not seeing 
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the client, someone else is carrying out supervIsIon on his or her 
behalf, which the welfare worker is monitoring and supporting; and 
when the welfare worker has located a specific problem in the client's 
social world, and is working on that for the benefit of the client 
following Baker's dictum, that is to' say, to go not 'where the pain is: 
in conventional therapeutic terms, but 'where the pain is caused' 
(Baker 1983). In relation to the first of these possibilities we did indeed 
find that social workers were significantly more likely to involve the 
parents in the supervision of the child (32 per cent of cases as against 
18 per cent of probation cases) and also the school (14 per cent against 
9 per cent); although neither set of workers made more than minimal 
use of other community figures as surrogate supervisors. This finding 
supports the possibility that in the midst of their confusion social 
workers were struggling to articulate a model of supervision concep-
tually distinct from the criminal justice model embraced (albeit 
uneasily) by probation officers. 
It would, however, be wrong to draw too stark a contrast between 
the habitual explanations adopted by the two agencies responsible for 
supervising young offenders: Table 3 sets out the various problems 
typically identified by social workers and probation officers, from 
which it is clear both sets of workers share an occupational ideology 
which sees juvenile delinquency as legitimately and appropriately 
explained by the family nexus. Indeed the rank correlation between 
the items referred to by social workers and probation officers is highly 
significant (re 0.948) and indicates a tendency to 'weight' the items 
similarly. None the less there are, within this similarity of 'proflle', 
differences in the frequency with which they· report the problems, and 
in all but two of the items (8 and 9) the incidence of reporting such 
problems by social workers is significantly greater than that of the 
probation officers. It is not that social workers hold one view of 
delinquency and probation officers another - that the former are the 
sole exponents of the family dynamics model of causation - but rather 
that the strength of attachment to this explanation is somewhat greater 
for social workers than it is for probation officers. 
If there is an element of need apparent in the lives of those 
youngsters encountered by social workers which makes the 'welfare' 
concerns of the supervision order the rationale for it as a disposal, 
there was little evidence of this being said in so many words in the 
social enquiry reports presented by them. We were interested to see 
to what extent reports, when they did recommend supervision, set out 
a proposed 'social work strategy'. The concern which magistrates 
have expressed about giving a 'blank cheque' to social wo~kers 
(Berlins and Wan sell 1974; House of Commons ExpendIture 
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Table 3 Cases seen to exhibit various 'problems' by agency of SIlpervision 
agency of supervision 
probation social services statistical 
(n = 701) (n = 270) values 
yes (%) no (%) yes (%) no (%) x2 p 
1 disruption caused by separation 108 (15.4) 593 (84.6) 79 (29.3) 191 (70.7) 23.94 < O.OOt 
2 significant separation from parents 333 (47.5) 368 (52.5) 169 (62.5) lOt (37.4) 17.73 < 0.001 
3 chaotic household 33 ( 4.7) 668 (95.3) 32 (11. 9) 238 (88.2) 15.48 < 0.001 
4 problematic parental disciplining 276 (39.4) 425 (60.6) 136 (50.3) 134 (49.6) 9.59 < 0.01 
5 history of economic hardship 108 (15.4) 593 (84.6) 64 (23.7) 206 (76.3) 9.04 < 0.01 
6 deviant family norms 62 ( 8.9) 639 (91.2) 39 (14.4) 231 (85.6) 5.98 < 0.02 
7 problematic school behaviour 144 (20.6) 557 (79.5) 72 (26.8) 198 (73.3) 4.23 < 0.05 
8 parental criminality 64 ( 9.1) 637 (90.9) 34 ( 12.6) 263 (87.4) 2.42 N.S. 
9 absence from school 214 (30.5) 487 (69.5) 95 (35.2) 175 (64.8) 1.93 N.S. 
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Committee 1975) might be diminished were the experts to describe in 
some detail what they had it in mind to do if an order was made. A 
specific recommendation for supervision linked with an identifiable 
welfare work strategy was found in just 30 per cent of the social 
enquiry reports prepared by probation officers, and only 13 per cent 
of reports written by social workers, a difference which is statistically 
significant (x2 = 28.57, df = 1, P < = 0.001). The 'welfare object-
ives' - which presumably the workers concerned might see themselves 
as having some competence in addressing - do not come across too 
often, and with notably less frequency and saliency in the case of social 
workers. It is unclear whether this arises because they are in fact less 
clear than probation officers about the purposes of supervision or 
simply that their court report technique finds them less adroit at 
spelling out the sorts of things that magistrates feel should be 
expressed. 
Finally, in both agencies we found a remarkable tolerance of clients' 
failures to conform to the requirements of their orders. Supervision 
orders typically require offenders to report to their supervisors as 
instructed, to be available for visits to their homes, to attend school, 
and to lead an honest and industrious life. Although our comments on 
this tolerance must be seriously mediated by a significant change in 
the law during our research period (it being possible to take breach 
proceedings only against clients subject to supervision orders made 
after 17 July, 1978) (Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, section 
15(2A) as inserted by the Criminal Law Act, 1977, section 37(2)(3)), 
it was previously possible for supervisors to initiate care proceedings 
in cases where supervision had broken down (Children and Young 
Persons Act, 1969, section 15(1)). 
About twice as many probation as social work clients appear to have 
breached their orders at some time. On one-year orders breaches were 
recorded by 69 per cent of probation and 36 per cent of social work 
clients; on two-year orders the figures were i3 per cent and 38 per 
cent. The likeliest explanation of this is that very much more was 
demanded of probation clients than was demanded of social work 
clients; a subsidiary possibility is that probation records were more 
complete than social work ones, though here and elsewhere we 
omitted all records with apparent omissions: over 100 cases in this 
figure. We noted 460 cases where a probation client had missed office 
appointments and only 91 social work instances; 13 per cent of ~ro­
bation clients on two-year orders failed on eleven or "more occaslons 
as against only 1 per cent of social work cases. Against this, however, 
over half of social work clients were asked to report to the office on five 
or fewer occasions on a two-year order, as opposed to less than a fifth 
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of probation clients, and only 9 per cent reported on sixteen or more 
occasions (as opposed to 39 per cent of probation clients). 
Yet in spite of the frequency of failure to conform in both sets of 
client, only nine probation clients and one social work client were 
returned to court for breach proceedings, and in only ten probation 
and four social w?rk ca~es were clients recalled for care proceedings. 
In short, the pIcture IS of each agency struggling to make sense of 
the unclear task it has been asked to perform. We are not arguing that 
the situation is straightforward for probation and not for social 
workers, for while it is the case that probation practice is closer to what 
courts expect, it is not precisely what courts expect;. nor is it the case 
that probation officers do not themselves struggle with the problems 
inherent in having to serve two masters. Rather it is that there exists 
within the probation service a set of routines for the supervision of 
offenders in the community; those routines have developed over many 
years and are based on office reporting interspersed with home visits 
and occasional group activities. When supervision orders were 
introduced in the 1969 Act, therefore, there was a series of tried (if not 
tested) practices on to which the new task could be grafted, and the 
supervision order seemed to present relatively few new problems for 
probation officers. Supervision orders were assimilated into existing 
practices and those practices constituted a fairly strong tradition of 
court-based supervision. 
In the case of social services, however, the very fact that they were 
being asked to take on part of the probation service's work indicated 
that something different was required, but the legislation and depart-
mental guidance to local authorities were not such as to elucidate quite 
what it was. But social services departments had a huge task already 
in creating a unified culture from a range of different traditions, some 
of which they might wish to continue (such as the tradition of a profes-
sional casework service with a distinct knowledge and value base) and 
others of which (such as the Poor Law origins of welfare services for 
elderly and handicapped people) they might wish to repudiate. So for 
magistrates and others in some simple way to 'blame' social workers 
for their practices with young offenders or for their ambivalence about 
the court is to miss the point that such characteristics cannot be located 
in the personality defects of the workers, the 'ivory tower' training 
they are said to receive, or matters of that kind: magistrat~s, ~olice, 
justices' clerks, lawyers, and probation officers may not like It, but 
social workers themselves are not necessarily the correct targets for 
their spleen. 
This then is the situation in which social workers found themselves 
in 1971. They had been given hitherto undreamed of resources; they 
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car:i:~ with them - .and had t~emselves encouraged - the hopes of 
politIcIans and public. But theIr organizational base was new and 
chaotic (Satyamurti 1981) and their knowledge base rather light. The 
ideas that they did have - that catering for the welfare of offenders and 
helping put their families and communities to rights would make a 
significant impact on both the quality of their lives and on their offence 
behaviour - were quickly to be disproved empirically and rejected 
ideologically by the liberal and radical intellectuals who might have 
become the gurus of a new welfare age. The social workers had 
considerable power but little tradition or experience on which to base 
its exercise. As time went on they had to make sense not only ofa new 
situation, but also very quickly of the collapse of part of the very 
theoretical and conceptual structure on which their existence was 
based. Only if we grasp this central point can we begin to understand 
the complexities of their task and the contradictions of their situation. 
Conclusion 
This short empirical report both justifies and explains the historical 
and conceptual analyses which preceded it. These analyses sought to 
unfold some of the dimensions of meaning of the supervision order, 
and by so doing to demonstrate the impossibility of understanding this 
particular provision without stepping outside the day-to-day world of 
the practice guide and the rhetoric of the experts. The logic and 
purpose of the present can only be grasped - and even then doubtless 
tenuously - through an understanding both of how it has been 
historically shaped and of the processes which occur between the draft-
ing of the tutelary provision and the encounter in the interviewing 
room in which the tutelage occurs. We have sought thus far to offer 
at least a glimmering of understanding of both these processes which, 
it is hoped, both illumines and is illumined by the account of the 
experts at work. 
In approaching the matter thus, we are aware of certain dimensions 
which are lacking. Readers will say, if welfare work is their commit-
ment, that we have been in some way 'unfair'; that the processes we 
described in relation to supervision orders which for the most part 
terminated in 1980 no longer apply now; that no credit is given for 
'practice advances' which endeavour to meet just the kind of problem 
we have been outlining: the use of 'contracts', the reluctance to write 
reports on first offenders, the practice of reserving supervision orders 
for higher tariff delinquents. 
Although we hope our final chapter will go some small way towards 
answering these criticisms, it will not, we concede now, go very far, 
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for no reason other than that to do so would involve either a very much 
longer or, more probably, a different kind of book. Material describ-
ing practice innovations is, however, on the whole readily available 
to practitioners, in the pages of the weekly welfare work press, for 
example, or in materials made available to their employees by depart-
ments to do with the writing of social enquiry reports. We are aware 
of such materials and use them in teaching; nothing in this book should 
be read as questioning their value, but their availability to the experts 
themselves discourages us from repeating them here. What has been 
lacking, we believe, is the kind of analysis we have attempted to offer, 
and this book can be read by those practitioners who have been 
interested enough in what we have to say to have stayed with us this 
far as a kind of gloss on the 'nuts and bolts' publications with which 
they will be all too familiar. We do think that some of this literature 
- much of it written by academics like ourselves, or by managers, or 
specialist practitioners - presumes too much: its cries to try harder or 
learn something new have the effect above all of asking people already 
in a whirl simply to whirl faster, or perhaps in a different direction. 
To the extent that the professional problems with which this literature 
seeks to deal are decontextualized and dehistoricized, they become 
matters with which the front-liners themselves are told to deal, but which 
it is in fact beyond their remit to change. 
But for practice improvements to occur it is certainly necessary for 
the experts to develop at least the kind of working distinction we essayed 
in Chapter 1 among those aspects of their work which are buried in 
the very logic of its structure, those which may be amenable to micro-
political pressure, say from their professional associations, and those 
which are simply the fall-out, the unintended consequences of the 
paradoxes or contradictions to which they are subject, and which can 
be remedied without undue alarm either by a modest and uncontrover-
sial legislative amendment or even by the development of particular 
practice principles. In relation to the possible criticism which we earlier 
forecast for ourselves - that we have failed to acknowledge that the 
welfare workers are getting much better at this kind of thing now -
we are happy to agree, and the reforms to which we alluded in passing 
are, we think - with perhaps some slight reservations - steps in the 
right direction. More, however, could be done - by no means.all of 
it by welfare workers - and we return to this and other related issues 
in our final chapter. 
For the moment however we turn to an analysis which complements 
the empirical stud~ reported in this chapter. The supervision of girls 
highlights also particular constraints to which the experts are themselves 
subject. 
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pp 146-159. 
PURITANS AND PARADIGMS: 
A SPECULATION ON THE FORM OF 
NEW MORALI1'1ES IN SOCIAL WORK 
DAVID WEBB 
SUMA1ARY. This JXlP?T' puts a name to what is taken as an emergent, and 
somewhat new framework for social work, a frarr..ework exemplified in recent 
statements from CCETSW. This is tenned 'puritanism' and its qwili1ies are 
described, focusing (XlrtiaJarly on properties of moral reguIatian. A social rontext 
to this derelopment is proposed, and it is maintained that a discourse dependent 
en clem moral altegories (which is the essena! of puritanism) is a natural outcome 
of reformist sixties and serenties legislation which sought to intervene in the 
amdud of relations around key socia1 groupings - those of generation, gender and 
race espedally. Accordingly social UXJrk now embraces moral CErtainty around 
several issues, giving an oau,mional and ethiall finnness to a profession 
notorious for its hesitancy in these respects. 
The ~ has the additional purpose of demonstrating the metJuxiDlogiaU 
impatfve of detJu:hmen1 and sautmy, in which the personal prediIections of the 
investigator remzin outside (so far as possible) the adioity of enquiry. 
---------------~~------------
But this brings us to the world of judgements, of value and of faith, 
with which this purely historical discussion need not be burdened 
(Max Weber,l%7, p.182). 
IntroductiOn! a trinity of concerns 
This paper has several purposes; firstly, and substantively, it seeks to put a 
name - 'puritanism' - to some of the utterances and intentions which inform 
and shape the direction now being given to social work through the 
authoritative voice of key definers, and theCentralCouncilforEducationan~ 
Training in Social Work (CCETSW)l most especially. In this way the paper IS 
a modest exercise in what could be called the semiotics of social work - the 
attempt in this case to say what is signified by the requirements and by the 
regulations for social work training currently enunciated by CCETSW. The 
'text' here under consideration is that enshrined in various new directives for 
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the training of social workers, and in particular those parts which refer to 
what maybe variously called 'values', 'ethics' or 'morality' (CCETSW, 1989). 
Significantly CCETSW's regulations de~d not only technical competence, 
but also demonstrable adherence to a cluster of attirudes and behaviours 
most notably around anti-racism and anti-sexism and as such this marks a 
signific~t re-dir~tion to ~e p~rpose?f social wor~ It is the identifying -and 
the nanung - of this new direction which features In this paper. The shift - in 
the very broadest of terms - is from an individualism in which self-
determination and non-judgementalism featured as reference points for an 
ethical neutralism (liberated from the legacy of Victorian evaluative 
sanctimoniousness) , to a more recent certitude and orthodoxy about the 
direction to be taken by social workers in constructing their own, and their 
clients', moral universe. 
This new discourse2 , which implies, even if it does not rest upon, an 
increasingly unambiguous set of moral - cum - p:>litical imperatives, is 
associated above all with one 'speaker' amongst the babbling crowd ('radi-
cals', the Home Office, CCEfSW) jostling to 'name' social work and define its 
purp:>se.Now, although social work is not by any means an unproblematically 
harmonious community marked by consensus about how it may be defined, 
about who may be called a social worker, and the ways in which the task 
should be practiced, certain influential voices do nonetheless exist. In the case 
of CCETSW, the speakeris powerful (even if not alwaysauthoritati ve) largely 
because of the bu ttress of statute and the threat of sanction, making it highly 
likely that defini tions of the si tua tion emanating from this particular quarter 
will stick with some considerable effect. . 
It is for precisely these reasons that I take the 'utterances' from CCEISW 
as being a reasonably robust guide to the direction being sought for the future 
of social work, since it is through education and training that the nature of the 
enterprise will be given shape in future years. In short (and the scepticism of 
cynics notwithstanding) CCE1SWacts to legitimate certain interpretations of 
the reality of social work. 
A second purpose of this article (though it is one which is linked with the 
first) is to suggest a social location for this new paradigm within w~~ ~al 
work is now being framed. Having identified this, and named It m Idea1-
typical fashion as 'puritan', an endeavour is made to gain .access ~o the 
underlying structure of social work's new discourse. Howeve:, s~ce soo?logy 
cannot long resist the pursui t of causation, the question remam5 (If only In my 
mind) about the reasons for the ascendency and currency of any o~e 
particuIarway of defining professional purpose. Hence i.dentifyin~ the sooal 
origins of an emergent paradigm is a necessary element.m a~ounting for. the 
appearance of any cultural phenomenon. Following sooologl(~1 convention, 
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this line of enquiry asswnes that it is within certain specific milieux that new 
ideas and new practices become possible; there is in other words assumed an 
'elective affinity' -aresonance-between the broader sweep of social, political 
and economic life and the particularities of this or that cultural expression . 
. This ~neralline of ~nquiry is applied to the :act that a statutory body is 
saytng soaal worl~ers will not be deemed to be '?t practitioners' unless they 
d~nstrat: ~ertain values an~ undertake ce~ practices directed at very 
highly specified fonns of SOCIal change. In this the prescriptive content 
towards the conduct of morals is high by any reckoning, and it is the attempt 
to both situate and to explain this which constitutes this paper's second 
theme. As I shall argue, the 'social context' which makes certain utterances by 
the Central Council much more likely, is one which is characterised by the 
legacy of an interventionist state where certain 'formal-legal' regulations 
towards civil society have established the bona fides of moral prescription 
through statute. These legislative mediations have announced ends which 
are entirely consistent with the reformist and 'progressive'worldviewwhich 
social work has arrogated foritself. So although the state may no longer seek 
to regulate sexual conduct through proscribing homosexuality, or demand 
exacting subordination to a strict ecclesiastical intetpretation of the mamage 
contract, it has by no means absented itself from prescription in new spheres 
-child protection,sexdiscriminationand race discrimination being examples 
of particular tutelages. 
The first and second aims of this paper -which are the 'semiotic' and the 
'contextual' respectively - stand as the substantive bit of the argument in 
which a set of observations are directed at certain features of contemporary 
social work 'culture'. But this should not lead the reader to confuse an analytic 
project with one of judgement; the approach here rests on a careful a voidance 
of the evaluative, eschewing absolutely any appraisal of the merit or other-
wise of the new discourse in question. It is this strenuous commitment to 
detachment which constitutes the papers third, methodological, purpose, 
since it looks to exemplify a mode of enquiry which is, as it were, 'outside' its 
object of scrutiny, wilfully agnostic towards the goodness or worth of the new 
moralities and deliberately remaining entirely unconcerned about any nor-
mative involvement or prescriptive inclination. 
The excavation of the discourse of puritanism takes place through a 
distancing from the investigator's personal opinion or judgement of the 
phenomenon; the goal therefore is objective commentary, or at least an 
endeavour in that direction. In so doing, it ought to be impossible for the 
reader to identify the enquirer' s personalappraisa1 of what is beingscru~, 
whether the new morality is held to be 'the flavour of the month an? ~pe ~or 
debunking', or alternatively 'the quintessence of social work's distinctive 
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moral~cal purpose'. The social scientist should, of course, be prepared 
(and be allowed!) as much to investigate matters which are cherished as those 
which are despised, for the advancement of knowledge (or at least more 
humbly, the struggle for this) ought not to be'limited to the socially acceptable 
or the professionally conventional areas of social life. 
So, a test of the investigator's success in analysis might interestingly be 
that of judging how far the reader remains in the dark over the views held by· 
the writer aoou t the phenomenon being discussed. And indeed, to mount an 
exercise in deliberate disinterest is precisely that which has provided some of 
the rationale behind this discussion; a self-conscious setting in abeyance of 
any personal commitment which in another guise (as a social work educa-
tor?) I might hold towards the new morality here under consideration. 
The paper then, in addi tion to seeking any analytical merit, is also looking 
to demonstrate that a decisive absence from the nonnative or the prescri ptive 
constitutes a legitimate component for social work if its claim to a place in the 
academy is to be sustainable. Now it is important to stress that whilst 
detachment is not necessarily a superior component - for the elucidation of 
what is morally or ethically desirable is equally part of the academy's purpose 
- it is certainly a complementary goal to which due regard ought be tendered 
in the pursuit of an agenda set by no body other than the academy itself. 
Some textual revisions in social work education - and practice 
Social work education is being increasingly called upon to deliver practice 
which is ooth technically competent and morally grounded. No longer do we 
refer to the rather empty emblematic (and problematic) phrases like 'respect 
for persons' or 'client self-determination' which hi therto furnished the ethical 
touchstone for social work. Fromnowonitis the uncompromising imperatives 
of anti-racism or anti -sexism which have regenerated the basis of professional 
education with a set of specific obligations which in their forthrightness have 
collapsed politics and morality in a way which may well have taken many by 
surprise. The contrast with earlier indicative pronouncements from CCETSW 
is worth noting, in order to measure thereby the direction and weight of 
change that has taken place in assumptive worlds. The 1976 report on values 
in social work (CCfE5W, 1976) whilst not(inevitably for a 1iberal' document) 
setting itself up as the conveyor of anything definiti ve, serves as an exemplar 
of a particular tradition in which universal Kantian principles are subject to 
the challenge - and perhaps refutations - of the empirical d~onstra.tion of 
indi vidual differences (psychology), the existence of StructurallIDpediments 
to self-determination (sociology), and exposure of the ideological nature of 
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philosophical categories themselves (IX'litics). Whatever certainty social 
work may have once held foritseIf, this report signalled an acute attack of self 
doubt. 
TIle document in its tone and content is.certainly 'balanced' and discur-
sive; its form is marked by 'wise' and 'objective' academic comment in which 
issues and problems are reviewed but all without any ultimate resolution 
offered. Its style and approach are tentative; it exemplifies characteristic· 
dilemmas in settling on unequivocal and uncontestable value stances - 'how 
far ... ', asks the chainnan of the working party in his introduction, ' ... is it 
possible or desirable for social workers to adopt political or moral stances in 
their employing agencies?' In the cultural fallout from the relativistic sixties 
this was perhaps an inevitable en de coeur; the more absolutist eighties have 
left us with another answer, though not always a welcome one. Tellingly - if 
somewhat despairingly - Noel Timms (1989, p.13) has recently lamented the 
end of uncertainty in social work ushered in by the Central Council's 
arbi tra tion: 
It appears that once the new form of CCETSW training has been 
introduced, any problems of value-talk will be more or less a thing 
of the past. CCETSW ... confidently expects that social workers in 
the 1990s will be able (as they will be required) to articulate a value 
system that is coherent. 
The Central Council (1989, p.lS) then has set aside equivocation in these 
matters and has 'ruled' on the values of social work, which, it announces, 
embrace: 
... a commitment to social justice and social welfare, to enhancing 
the quality of life of individuals, families and groups within 
communities, and to repudiation of all fonns of negative discrimi-
nation. 
In addition to what may be seen as conventional conunitnents to self-worth 
and the dignity of individuals, to privacy and the right to protection, the 
Central Council also requires social workers in training to be aware of 
'structural oppression', to demonstrate ways to combat individ~ ~d 
institutional racism through anti-racist practice; to demonstrate anti-seXlSm 
in social work practice and promote policies and practices which are anti-
oppressive (CCETSW,1989, pJ6). . . 
Though the documentation from CCETSW refers to a vanety of dlsad-
vantagingconditions,radsmandsexismareidentifiedasparticularinstan~ 
of how professional social work should be conducted around the active 
identification and eradication of certain social practices. The imagery em-
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ployed by the Centnil Council is redolent of General Booth's Salvationists' the 
vocabulary calls on phrasing drawn from battle; reaching the goal de~ds 
censure orban, and declaration servesasa mea,sureortestofindividual motive. 
Itisa sequence which conveys the underlying cultural momentum to the new 
elements of the social work discourse enunciated by the Central Council. This 
I call 'puritanism' ,a tenn here used (I hope scrupulously) without reference 
to evaluative connotations through plaudit or sarcasm, but as a means of 
summarising a cluster of attitudes and behaviours. The following section is 
an attempt to sketch out ~ in Weberian idea1- typical fashion - the essential 
properties of this particular social work Weltanschauung;" to contribute 
thereby to mapping the cultural shifts which characterise the conduct of 
today's professional ideology. 
New tones in moral regulation: the vocabulazy of puritanism. 
It is a commonplace observation when conducting the sociology of everyday 
life that itis really surprisingly easy to be socially disruptive. Not laughing at, 
or joining with sexist or racist humour, let alone the taking of bold exception 
to things said or done, is to break with thenonnal and comfortable reguIari ties 
of the social order. Any of these 'impertencies' sabotages the reassuring world 
as it is known; the moral order is made temporarily problematic by the fail ure 
to play the game by the unspoken rules, and student social workers (and 
future practitioners) are now being required to engage in precisely this as part 
of their training. Significantly it is an obligati0t:l arising from being a 
professional, and the calling thereby entailed, rather than from being a 
responsible citizen. 
What are the mechanics to the stance which must be demanded of these 
tyros as they make their way through their studies? The qualities follow on 
inevitably from the requirement: the anti-racist oranti-sexist is self-consdously 
and deliberately censorious; to them the mundane is made serious, and the 
reassuring and comfortable'sharedness'oftheassumptiveworld is assaulted. 
Others become subject to judgement, and the exception-taker is set above 
those who are found wanting; an element of uprightness is embraced by the 
accuser, and the behaviour or sentiments of the tainted are held aside as 
morally deficient. To be such an arbiter is far removed from the tolerant 
relativism which emerged from the 1960sand its various cu1turesof indulgent 
expressiveness; rather it involves certainty about both rightness and wr.o~g­
ness which is often - perhaps necessarily - phrased in an ~compro~smg 
and forceful register. There is here an ironic resonance W1~ the strident 
tendency in the Conservative party, and its most accomplished .spo~es­
woman; after all, both have something unswerving about what IS bemg 
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pursued, with. the ~m t? oc~py the moral high ground becoming a 
pronounced leztmotif to political life. And equally there is nothing weak or 
negotiable aoout the purposes of anti-racism or anti-sexism, which involve 
the vanquishing and eradication of the objects of their opposition. Such 
activi~es ~ ve as their pro~ the reconstruction of practices and of thoughts 
forwhichlsneed~ an une~gan~ secur~reason for ~ing so 'presumptious' 
as to wage these Jihads. This certainty, this unswervmg faith in the worth of 
certain actions, ~an be expressed as a fonn of puritanical exactitude. Judge-
ment, censure, nghteousness and watchfulness - all of which must perforce 
attend anti -sexism and anti-racism if they are to succeed -are also the defining 
attributes to the ideal-typical puritan. To the puritan falls the heavy obligation 
of practising extreme strictness in matters ofI11Orals and a developed sensitivity 
to breeches in the correct code of behaviour or thought; the puritan is 
prepared to see the eradication of the corrupt, and will engage in a holy war 
to meet this end if needs be. 
Despite this stance of rectitude, the puritan does admit to knowing the 
devil and very often intimately, and will know too all about the temptations 
and allure of racist and sexist sentiment and practice: it is precisely upon this 
enticement that anti-racism is often premised after all. To the puritanitis only 
by knowing, articulating and therefore objectifying corruption that it can be 
countered and fought. There is accordingly a recognition of evil and that 
moral existence is a constant struggle between the acknowledgment of, but 
not the wallowing in, temptation. Fallibility is certainly recognised, for it 
keeps the guards forever in place. 
What the puritan grasps then is the part played by 'deconstruction' in the 
moral crusade. Whether puritanism is of the old or new variety, it detects the 
devil and all his works in the seemingly innocuous: the sub-text lying benea th 
the surface of the everyday is always the force which is to be reckoned with. 
The puritan hunts down the signifier within, because to the puritan the 
allegorical devil's stalking presence is patently detectable, however much 
others are oblivious of these things. 
Puri tanism stands as an open acknowledgement that evil exists and tha t 
its corrupting ways need exposing and eradicating. Now if the old pre-
Restoration puritanism derived its understanding from scripture and from 
divineguidance,contemporarysourcesaremuchmorehurnble.Eventhough 
that earlier generation sought guidance from spiritual revelation, today's 
equivalent struggles to secure something in a way which provi~es c?mFa-
ble - even if secular - certitude of purpose. Whatever these mspIratlOnal 
sources might be, somehow they have to equip the ad vocate of anti-racism or 
anti-sexism with moral resolution, a willingness to judge, a commitment to 
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vanq~h. And this is ~ed because today's puritans certainly wish to 
enforce the moral boundanes between good and evil. Just as the original 
puritans saw the Reformation under Elizabeth I as half-hearted and compro-
mised by worldly interest, so contemporary puritans see today's talk of 
equali ty, freedom and liberty to be as much corrupted by mammon' s deceits. 
Like their ascetic forebears, modern puritans look to external restraint 
internal cautiousness, a rein on instinctiveness and expressivity, and th~ -
careful attendance to procedures and protocols in social interaction (Weber, 
1%7). Regulation and predictability provide a secure and cognitively im-
penetrable barrier, devoid of the inadvertent gaps through which the devil 
will reach his ann and embrace the unwary. 
To be committed to anti-racism and anti-sexism is to be embraced by the 
ideal-typical 'Puritanism' thatI have outlined; what the new 'text' to animate 
this enterprise might be remains unclear, though paper 30 looks set to occupy 
a place of some significant reference so far as social work is concerned. But 
whatever way this inspiration is secured, 'puritan' is that which issues from 
it, for what other word would quite so adequately describe that ensemble of 
practices and values - amongst them righteousness, censure and watchful-
ness - which underpin these activities? 
The societal frame: modes of regulation and new professional possibilities. 
The somewhat metaphorical term of puritanism has been employed to 
name, or to discern, a new direction to the way in which the activity of 
social work might be being framed. Its purpose has been to go beyond the 
surface of what could be seen (by the unsympathetic) as 'fads' or 'fashions', 
the products of pressure groups exerting untoward influence on a pro-
fession congenitally vulnerable to good causes. Instead of examining the 
minutiae of various 'contents', the metaphor points to a paradigmaticalIy 
radical form being taken by authoritative voices within the profession, 
even though that revised form may have been brought about through the 
need to accommodate an accumulation of new ideas which could no 
longer be contained by the overloaded 1iberal' (non-judgemental) dis-
course. Social work's tendency to add bits on to an existing framework 
may be giving way to a rather different (and perhaps radically novel) 
framing for professional activity, and the emergence of 'puritanism' is an 
attempt to identify this. 
But this paper, (as was emphasised at its outset), is not concerned only 
with a description through metaphor of an emergent discourse to a. new 
morality in social work. Setting this within a broader context that mes to 
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explain the 'socio-genesis' ~f something that is emanating from its predeces-
sor presents the opportunity to speak, however tentatively and cautiously 
about 'causes'. ' 
Puritanism has, quite obviously, reactionary and revolutionaiy expres-
sions, and roth the Cromwellian and Islamic fonns have adopted a call to 
fundamentalism in order to repudiate the corruptions of a morally and 
JX>litically bankrupt order. But the giving of licence to a secular puritanism 
with origins outside the spiritual and beyond the holy book, can be traced ~ 
modes of regulation within the 'host' society from which it develops. Ironi-
cally the certainties of Thatcherism (Conservatism's 'smdent tendency') may 
have operated to move the ideology of weHare practice away from the culture 
of relativism and expressivity which it conveyed so dearly during the age of 
Aquarius (Martin, 1980); a 'new realism' that has percolated across to the 
British Larour Party and the pages of Marxism Tpday, as well as to what many 
see as the quintessentially occupational expression of both these, namely 
social work. The theme here, then, is the social location of ideas - the manner 
in which what passes for knowledge is contingent as much upon exterior 
political and economic shifts in the cultural climate as on internal develop-
ments and progressions within a particular set ofideas advanced within this 
or that 'speech community'. 
Now it is true that all this adds up to a somewhat cynical sounding 
exercise in ethical and epistemological relativism, since the coherence or 
integrity of ideas (such as those expressed within social work's new morali ty 
for example) and the vocabulary used to convey or sustain these ideas or 
practices, are mostly set aside as far less interesting than the reasons for those 
utterances becoming acceptable in the first place. Suchan approach maintains 
that were social conditions not right then the utterances would not be made, 
or if made would certainly not be heard. 1bis, of course, is not always a 
palatable line of enquiry; its agnosticism and moral disengagement might be 
read as doubting the authenticity and sincerity of pronouncements, since 
what is said or otherwise promulgated is analysed as merely the product of 
specific circumstances, given by history or culture rather than through the 
agency of human enlightenment or uncontestable rectitude. 
This present excursion into the sociology of knowledge (which Elias 
[1971, p.161] has nicely described as the examination of that which is hel~ by 
those who know, rather than of the objects to which their knowingosten51bly 
refers) sets the condi tions for the emergence of social work's 'new' discourse. 
And the conditions are those given by what the collective senti~nt of 
professional weHare has come to see as the generally (but not sufficentIy) 
progressive and beneficient consequences of refonnist, social justice oriented 
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legislation of the sixties and more particularly the seventies. The intervention 
of legal regulation to remedy the deficiencies of rampant 'pure freedoms' 
which lead to exploitation and injustice, has created an accumulation of 
cultural changes (readily available as a legitimating resource) which make 
more acceptable the fonn of prescriptive-proscriptive utterances which 
CCETSW is now endorsing. In particular, the vocabulary of censure or 'ban' 
(which during an earlier era social work would have avoided like the plague)· 
has become an increasing feasible lexicon to employ. Hence it is that the 
outlawing of racial and sexual discrimination, and more robust intervention 
over abuse of children, are viewed as clear instances of a more·or less entirely 
legitimate expansions in moral legalism in order to ensure that structural 
disadvantage (or oppression) does not impede the attainment of rights. (The 
salient statu tes here would be the Race Relations Acts of 1965,1968 and 1976; 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, and the Oilldren Act 1975). As the law has 
progressively absented itself from the regulation of personal morality (ex-
emplified by the statutes decriminalising - more or less - abortion (1967) and 
homosexuality (1967», so it has moved proactively and positively into the 
regulation of contracts which effect three major social categories, those of 
generation, gender and race. This contrapuntal movement in social regula-
tion is what Stuart Hall (1980) has referred to as a 'double taxonomy', 
whereby the 'liberated' domain exists alongside, and in parallel with, an 
increase and expansion in precept by the state as it seeks to ensure (and 
secure) a stabili ty in the Millsian I general interest' (Lea, 1980). And of course 
safeguarding the rights of all citizens is an important means to legitimate 
underlyingeconomicdivisionsbeneaththeurnbrella·ofuniversalcitizenship. 
This focusofmoraI regulation has shifted from an ecclesiastically inspired 
concern to maintain propriety in the conduct of sexuality and reproduction 
(Hall, 1980), to an emphasis on ensuring that waywardnesses of a more 
secular and 'sociological' nature do not overwhelm the attainment of social 
order. If for the Victorians morally upright individuals would lead to the 
creation of a moral society, for social democratic refonners of the sixties and 
seventies, establishing a morally correct society ensured that individuals 
perforce become moral in compliance with this framework for manners. 
The mode of regulation for the conduct of personal and social relations 
has therefore changed from the 'ecclesiastical' to the secular, from an empha-
sis on the indi vidual to an emphasis on social categories (Donzelot, 1980). The 
deregulation of some behaviours has been matched by a regulation of others; 
moral surveillance of one kind has been replaced by another; importantly and 
conveniently, HaImos' (1965) secular priest now has a treatise upon whi~ to 
draw in demonstrating the bases forIn)ral action. Thisisthetextof'progresstve 
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legislati~n' ;;hi.ch is concerned ,,?th. corporatist social engineering and 
substantive JUstice. It has served to JUStify the sometimes tenuous claim that 
the state can indeed stand as relatively autonomous to the interests of a 
mercantilist ruling class: protection afforded through these laws demon-
strates that the bourgeois state acts as a protective shell for refOrmist social 
policy and practice. Anti-discrimination legislation, predicated as it is on 
substantive justice which takes account of differences between individuals· 
reveals to social democratic reformers how legal enforcement can be used 
- even if only symbolically - to secure advances in the social position of the 
vulnerable and also to promise a modicum of restructuring of civil SOCiety 
(Gregory, 1979). 
Such innovations revealed too that the move to establish moral 
legalism need not be the exclusive and repressive province of the Ireac-
tionary' forces of moral rearmament (The Festival of Light, Mrs Mary 
Whitehouse), but might serve rather as the expression of a Iprogressive' 
spirit which, if not revolutionary, was at least moving in the direction of 
curbing the archetypal (and summative) exemplar of oppression - the 
white male adult. 
The role of the state - even the bourgeois state - in the management of 
that civil society has much of a progressive residual about it, especially 
when faced with the prospect everywhere else of a truncated intervention 
allowing free rip to unrestrained social forces and social relations. Hence 
the attachment to and affini ty for regulation becomes a poli tical touchstone, 
and for state welfare professionals (and their statutory voice, CCETSW) 
an occupational one too. Regulatory machinery, whilst introduced for the 
protection of some citizens and the enhancement of their rights, offers a 
cluster of 1egalistic scriptures' which serve as a new point of moral 
guidance and reference. The largely proscriptive nature of legislation to 
do with the eradication of discrimination exemplifies the puritan project 
of ~an'. In practice this is established as a progressive censure, permitting 
moral arbitration with a confidence which social work now relishes, 
having suffered (perhaps outrageously) from the critique which once 
berated it for doing the very thing which is largely inescapable, namely 
making moral judgement. The embracing of regulation (and the 
occupational certitude offered thereby) provides a link with that kernel 
(or is it vestige?) of the welfare state which still remains. This benign 
disciplining of civil society - upon which welfare 'policing' is unavoidably 
premised - is accordingly the social context from which is drawn the 
puritan vocabularies that provide contemporary references for the 
preferred nature of social work today. 
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A concluding reiteration 
This paper has sought to account for the moment at which a paradigmatic 
shift in the ass~pti ve,wor1? of social wor~'? ethical base occurred. Captured 
through the deVIce of nammg' the new dlSCourse and identifying the ideal-
typicalpropertiesassociated~thit,the~ttempt.hasbeentorenderc1early(in 
the methodology of exaggeration aSSOCIated WIth typifications) what could 
well otherwise remain unacknowledged. There is, of course, the inevitable 
whiff of semiological arrogance about an approach which claims privileged 
insight into the matter at hand. Still, social work too is someti~es encouraged 
by its own pursuit of 'uncommon sense' as the enterprise tries to move 
beyond the superficial, everyday renderings of social and p:rsonal problems 
that obscure through ideology, or sheer ignorance, the 'truth' which lies 
beneath appearance (Cammack, 1982). 
The construction of the 'dramatic' ideal-type of 'puritanism' has been 
presented here as an exemplification of detachment from moral or other 
evaluative concerns. Just as Max Weber's personal sentiments concerning 
bureaucracy were irrelevant to his social scientific task of describing the 
properties to this mode of authority, so in emulation of that methodological 
imperative has this paper sought a similar separation between the spheres of 
involvement and detachment. In so approaching the subject at hand, a point 
has thereby been made about the struggle for 'value freedom' in the social 
scientific quest; in pure fonnthismayindeed be unattainable, but a capitulation 
to solipsism which this despair arouses ought perhaps to warrant resistance. 
The injunction made in an earlier section about the role to be taken by social 
work within the academy is, of course, closely relab~d to this, since it invites 
a consideration of the relationships between the activity of social work 
education (which to an increasing degree operates within given ordeterminate 
discourses) and a more or less autonomous enterprise which might be known 
- perhaps only a little pretentiously - as 'academic social work'. 
Situating some of the paradigmatic changes in social work within the 
broader contexts of cultural shifts is part of that posture of autonomy 
associated with detachment. It contributes to reflexivity or self-awareness in 
which departures or innovations in thought or approach are understood .as 
decidely social phenomena. Insofar as this paper has been about the ~ 
location of these ideas, it has veered towards a materialist analysis, setting 
human agency on one side in its pursuit of what David Matza (1964) has 
called the 'grounding for the conduct of will'.1bat context was of cou~ one 
in which legislative changes in the sixties and seventies (in symbohsm as 
much as in actual alterations in practices) issued new directions for the ways 
by which social solidarity might be maintained. The name of that way has 
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been here given - neutrally and without connotations of either favour 
d · a1 'Pu ......... ' ·th or lsapprov - as nuu l I WI contemporary 'official' social work thinking 
revealed as approximating empirically to this ideal-type. 
Notes 
1. Overseas readers (and even the sheltered domestic ones) might find it helpful to know 
that the Central Council for Education and Training in Social Work (ccrrsW) is 
established, and empowered, by statute to promote training and e.:iucation through': 
out the United kingdom for social work and other kinds of personal social service. It 
is steered by a ministerially appointed council of 25 representatives from the various 
constituencies with an interest in social work education, primarily employers, aca-
demics and practitioners. The work of the Council is discharged by about 40 
professional officers and a supporting administrative staff. The organisation is funded 
by the Department of Health, to whom the OUefExerut:ive <Director) ofCCErSW is 
ultimately financially and managerially accountable. 
CCETSW establishes national requirements for social work training, monitors pro-
gramme quality and approves accordingly and sets the permitted course intake in 
each training establishment. CCElSW awards are the only recognised social work 
qualifications in the UK though, except in the Probation Service, there is no mandatory 
requirement to be qualified in order to practice. 
2 The word 'discourse' is introduced because it conveys well- and economically - the 
way in which the symbolic domain of words, phrases, assumptions, thooriesetc. strive 
to constitute the world to which they are being addressed. It points to the merit of 
taking seriously the text as a product of utterances about how the world should be 
vieWed. The claims for discourse analysis are sometimes ambitious: 
In other words, the ... description of discourse is deployed in the dimension 
of a general history. it seeks to discover the whole domain of institutions, 
economic processes and social relations on which a discursive formation can 
be articulated ... what it wishes to uncover is the particular level in which 
history can give place to definite types of discourse (Foucault, cited in 
Sheridan, 1980, p.108). 
Exploring the conditions behind the emergence of a certain discourse is therefore a 
legitimate project; its resonances are with a 'conventional' sociological tradition 
associated with the popular workof(say) Berger and Luckmann's Social ConstTuction 
of Rm1ity (1967). Indeed, the definition of discourse thoory, in a ra:ent volume which 
appliesthisexpresslytosocia1 work, seems more to a::ho that earlier phenomenological. 
social constructionist line, than it necessarily announces a radically new method. 
Discourse throry examines the language, knowiooge, myths, and assumptions 
that underpin a partirularmanifest position. .. Disroursetheoryargues that specific 
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discourses can be shown to produce problems and impose solutions on the 
individual (Rojek, Peacock and Collins, 1989, p.B). 
Since these are almost precisely the same words used to explain the nature of a 
'paradigm' (' ... universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide 
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners', [Kuhn, 1962 p.x]), I 
have used the same word occasionally to signify the idea of 'discourse'. This . 
interchangeability has proved sufficient for my purposes, and refle:ts for example the 
recognition by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) that there are points of affinity between 
the two. 
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A STRANGER IN THE ACADEMP 
A REPLY TO LENA DOMINELLI 
DAVID WEBB 
----------------~~--------------
'" the objectivity of the stranger' does not simply involve passivity 
and detachment; it is a particular structure composed of distance 
and nearness, indifference and involvement'. It is the stran erer too 0' , 
who finds 'what is familiar to the group significantly unfamiliar 
and so is prompted to raise questions for the inquiry less apt to be 
raised by Insiders' (Merton, 1972:33). 
Let us assume -not I hope unreasonably, for inhabiting the academy imposes 
its ovvn obligations - that the concluding sentence of '\-\That's in a name?' is not 
rhetorical, but instead signals a genuine invitation to open debate, in which 
theoretical or empirical disagreement, rather than moral attributions, are 
what is recorded. And since I am not so naive as to imagine that the subject 
of my original paper is vvithout some sensitivity, the possession of a cool head 
in these matters becomes especially necessary. 
So then, in response to that closing question, just what do I think? In fact, 
I happen to think Lena Dominelli has rather missed the point, and done so 
pretty comprehensively. 1his means, inevitably, that most of what she writes, 
however interesting and othenvise important it might well be, makes for a 
response that shows considerable indifference to the principal matters at hand. I 
also think there is more than one occasion when Dorninelli engages in an 
imaginative interpretation of what I say that makes my own tentative foray into 
'the semiotics of social work' look like the very acme of positivist rectitude. 
Dominelli assumes that 'Puritans and paradigms' is a thinly disguised 
pi'ece of what she refers to variously as 'point scoring', 'debunking', 'disap-
proving', and as 'barbed', 'incontrovertibly aimed at identifiable targets', of 
feminists and black people who are engaged in the progressive movement 
\vithin social work. TIU.s view she reaches from a privileged (or is it partial?) 
'reading' of my text. To arrive at such a conclusion, Dommelli must perforce 
set aside, as at best disinerenuous and at worst dissimulation, any disclaimers 
. 0 al 
that criticism is my intent. A parallel avowed quest for a neutral contextu 
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analysis ~ sm:narly shoved away as self-delusio~. Presumably then, any 
further reIteration here about the challenge ofpursumg objectivity, or a denial 
that my intention was disparagement is ahnost certa:inly a complete waste of 
words. After all, in a fashion that surely warrants her citing Louis Althusser 
or Terry Eagleton, Dominelli ascribes the text of 'Puritans and paradigms' no~ 
in the least to authorial intent or agency, but to the over-determiningOdomain 
of a masculinist and orthodox 'malestream' epistemology. Now whether or 
not she holds to a curious philosophy of biological reductionism in the 
creation of knowledge, Dorninelli certainly reveals in her paper a methodol-
ogy (which for want of a better word we can call 'structuralist') that is every 
bit as much 'objectivist', semiotic and arcane as that found in 'Puritans and 
paradigms' and which she so roundly seeks to indict for the semiological 
arrogance that it fails to eschew. 
Dominelli's attempted deconstruction job on my pa pernotv.:ithstanding, 
I can but repeat (but will anyone believe this, or shall these utterances be 
consigned to the bin of strategically phrased motivational accounts?) that my 
intention was not at all a critique of feminism or of black perspectives. For the 
purposes of what I was exploring in 'Puritans and paradigms', it is entirely 
immaterial whether these approaches are good or bad, adequate or inad-
equate. Accordingly, Dominelli's defence of these perspectives, and her 
charting of the social work terrain to which they lay claim, have to be, I'm 
afraid to sa y, an absolute irrelevance to my project. Nor does such a response 
lend one jot to a critique of 'Puritans and paradigms' . My point, after all- and 
I do rather belabour this, so it is a little surprising it was missed by Dorninelli 
- is about the structure of endorsement to the very approach to social work 
that is (as it happens) conveniently outlined in 'VVhat's in a name?' Now I 
happen to find this legitimation process quite interesting sociologically and 
certainly worthwhile puzzling over; a question meriting at least a stab at an 
answer. To successfully criticise 'Puritans and paradigms' Dominelli onght 
surely to have attempted to sketch out a more adequate ac,=~unt of the same 
phenomenon I addressed, rather than deny so strenuously its very existence 
as what may be called a sociological problematic. As things stand, Dominelli 
seems less troubled about the quality of the answer I tentatively (or as I put 
it, speculatively) offered, than with the fact that I actually asked in the first 
place a question about the nature of what passes for social work knowledge 
and practice. 
In the substantive part of her commentary, Lena Dominelli begins to 
sketch out-orratherreveal-heridea of academic social work; the philoso phy, 
as it were, ofyvhat that activity might look like if called upon to justify its place 
in the academy. Not for Dominelli tvvin tracks of parallel importance -
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reflexive analysis matched by that I called 'the elucidation of what is ethically 
and morally desirable'. For Dominelli, itis one element and one element alon"e 
that constitutes the rationale for the social work academy, and she declares 
the irrelevance, pretence and deceit of dispassionate enquiry. By implication, 
the modest exercise in reflexivity introduced in 'Puritans and paradigms' as 
a small contribution to social vvork's self- a'wareness is seen as tantam~unt to 
a betrayal. Such indulgence has no place in Dominelli's emphasis on the 
exclusively normative; the discourse of 'Puritans and Paradigms' is unrelated 
to the vision held by her of the social work academy and as such does not 
warrant any serious (or substantive) consideration. 
Even those points at '\vhich she does begin to engage with substantive 
issues, Dorninelli's approach is marked by a tendentiousness that promotes 
a fusing of misunderstanding and of misrepresentation, all seernin~lv di-o ~ 
rected at keeping at bay the exercising of any reflexivity towards certait., 
aspects of contemporary social '\",York thinking. Let us, in this connection, take 
the issues of involvement and detachment ,,,,yhere in paragraph m'o of her 
reply Dorninelli would have the reader believe that I really do write that 
involvement is 'deemed emotional unscientific, and female', and in inferior 
contrast to my favoured approach of neutral detachment. No, this makes me 
seem sometrung of an epistemological misogynist, but in fact nowhere do I 
attribute these qualities to the posture of involvement, and to suggest the 
gender-cum-episternic polarities that Dominelli alleges I operate v:ithin is 
entirely devoid of foundation. References to Elias (1978), to Habermas (1972), 
to C. Wright Mills (1959), or to Merton (1972) could all point to the enduring 
and far from novel nature of these concerns in sociology, vvithout the need to 
introduce (in this instance) spuriously gendered features to philosophy and 
method in the social sciences. 
This excess of attribution ,\ithout real warrant is further demonstrated 
when Dorninelli refers to the 'unfortunate' use of religious metaphors in 
'PuritaIb and F?r(\digrns'. These are undesirable, she says, because they rest 
on 'stereotypes which are inunediately conjured up by readers and shape 
their interpretation of words'. No,Y 'V\~hat exactly is Dorninelli saying here? Is 
it t..1.at religious metaphors have been mischievously introduced to dupe the 
unsuspectincr reader and seduce their critical facilities with powerful images 
that bear no ~elationship to what happens in real social life? In particular is 
there sometruncr about the 'V\Tord 'Puritan' that has derogatory baggage 
b . . , 
associated with it that then becomes attached to anti-racism and anti-seXISm. 
But conceivably (and this is made 'V\ith as much warrant as Dominelli's 
assertion to the contrary), readers hold an abundance of imag~s w~en 
presented with religious metaphors. In the face of such pluralism (m which 
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Puritanism 7111!y have a very high value for example), it certainly seems 
unV\'ise to declare that words have one meanmg alone. In any event, 'Puritans 
and paradigms' does endeavour to proffer a non-evaluative definition of 
'P~tan' that. ~eeks to a:,oid stereotyping an~ misunderstanding through 
bemg as specific as pOSSIble about the properties of this ideal type. In doin~ 
this, the objective is, above all, to conceptualise the hitherto 'unnamed'. And 
it may be of course that there are some who would be 'proud to be Puritan', 
embracing the qualities as a mark of integrity: stereotyping and the negative 
assumptions may be Dr Dominelli's and not necessarily those of each and 
every reader. 
Again, referring to the impact of legislation that has sought to extend 
greater equality, Dominelli seeks to \veaken my argument that this has been 
symbolically important in legitimating restraint on social relations, by citing 
the limited impact these laws have had in practice. Now I acknowledge 
precisely this: my intent in this part of the paper is not with the material 
consequences, but with the cultural ones following on from what I argue is 
a new framework for regulating civil society. I think even the most casual 
reading of 'Puritans and paradigms' could reveal this as what I am driving at; 
legislative interventions signal a cultural shift that can be (and has been) 
symbolically appropriated by 'progressive forces'. Of course - and as anyone 
who knows the organisation vvill certainly aver, CCETSW does not lead in 
these initiatives, and nowhere did I suggest it might do so. But it does endorse, 
and the fact that it has effectively legitimated anti-oppression as a plank of 
social work training, is surely interesting. To put down the shift in the social 
work paradigm to feminists and progressive black people having exerted 
effective pressure begs just too many questions, and of the kind I was trying 
to both ask, and to speculatively answer, in 'Puritans and paradigms'. 
Dorninelli's view of history and change in this area of socialli£e does seem to 
beofa singularly Whlggish nature, which may I suppose be all well and good, 
but it merits some articulation if it is being held up as a superior explanation 
to what she clearly finds unsatisfactory in 'Puritans and paradigms'. 
These more or less detailed points of dispute over substance or interpre-
tation are but examples of the general misunderstanding to which I referred 
at the outset of this reply. There is one further instance though which is ra~er 
more serious, since it reveals an ad hominem agenda of some potential 
unpleasantness. Dominelli purports to show I have introduced racist notions 
about a (white) host society and (black) migrants or 'visitors' and in doing 
such have inadvertently revealed myself. She says this terminology is offe~­
sive, as indeed it would be had it been used in this way. But I did not use It 
in this fashion, and any careful reading 'Vvould shov: as much. The term 'host' 
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society is employed when describing emergent value systems 'which borrow 
from the dominant culture, vlith the consequence that sometimes the content 
(and sometimes too the form) of oppositional cultures bears a de£Tee of 
similarity to that of the dominant culture. I was trying to point ~p the 
(occasionally ironic) continuity betvveen dominant and emergent world 
viev,'s. Using 'host' society in the section entitled The societal frame' has 
nothing whatsoever to do '\vith white hosts, or vvith black 'guests' or '\\rith 
'migrants'. Dominelli's response here is far too readily triggered, assump-
tions hurriedly made, a 'key word' taken to mean one thing only, and over 
eagerly ripped out of context in order to augment a rush to censure. Nonethe-
less, and even though Dorninelli's confusion here seems almost vviliul given 
the reasonable clarity of the context; hindsight suggests some lexicological 
caution might have been in order so that other readers do not fall into making 
similar mistakes. 
'Puritans and paradigms' was an attempt -and the use of 'speculation' in 
the title announced a fairly evident tentativeness and caution - to situate, to 
explain and to excavate '\vhat I discern as a significant new cultural fonn in 
social work. The methodology - vvruch Lena Dominelli finds incapable of 
doing the job asked of it - sought through radical disengagement, and the 
ideal type 'dramatisation', to extract that new form from its context and 
analyse it dispassionately. Clearly Dominelli sees this activity as having been 
compromised, yet we have from her no suggestion of a preferable mode of 
analysis of this new form, nor does her encounter with substantive points 
seem to undercut the general drift of the thesis in 'Puritans and paradigms'. 
Rather surprisingly, her strategy has not been so much a direct rebuttal or 
critique of that paper, but more a 'defence' of something that it was never 
sought to question or impugn in the first place. VVhat that first place 
endeavoured to do was to explain. This seems to me a perfectly acceptable goal 
fora social work academy which might usefully think about coming dean on 
just how it is prepared to align itself with involvement or detaclunent. Lena 
Dominelli may put this down to hopelessly unreconstructed 'malestream' 
inclinations, but I happen to think that Norbert Elias provides a worthwhile 
rubric for our enterprise. 
The problem confronting those who study one or the other aspects 
of human £rou ps is how to keep their two roles as participant and 
as enquire~ clearly and consistently apart and, as a professional 
group, to establish in their work the undisputed dominance of the 
latter (Elias, 1956, p237). 
vVhat do you thIDk? 
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Note 
1. This phrase is Simmel's. It is cited in the paper by Merton from which is also 
taken my opening text in this rejoinder. His is an article worth returning to in 
any attempt to understand the bases from which truth claims are - and can be 
- made vvithin a particular academic or practical discourse. I've drav:n some 
inspiration from Merton's discussion of that 'autonomy which ... enables the 
pursuit of truth to transcend other loyalties' (p.44), though it is important to 
stress that he is by no means indifferent to the intellectual advances that can 
emerge from what he calls the 'group-influenced perspectives' of insiders. In 
British social work, Lena Dorninelli's own contributions obviously fall within 
this 'insiderist' canon, as her writing on feminist and anti-racist social work 
testifies. So, of course, does, her comment on 'Puritans and Paradigms'. 
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Summary A number of convergences in the 'structure' of nurse and social work education are identified. 
These are seen as being marked by an increasing state direction that ensures a continuin cr and increasincr 
b b 
subordination of any autonomous professional agenda. Interprofessionalism is taken as part of occupational 
de-regulation within the context of 'post-modern' demands for a flexible expert workforce, as demandt:d 
by Go'vernment policy towards community care. 
Key words: Control; interprofessionalism; nursing; post-modern; social work. 
"Changes in the division of labour are creating a different concept of skill. The inbuilt 
obsolescence of whole varieties of skills reduces the significance of context-tied operations 
and increases the significance of general principles from which a range of diverse operations 
may be derived. In crude tenns, it could be said that the nineteenth century required 
submissive and inflexible man [sic], whereas the twenty fIrst century requires confonning 
but flexible man [sic]". (Bernstein, 1971; p.67) 
Introduction: 'reading' interprofessional care 
This paper presents rather a different interpretation of interprofessional care than one which 
unhesitatingly celebrates and promotes it as a self evident good. It may indeed be this, but the approach 
here is more agnostic, and endeavours to place these developments in trans-occupational harmony 
within a historical, political and social context. Questions are invited about just why so much interest 
in interprofessional collaboration is currendy being shown. The matter is not one of simply charting 
the remorseless progress in 'working together' as if it were an inevitable process of better sense 
prevailing; rather we might choose to consider these changes as an alternative set of announcements, 
or as a sub-text to what appears as the surface narrative or the tale of events themselves.. . 
So it is that the promotion of interprofessionalism can be viewed as an arrack on the pnvileges 
of restrictive practices and the control over demarcation boundaries that occupational closure allows. 
In Professions and Power, Johnson (1972) pointed to the 'exclusionary strategies' (Witz,. ~990) by 
\:ruch the attainment of a particular occupational status serves to detennine market poslUon. The 
liberalizing and de-regulation of professional leverage is accordingly as much a project f~r a free market 
administration as is curbing the power of any other kind of organized labour (Alaszewski & Manthorpe, 
,Correspondence: David Webb, Depanrnent of Applied Social Studies, Nottingham Polytechnic, Bunon Street, ~oningh.am 
:\Gl 4BU, UK. 
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1990). Those practic.es that had grown up Wlder the 'rational' division of labour that the lo~c of 
the modem age had illtroduced, eventually became a threat to the material interests that that epoch 
had promoted to ascendancy. Marx, of course, spoke critically-if hopefuliy-of 'inh 
, b th f: f ul' f erent contradictions, ut e acts 0 an accum auon 0 power running contrary to the existin d 
.' . d b th f . . g or er have been likewISe recogruze y ose 0 contrary poliucal persuasion, and they have sou h 
S thi . . , din" g t to break that power. 0 s paper IS an essay ill rea g illterprofessionalism in such a fashion' 
th . fth·· . ,as de-regulation in e guIse 0 e illJWlCUon to co-operate; as new 'competency' driven initiatives in 
professional education as a mask for the superintendence of expen labour by the state; as the promotion 
of consumer, client, or user-responsiveness; as a vehicle for endorsing the increasingly market oriented 
context within which employers now operate. Hence interprofessionalism 'de-constructs' the hitheno 
established and secure; the old occupational 'framing' with its rigid bOWldaries is viewed as inhibiting, 
or no longer tenable in the face of a challenging 'real' world that does not accord with traditional 
practices; present spheres of influence are collapsed as occupations are allowed (and encouraged) 
to step into territory that would hitheno have required a professional passpon. 
Transfonnation of the kind just described is sometimes seen as indicative of a 'post-modern' social 
condition that is characteristic of economically advanced societies. There is, so the argument goes, 
something radically different emerging in much of contemporary social and productive life. In the 
confident cenainties expressed in scientific rationality or the philosophies of social progress such as 
Marxism; in the soaring architectural ambition of Le Corbusier and the Newtonian 'harmony' of 
two balanced super-powers; in the international cultural hegemony of the West or the settled hierarchies 
within gender and race, all-and more-is now 'up for grabs'. "Post-modernity", writes Anthony 
Giddens, "is characterised by institutional pluralism, variety, contingency and ambivalence ... (and) 
we are justified in treating the post-modem condition as a phenomenon to be investigated in its own 
terms" (Giddens, 1992; p. 21). 
The metamorphosis from the modem to the post-modern is not seen as fInal or complete; vestiges 
)f the old epoch run alongside the new. In the case of interprofessionalism in social work and health 
:are, the liberalising 'post-modem' synthesis of nursing and social work to create a novel occupational 
)lending is taking place Wlder the auspices of a state with strong centralist and controlling inclinations. 
fhis paper offers an analysis of interprofessional care that is framed within precisely these contrapuntal 
:endencies. 
Schon (1987) maintains that modernism's philosophy of scientific rationality has had its day with 
I more intuitive, reflective and inductive discourse taking the ascendant. He celebrates this on the 
~rounds that technically such is the best way to proceed-or problem solve-and in so doing shows 
I concern for interprofessionalism that places it as a higher and more efficient strategy for the social 
lrganisation of expen labour than the defunct, inflexible, procedurally obsessive and philosophically 
nyopic methods of established professional practices. If the world of automobile engineering follows 
I post-Fordist trajectory that takes us from old dirty Dagenham to new clean green Sunderland, 
hen Schon is the spokesperson for a parallel 'post-modem' veer within the professions. Nonetheless, 
here is an underlying and consistent prompt or drive to these changes, whatever might be the shifts 
n knowledge, or in professional culture, or in occupational bOWldaries. Here-transparent1y~~e 
magery moves towards the detenninistic an account of changes more given over to const.ra.Ul1I1g , . 
ocial structures than the purposeful action of individuals; an approach which views these alterauons 
s associated with deeper political or economic scripts that set a framework within which courses 
f human action are worked out. 
Such is the sensitising outline for approaching trends in the contemporary development of. the 
aring professions, and particularly those moves that address links between social work and nursmg. 
: sets an (heretical?) agenda that is unmoved by nonnative pleas for the "furtherance of whol~. pe~~ 
. I C 1992 p 11)' lt IS lre ... (and) the need for collaboration" (Journal of InterprofesSlona are, ,'" 
nconunined as to whether interprofessionalism is good or bad and prefers instead to speculate on 
1St Why such moves in collaboration or co-operation may be underway. 
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:are to converge? 
"he education of both nurses and social workers is also caught up in this process and th h 
I . fi th fi· ill ' e c anges lut are current or oonung or ese pro eSSlOns ustrate a pathway or sequence that features firstlv 
n expansion in control, secondly, a decomposition of 'specialist' knowledge and thirdly a 'II ". , 
, ,co apsmg 
f space betv;een the two professions .. Indeed I shall try to point to a remarkable and steady convergence 
1 the strUcrure of state control that IS now exercised over them as they are hustled, jostled, induced 
nd obligated to become more collaborative and less protective o~ jealously held identities .. 
Moves toward interdisciplinary collaboration are not just the expression of a liberal and egalitarian 
omradeship dedicated to the meeting of a need that knows no occupational frontiers, for these 
onvergencies are also 'orchestrated', given structure, endorsed, or otherwise promoted. One example 
lat is indicative of things to be, and which is drawn from the increasingly coincidental domains 
f social work and nursing will serve to illustrate this line of thinking. 
There have been more or less successful moves to 'integrate' social work and nurse training within 
le field of 'learning difficulties', or what in the lexicon of nursing is still called mental handicap. 
~ualifying programmes, common for both, have been promulgated and validated by the National 
oards for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting and by the Central Council for Education and 
"raining in Social Work (CCETSW). There has been a transformation in RNMH (Registered Nurse 
)r Mental Handicap) courses to address 'the social'; there is a sense sometimes that the weakness 
f boundaries is such that a new occupation is needed as the old model that was institution and 
athology oriented is supplanted by one in which community based provision allows people with 
arning difficulties to occupy a position, not of a defective 'mental handicap', but of ordinariness 
ee Webb 1989). 
This humanizing trajectory stands alongside-or even within-the fiscally informed one that is as 
luch a part of community care as is the ethical prompt for 'normalization'. With the 
leconstruction' -often in the quite literal manner of physical demolition-of that exemplar of the 
gid categorization of social groups, namely the 'lunatic asylum', a more fluid and less regulatory 
lut not necessarily less supervisory) approach to human management becomes appropriate. 
n.ablement replaces contairunent; the 'social' supplants the medical, the community rather than 
e carceral is the setting. The segmented world of objects that are mentally handicapped (who are 
lfSed or residentially contained) becomes the integrated world of subjects who happen to have learning 
fficulties (who are empowered). A parallel occupational transformation meets and serves these changes 
rough a weakening of professional boundaries, there is a jettisoning of the established settings (the 
)spital, the 'home') that defme a profession; and organizational arrangements such as joint training 
ke occupational culture from closure towards penneability. 
There are then, several links between the wider setting or social context in which policy changes 
(e place, and the inner world of professional conduct and contact. This brief example of 
terprofessional care also serves to suggest a 'structuring' of those moves that are entertained by 
:lividuals or groups as they adopt new or innovative occupational philosophies that offer preferences 
: dealing with the world that they encounter as 'professionals'. " 
Nursing and social work occupy a similar space in the social fabric, especially once comm~ty 
alth care begins to take on more significance for nurses than the familiar picrure of the clin!cal 
hospital based practitioner. Well worn discussions about the control function of the ostens:bly 
ing need not be restated here, for I take it as now generally accepted that for both occupa~ons 
~ tasks involve a fluid combination of help (resource brokerage, technical skills f?r p~blem solvmg~, 
tJlCe (option giving, knowledge) and surveillance/sanction (legal progressing of social misdemeano~/' 
arris & Webb, 1987; Abbott & Sapsford, 1990). Of course both professions stand largely ~\1thin 
toric ambiguities of the Welfare State (see Taylor-Gooby, 1991), and it is because of this ~a: 
ir role is not unequivocally aligned either to social control or amelioration, or to some 'progr~sl\"e 
al that puts them at the forefront of social transfonnation. Both practices doubtless occur m the 
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occupational routines of nursing and social work, but recent developments in tr'li"i,.., . . th 
• • • <UJ..u .. .llg POInt to ese 
professions commg under more direct state con~ol, effectlvely curtailing their autonomv d disc . 
Rather than address each of these professions and the developments in education 'an~ .. re~~n. 
I · uld "th trauuno lor them separate y, It wo se~m more consIstent WI the particular approach that underpins this 
paper to take matters themaucally or strucrurally and to identify convergences and comm ali' 
. . al .. Ii on Des 
by tracking empmc apprOXlffiatlOnS to my ear er stated ideal type or model. The theme here is 
control, of course, and more particularly the progressive movement of this beyond the sco 
influence of the profession itself. Now in each case under consideration the key agencies in sec:;r 
control on behalf of the s~ate are the :alidating bodies that variously promote, approve and inspec~ 
training programmes. WIth both SOCIal work and nursing these bodies are either substantiallv or 
part government funded and as such are appropriately accountable. Neither CCETS\,\' for s~ial 
work, nor the National Boards for nursing are in this sense independent and their 'charter' is inevitablv 
circumscribed by some fairly obvious commitments, the most notable of which is probably their 
role in contributing to workforce planning for what are in effect publicly funded experts in health 
and the personal social services. This means too that the statutory bodies are obligated to ensure 
that the volume and narure of training is consistent with whatever is sought by employers, and that 
they deliver the necessary skill mix that is shaped by Government policy which effectively decides 
these occupational tasks. And since validating bodies are like any other organization, there exists 
within them a deep seated interest in maintaining or enhancing influence and authority; policy 
compliance is clearly an effective means of doing this. 
For social work, recent changes in qualifying training requirements for the new Diploma in Social 
Work CDip SW) CCCETSW, 1991) have seen the introduction of a two year higher education 
programme as the basic qualification (though for graduates it is possible to secure a higher academic 
award contemporaneously). Specialization figures in the second year. There are proposals (CCETSW, 
1990) for an award beyond this basic one, which stands as equivalent to the second year of an 
undergraduate programme, and as such is a considerable advance on the much lower level requirements 
enshrined in the old Certificate of Qualification in Social Work. An inservice route to qualifying 
status is possible. Nursing, following the introduction of the Project 2000 proposals, (UKCC, 1986) 
has moved out of schools of nursing (where the 'students' were such in name only) into colleges 
linked to higher education that also award the new Diploma in Higher Education level qualifications 
for people who are now officially students rather than nurses in training. This is a three year 
programme, with 'branch' specialization during the last eighteen months and like the Dip SW is 
the academic equivalent of the second year of an honours degree course. Proposals are afoot for an 
advanced award that would secure an increasingly graduate level profession (ENB, 1991). 
Control by the centre: 'enforcing' new training practices 
This resume has so far pointed descriptively to some commonalities in the shifts to qualifying training. 
The parallels are important because of what is something of a latent theme here-namely that st11l~ru.~al 
hannonization makes much more likely professional integration and thereby greater operational flexz~zlz.ty 
in staff deployment. Nonetheless, it is important to revert to a thematic and conceptual fr:une \\:~ 
which more explicitly to see these changes and to offer an interpretation of what is happe~~. WIthin 
what I have already said is the theme of state control over professional education and tralIllIlg, so~e 
greater grasp of what this means empirically can be sought by looking at (i) contracting (t~ estab~h 
education's compliance with employer agendas), (ii) competencies (to set a national c.urnculwn ill 
professional education that allows for consistency and reliable tranSportability of the qualified worke~), 
d Coo.) . • f d f alified workers that will an ill -not entirely for alliterative purposes-the creatlon 0 a ca re 0 qu 
b I . . . d th ource managers and care e ess a cohort of quasl-mdependent profeSSIOnals, an ra er more res . . 
I f hi h st-qua!ifvrng awards p anners. The extension of specialization and the gradual emergence 0 g er po . 
are further elements within this. 
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Contracting 
It has become ~omm~n to. co~trast the movement .of nursing into higher education and the 
strengthening of Its SOCIal sCIentific knowledge base, WIth the tendency in social work education to 
remove disciplines that have been viewed as somehow disloyal or troublesome to professional 
. th di " th " purpose. It is certainly true, as e SCUSSIon m e next sessIOn IS meant to show, that social work has become 
much influenced by competency based education as a way of guaranteeing quality, but it would be 
a mistake to see nursing meandering off into a ~~r~d of academic indulgence. For both nursing and 
social work are now squarely employer led acuvlUes. Nurse education indeed may be linked with 
higher education, but the 'contract' to train is with Regional Health Authorities (Deparunem of 
Education and Science, 1990), and not with the education funding councils. Well versed in mercantilist 
purchaser-provider protocols, and with a strong sense of workforce needs, it is clear where the power 
in this relationship is likely to be located, and it is not difficult to imagine the agenda which feature 
in these contracting arrangements as the RHA draws up its specification for training. Hence the 
apparent 'progress' that marks the new Diploma course for nurses, and the assigning to these of 
full student status, is undercut by giving employers urunediated access to the cash nexus as a means 
of exercising more or less express control over nurse education. 
The situation is in some respects more indirect in the case of social work, but the effect is broadly 
the same nonetheless, and marks a significant curtailing of the education institutions' autonomy. 
Under the regulations for the Dip SW, the Council makes it obligatory for programmes to be submined 
in the form of partnerships between colleges and agencies (CCETSW, 1991). No social work course 
can be validated without such an arrangement which also entails-in theory anyway-collaboration 
with employers in all aspects of teaching, assessment and monitoring. Judging by the alacrity-if 
not enthusiasm-with which institutions have settled into partnerships, it would seem that if there 
are objections to these new arrangements then they have been quickly set aside in the interests of 
sustained existence. And since the only institution in these partnerships that depends for its immediate 
survival on the Dip SW also desperately needs student placements to keep in business, it is clear 
who holds the whip hand over participating colleges. 
So in both nursing and social work the shots are effectively called by the employers. Breaking 
the independence of the academy whilst simultaneously upgrading the academic level of training 
has meant that government has had it both ways; it means too that the academy can be obligated 
to change or redirect its curriculum in a manner that reflects employer requirements rather than 
the fancies of airy fairy theoreticians with their obdurate and obstructive notions that refer to 
abstractions rather than to practicality (Sibeon, 1990). Those employer-led events found elsewhere 
in education-TVEI, CPVE Compact Initiatives, NCVQ-are echoed in both social work and nursing 
as training has become more closely yoked to workforce demands. And it is in the specify~g of 
occupational competencies that a skills based outcome training rather than a process onented 
professional education has been gradually established. 
Competencies 
Competency based education insinuates a national curriculum into professional training; it rests upon 
the premise that occupationally derived tasks can be isolated and converted into identifiable outc~mes 
capable of assessment. The influence of industrial work study practices is clear. Promoted acuvely 
through the government funded National Council for Vocational Qualifications, competency based 
. . 'bili' kill d knowledge traming sets attainments at a series of levels denoting job size, responsI ty, s san· 
The scheme offers a framework'designed to hannonize and rationalize what was seen as the ramsha~~e 
plethora of vocational, technical and occasionally professional training schemes wher~ comparabili; 
Was vague and scope for protectionist occupational isolation rife. Only through a '!ead ~dustrY b~) d' 
with . . . ' al V . al Qualificauon go fo[\\ ar Us conSIderable employer representauon, can a Nauon ocauon 
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for ratification; no longer can a college engage in vocational training without b . . . 
elIlg masSI velv 
circwnscribed by demands set by employers. . 
This vocationalist discourse has had a considerable impact on both social work educau· d 
" on an nurse 
education. The requrrements for the new DIP SW and for Project 2000 have been couched in bras 
heavily influenced by the language of 'competencies' (see CCETSW, 1991; UKCC 1986· ~-41~ 
Whilst all this may be no more than validating bodies cynically taking a strategic d~isio~ t d I· 
. . d 0 a opt 
the Government's leXlcon m or er to curry favour (and resources) for implementing chosen ideas 
on the assumption that the new framework for education will become routinized, solidified and reified 
into teac~g practices, it is likely that the .c?nseq~ences will be more far-reaching than perhaps the 
strategists ill CCETSW or the UKCC ongmally mtended. 
Competencies, when linked to a training scheme that is employer driven, become a set of stipulations 
that effectively limit the latitude or discretion available at the periphery of an education system, and 
it is for this reason that the imagery of a national curriculwn has been introduced in order to convev 
a sense of the State's expanded role in defming certain knowledge and practices. So it is that a 'liberai' 
strategy of interdisciplinarity (in which old fashioned restrictions on co-operation and collaboration 
are set aside as counterproductive to conswner care), occurs alongside a strengthening of the centre's 
control over the direction of those professions should they 'elect' to come together in various ways. 
The theme of convergence has featured in the discussion so far-that there are correspondences 
in the structure of social work and nurse education which point up how both have become similarly 
placed within the 'training for care agenda'; that as semi-professions they are malleable and have 
proved amenable to recasting in terms of a new itinerary for training; that they are subject to advancing 
degrees of control by the state as part of an increasingly explicit subordination to policy agenda; 
and that any discretion or latitude that ever applied to these bureau-professionals (as 'caseworkers" -
for example) has been channelled elsewhere. 
Cadres 
There is a third common theme that applies to these occupations, and that is of an emerging cadre 
of specialists. Within both the Dip SW and Project 2000 there is an .emphasis on progressive 
differentiation of training for increasingly specific duties-in the case of social work, a 'Particular 
Area of Practice', and of nursing, 'Branch Studies'. But it is also at the levels below and above 
qualifying training that significance lies. Beneath lies an increasingly homogeneous group of care 
assistants or aides who will carry out the more routine and less discretionary aspects of social work 
or health care. Just as ambulance personnel have become distinguished (in the wake of a bitter dispute) 
between paramedics and what are in effect chauffeurs for the non-ambulant, so too vertical occupational 
stratification within the caring professions has become greater as lateral integration between them 
has intensified. The conditions for greater ~terprofessional collaboration may therefore be associated 
with boundaries that are more rigidly set between those levels that were hitherto often blurred ~d 
without rigid or precise adherence to title (the previously generic 'nurse' or 'social worker'). It re~ 
an open question, of course, whether these newly emerging cadres, especially at the post-qualify~g 
level of Higher A wards (in nursing) and post _qualifying and advanced awards (~ s~ial work). \~·ill 
segment into frrmly set occupational entities. The confidence that comes from ratificauon of ~s1Uon 
may enable more effective co-operation than when occupations are only tentatively and precano~ly 
holding on to 'standing and identity. It seems highly likely that the latter will be encourag~, Wlth 
any tendencies towards fragmentation being circumscribed by the stricture of control that IS now 
exened over these expert workers. 
So it is that strengthening' the cadre, which is both consequence and intent of the arr:angements 
for expanding and refining education for the caring professions, establishes greater confo~ty ~ugh 
the standardization of expectations. Such of course is the influence of the NVQ driven curncula 
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that have percolated into social work and into nursing. Yet simultaneously employer directed ._ 
sanctioned control makes for flexibility through shaping training better to adckess the .' con~ctf 
. . . . eXlgencies 0 
Government policy and the consequent nature of servIce delivery. Hence it is that in both nursino-
and social work there are signs that the cadres are being restructured or 'reshaped' as a 'new animal~ 
(UKCC, 1991:17; UKCC, 1986:33) to reflect fresh occupational demands. The historic divisions 
between, say, health visiting and district nursing would be subsumed within an integrated entity 
of Community Health Care Nursing, in such a way as to be consistent with "organisational chan ~ 
(which) will ... affect the kind of care offered by agencies and the composition of caring team;" 
(UKCC, 1991:10). And this requires a new knowledge base that is' itself more integrated looser in 
its classification between life science and social science. In social work likewise, distinctio;s between 
client group driven considerations which often promote operational inflexibility (such as amongst 
those concerned with the elderly or with mental illness or those with learning difficulties), has been 
replaced by a new 'specialism' of community care management in which agency determined practices 
draw upon skills that are highly transferable. (Alaszewski and Manthorpe, 1990). 
The emergence of cadres as a distinctive feature in the caring professions of nurs~g and social 
work reflect not so much a solidification or culmination of old professionalising tendencies, in which 
the semi-professions follow in the footsteps of the good (the clergy), the great (medicine) and the 
rich (the law), but rather these cadres are low on independence, and exemplify the new 'sponsorship' 
to which those professions are subject. Their position and support are conditional on them giving 
in return that flexibility which is a feature of the 'post modem' division of labour that Basil Bernstein 
suggests in this paper's opening quote is increasingly demanded in the organization of contemporary 
social activity (see also Alaszewski & Manthorpe, 1990). 
Conclusion 
As an ambition, interprofessional activity in the caring professions emerges from somewhere; it has 
its own 'sociogenesis'. Certainly there are individual champions of such 'progress' and there are 
sponsors such as this journal that promote collaboration as an infInitely preferable way of addressing 
the totality of human existence than is allowed by an antiquated demarcation by specialists. But all 
this-desirable though it may be-sits within a context, aild it is the consideration of this that gives 
a measure of 'reflexivity' to the pursuit of interprofessionalism, even though in so doing a degree 
of sociological bleakness falls over yet another scene of human endeavour. 
The paper locates developments in nurse and social work education within a framework of control, 
in which both are becoming increasingly subject to direction by part of the state apparatus-namely 
the statutory validating bodies. Although the academic enhancement of programmes of study suggest 
an embryonic attempt at the emulation of conventional professions, the increasingly clo:e 
superintendence of nursing and social work ·training indicates that autonomy and independence will 
remain low and that they will be subject to labour market requirements to a high degree. 
Interprofessional care, however much inspired it may be by sentiment and reason, is also subject 
to an imperative for workforce flexibility that is important to a neo-liberal administration repugned 
by restrictive practices and by 'archaic' task demarcations. . 
The paradox of a liberal, progressive or humane social activity-which is what in~erprofesslOnal 
care is announced as ushering in-sitting within a structure that is defined by mecharusms of.c.on~ol 
. . . bl ~ tilitarlan IS perhaps not an attractive one. However, it would be by no means mconcelva e or a ~ 
view to be taken in which the virtue afforded by the restructuring of the professional sphere IS ~eater 
than the hann occasioned by the breaking of old occupational liberties that are no longer swted to 
the principle of the greatest goOd. Either way though, it remains the case-or at least the case ad\'~ced 
he th . .. b eparated from the wIde:-
re- at understanding the progress of mterprofesslOnal care cannot e s 
COntext of political, ideological and economic interests that are embodied in the state. 
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Chapter 10 
Regulation for radicals 
The state, CCETSW and the academy 
David Webb 
There's nothing more guaranteed to excite the sociologist than the 
opportunity to uncover the gap between humanity'S good intentions 
and prosaic reality. Exposing and then disposing of idealist illusions 
in the face of materiality remains a staple analytical device of 
sociology, despite the rather breathless rehabilitation of human 
agency in the discipline's explanatory repertoire. And what better 
subject on which to tryout this debunking tactic than anything to do 
with the welfare state and those that work within it. Here we have 
charitable, doubtless well-intentioned and often reformist sentiment, 
individuals too who frequently possess the noblest of attitude and 
who look to serious changes in the way society ought to be organised. 
Yet what is the picture portrayed by those who are sociologists or 
who have come under their influence? That the welfare state is 
fiscally dependent on capitalism, thereby making a sham of anything 
but the most modest and conditional transformations; that welfare 
practitioners engage in practices that routinise cases in order to 
process them more readily; that these same welfare workers are 
reproducing social relations and transmitting ideology or, as the 
Foucauldians have it, are 'distributing norms'; that they support 
racist and sexist practices; that the 'helping' organisations within 
which they work are patriarchal and oppressive of disadvantaged 
women employees. Although claims made in the past - such as social 
work being what Halmos (1965) called 'altruism under social 
auspices' - seem endangered and naIve when set within a soci-
ological framing of social work which casts it as politically com-
promised and morally suspect, it would be wrong to assume that the 
same scepticism 'should not be brought to bear upon contemporary 
and equivalent claims for ethical perfection. 
More recently, social work (like social welfare more generally) 
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has been pictured as swept along by post-Fordist shifts in the nature 
of production and underpinning work tasks, as the organisation of 
welfare begins to emulate that found in other spheres of the economy 
(Burrows and Loader, 1994). Decentralisation, team-based work, 
purchaser-provider quasi-markets; the decomposition of social work 
as a coherent (if semi-)profession in the face of a prospective 
independence of probation training, and signs of indivisibility 
between certain social-work and community nursing tasks, all 
suggest that something quite significant is happening to the roles and 
tasks of the social worker. And as sociology has charted the 
admittedly contested onset of postmodernity, so too has social work 
been set within this putative rupture in how we approach truth, 
reason and culture. In short, and not surprisingly, we are told that 
social work simply cannot stand alone and outside capitalism, trying 
somehow to have both its cake and eat it by existing simultaneously 
within and against the state. Indeed, if anything, social work is 
'overdetermined' by that economic and social formation so that its 
status is best seen as relatively subordinate rather than as relatively 
autonomous. Put at its most uncompromisingly straightforward, state 
welfare is an element within the state apparatus, and as such will be 
to some extent articulated with it at both ideological and material 
levels. While it would be too teleological or 'functionalist' to 'read 
off' the nature of social work from the nature of the state, at the same 
time it does not take any special sociological insight to realise that 
the relationship between the two is worthy of reflection as we try to 
understand the nature of social work under conditions of con-
temporary change. 
What passes for social work is the product of the varying capacity 
of certain institutions and agencies to give it a particular definition, 
to shape what it is that constitutes legitimate professional knowledge 
and the manner in which the delivery of services should be organised. 
In both respects this means that the nature of social work is an 
"accomplishment, a construction, or the product of what Althusser 
called 'ideological practices'. In view of the role that social work 
plays in remoralising the poor, or in returning people to utility, or in 
policing the boundaries between waywardness and righteousness, 
then it is understandable that a great deal of political interest will be 
shown in the manner by which these duties are discharged by welfare 
professionals. . 
All this is but a continuation of that sociological worrying about 
how things are not as they seem, and that in our enquiries we need 
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to search endlessly for better (or perhaps more adequate) under-
standings of what is 'really' going on. It is this which allows 
sociology (or at least certain traditions within the discipline) to claim 
that it is a science. In truth, sociology cannot long stay with 
description alone nor with the purely empirical. It is weak in resistin a 
the temptation to explain, to generate causal explanations. to put thi~ 
or that institution or event sequentially and conceptually before 
another so that some order can be imposed on experience. It is 
something that David Matza (1964) some time ago called 'soft 
determinism' and which has had a contemporary echo in Giddens' 
theory of structuration, whereby there is an attempt to cope with the 
sheer limiting materiality of human existence without succumbing 
to anti-humanist determinism. Although this shies away from re-
ducing human activity to the remorseless and invariant force of 
social circumstance, permitting instead some latitude for what is 
sometimes termed 'action' or what Giddens terms 'agency', there 
remains the sociological equivalent of the deus ex machina - the 
looming presence of causal antecedents. of structure, of materiality, 
or of inescapable 'social facts'. 
OFS\VET - THE OFFICE OF SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING: A NE\V NAME FOR CCETSW? 
Of course social work is caught up in a wider trajectory than a history 
of its own making. Its form under what is sometimes called 
'postmodernity' is clearly what exercises much of this book, reflect-
ing previous concerns to locate socially within this meta-narrative 
the reasons for certain shifts in the practices and discourses within 
which the enterprise may sit (Parton, 1994a; Howe, 1994). This 
particular chapter is only obliquely about the practice of social work 
and the various changes to the organisation of welfare agencies or 
the typical work tasks of individual practitioners. Rather, it continues 
an earlier attempt to say something about the role of a particular 'key 
definer' of what passes for the nature of social work (Webb, 1991). 
Howard Becker used the notion of a 'moral entrepreneur' to capture 
the motivations and interests of those competing to secure the right 
to declare the boundary between virtue and waywardness. Here the 
accumulation ana investment of cultural and moral capital is being 
managed by the statutory body responsible for the education and 
training of social workers as it seeks to define the nature and scope 
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of competent practice and professional ethics. The Central Council 
for Edu~ati?n an.d Training i~ Social Work (CCETSW) has always 
done thIS SInce It was estabhshed by statute in 1971 'to promote 
training in relevant social work for staff in local authorities, health 
and social services boards in Northern Ireland, the probation service. 
the education welfare service and the voluntary and private sectors' 
(CCETSW, 1994b: 7). CCETSW sets down the content and standards 
of training programmes and therefore determines what it is that a 
proficient social worker needs to know and do. It has also an 
inspection role by which the Council supervises training pro-
grammes in order to assure quality, something which gives it licence 
to lay down expectations of those universities that are associated 
with professional education, a point of some significance for a 
'regulator' and one that will be given more attention later in 
this chapter. 
It goes without saying that the role of CCETSW as a legitimator 
and definer of social-work knowledge and skills is not the product 
of a genteel debate among the good and the wise about what it would 
be nice to see in qualifying training for social work, though there is 
a suspicion that in CCETSW's past this may indeed have been the 
case. The Council has become increasingly answerable to govern-
ment as an instrument for policy control over skill mix and the 
workforce superintendence that accompanies placing social-work 
training under the auspices of employers (Jones, 1989. 1994; Webb. 
1992). And CCETSW with its Chair and up to 25 members appointed 
by the Secretary of State is nothing if not an extension of employer 
interests. 
There have occurred a number of recent modifications to the 
requirements made of those centres providing social-work training 
and education, and it is with these and what they express about the 
social location of social work that this chapter is concerned. In large 
measure the exemplification of change is to be traced through 
.CCETSW·s Paper 30. the document that ushered in the new Diploma 
in Social Work (DipSW), setting down expectations and regulations 
about the key themes of training, morality and partnership, around 
which this chapter will range. Although this document has .b~en 
reviewed and although there look to be revisions to the tram~ng 
regulations, the underlying form of the Council'S strategy remams 
largely unaltered; There is, however, a particularly significant textual 
amendment which has attracted some attention. The original Paper 
30 spoke about the basis for one particular aspect of its moral thrust 
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as resting on the 'endemic racism' in British society. Not surprisingly, 
this was not well received in certain quarters of the administrati;n 
and alone probably accounts for why CCETSW has been required to 
revise something which was only launched two years before this 
DipSW review was announced. Needless to say, the inflammatory 
(though empirically verifiable) utterance no longer appears in the 
new documentation that CCETSW has produced, accompanied no 
doubt by murmuring about the hubris being visited on the Council. 
The revisions to Paper 30 notwithstanding, its initial appearance 
marked a paradigmatic shift in the discursive practice of social-work 
education and training. These cultural and ideological changes in the 
preferred content of social-work education are ones that I will try to 
assess as having properties that are postmodem. There is at the same 
time an equally interesting move in the way that skills and com-
petencies are being reconstituted by CCETSW that has a distinctly 
post-Fordist air of workforce flexibility about it. Analytically, these 
general and conceptual points can be approached through seeing the 
Central Council as seeking to frame social work within three 
extremely significant and inter-linked domains: first, the stipulation 
of practice competence by means of a discourse around 'training'; 
second, the requirement of demonstrable moral conduct towards 
social oppression; and third, through the insistence on 'partnership' 
in delivering social work there is the de-centring of the academy as 
the site within which what passes for social work knowledge is set. 
STRATEGIC CHOICE, SETTLING SCORES AND 
CCETSW'S SURVIVAL 
Regulation occupies an important place in the analysis of modernity. 
Its role is in securing essential predictability for the control of 
productive forces and for the surveillance of the social relations 
which flow from these forces and upon which they depend. The 
panopticon was regarded by Foucault as exemplifying proximate 
hierarchical surveillance operating through concrete and empirical 
solutions to the problem of order, whereas the emergence of social 
control by the moral and psychological reconstruction of a person 
through the benign interventions of the psy-experts presents the 
regulation of actual or potential deviants in a 'new' form - and one 
that is in some way postmodern. However, neither Foucault nor 
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Donz~lot s.p:culat~s o.n ~hat happe~s if the norm distributing 
agencIes fall In then ObjectIve of what In an earlier epoch was called 
(by the Victorians - rather presciently) 'gentling the masses'. 
Foucault, for example, seems to consider only a progressive and 
unilinear trajectory of increasing complexity and sophistication as 
remote surveillance triumphs over proximate control. However - and 
Parton (1994a) alludes to this exhaustion, or crisis, of tutelage - the 
predicament within the welfare approach to social disruption does 
not automatically lead to the perfection of yet more efficient and 
subtle techniques of norm distribution. It leads instead to techniques 
of behavioural change, a backtracking to the future with practices 
involving hierarchical surveillance and more or less unmediated 
regulation. What we are presently witnessing (in social-work educa-
tion as in social work itself) is an instance of conservative modern-
isation, in which economic liberalisation joins with increasingly 
desperate measures brought to bear in order to secure compliance 
with political and economic objectives. 
Whilst a political and moral endorsement of the 'social' (and its 
psy-experts) exemplifies high modernity in securing conformity 
through self-regulation or by the legitimate interventions of the 
'secular priests' in the resolution of personal malfunction, this 
inevitably depends on some sort of concordat between the state and 
these 'distributors of norms'. But if this breaks down, the issue of 
governance becomes critical. And indisputably it has broken down 
in the case of social work and how its training is conducted. The 
'fragile discursive practice' (Parton, 1994a) of social-work educa-
tion is once more under further investigation for its failure to deliver 
reliability of product. The evidence is clear: yet another 'functional 
analysis' of the roles and tasks of the social worker in order to find 
out exactly what it is these unreliable, if not treacherous, welfare 
workers actually do (Jones, 1994); and, as we have already seen, 
there is a politically inspired review of the DipSW almost before its 
. first award-holders have hit the streets, as well as a Home Office 
'scrutiny' of probation training with the transparent objective of 
recovering control of what was relinquished in the heady days of 
generic training in the mid-1960s. Something appears to be on the 
verge of a break-up: there are signs in these events of the de-
composition of old certainties, with difference, fragmentation a~d 
hyper-pluralism becoming increasingly the postmodern world withm 
which social work struggles to survive. 
Despite the value-talk centred on anti-oppression - which not only 
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cynics see as having been offered as a strategic concession to some 
of its constituents (Dominelli, 1991) - CCETSW exists as a quasi 
non-governmental regulatory body that operates only with the 
permission of the departments of state which sponsor and fund it. It 
is an element in governance that constitutes or constructs the way in 
which social-work education is formed and the practices and know-
ledge that are permissible therein. Within a context of the problem-
atic superintendence of what the Victorians called the dangerous and 
threatening aggregates, social workers need to become reliable state 
agents and CCETSW must perforce play its part in ensuring precisely 
this. The recent, and as we have seen, the continuing history of the 
organisation revolves around its struggle to secure sufficient cred-
ibility to remain in sponsored existence. Though this context consti-
tutes an environment which significantly shapes the possibilities that 
CCETSW is able to mobilise, measures taken by its senior executives 
within this set of imperatives should still be seen as conscious 
designs on how to secure the organisation's future. It is in this sense 
that we can use the notion of strategic choice that has played a part 
in the study of organisational behaviour (Bryman, 1993). 
A current means of meeting the goal of corporate survival is to 
emulate the neo-liberal regulatory machinery that government has 
employed to police the activities of organisations which have been 
freed from the shackles of corporatism. Managing the productive 
forces within contemporary capitalism is set within this seeming 
paradox of organisational decentralisation on the one hand and 
centralised strategic control on the other (Hoggett, 1994). But it is 
only an apparent paradox, for there is a seamlessness to the 
apparatuses that play a complementary role in the maintenance of 
order, with the present arrangements for the administration and 
superintendence of social-work education serving as something of a 
case study of these new forms of integrated and multi-level social 
~ontrol. These strategies of intervention work through those three 
interlinked domains of training, morality and partnership that have 
already been identified as the new frame for social-work education. 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with isolating each of 
these elements in turn. 
TRAINING, COMPETENCIES AND PERFORMANCE 
The emphasis on training and the specification of competencies has 
set a tightness to CCETSW's regulatory project since it allows an 
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intr.usive~ess into. the academy t~at was. hitherto not possible. Up 
until. the mtroductlOn oft?e new Dlpl~ma III Social Work the training 
reqUlrements for professlOnal educatIOn were relatively permissive 
and accordingly gave scope for a greater emphasis on knowledge 
than on skills. This had given the universities and colleges sufficient 
space to determine matters in their own light and to write the 
curriculum according to agendas that were only partly determined 
by the concerns of narrow technical proficiency. There can be little 
doubt that the expansion in the social sciences of the late 1960s _ 
and sociology and more latterly 'critical' social policy exemplified 
this - led to a major shift in the prevailing conceptual framework 
through which social-work knowledge was transmitted (Jones, 1994). 
It seemed that control of professional socialisation had been ceded 
to most unreliable custodians. The independence of the academy 
posed an increasing problem for CCETSW, as the universities' claim 
for academic freedom led to doubts about the Council's capacity to 
give direction to training that was not going to be compromised by 
the mischievous meddling of people for whom academic values had 
supplanted professional ones. Quite simply this meant that it would 
never be possible for CCETSW to exercise leverage (and thereby 
secure its own future) unless that autonomy could be broken. 
From the early 1970s onwards there has been a frequently 
articulated - and more often than not politically orchestrated - set 
of public utterances doubting the calibre of social workers, with 
various strategies of shaming, mockery and degradation being 
brought to play in repudiating not only state welfare workers, but 
those whose social incompetence or deviance found them in the inept 
clutches of these 'do-gooders'. Much of the 'evidence' that some-
thing was seriously wrong with the capabilities of social workers was 
supplied through the increasing number of child abuse enquiries. 
CCETSW did not demur from this (Jones, 1989), and behind the 
scenes contributed to the dissemination of the view that training 
"needed a thorough overhaul. The then professional qualification -
the Certificate of Qualification in Social Work (CQSW) was por-
trayed by CCETSW itself as inadequate as a basis for contemporary 
practice as it sought to show government how it would put the world 
of training to right. Key (if maverick) opinion-formers within the 
academy such as Martin Davies (Professor of Social Work at the 
University of East Anglia) and Robert Pinker (of the Lon~on Scho~l 
of Economics) also played a significant role in the fraIll1ng of thIS 
challenge to standards in soCial-work education, largely from a 
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sociological 'logic-of-place' perspective which owed a good deal to 
structural-functionalism. Attacking both the excesses of ambitious 
(often politically radical) social-work-driven meta-narratives of 
social change as well as the corporatist interferences of CCETSW in 
the academy, these neo-liberal voices added to the increasina 
destabilisation of the enterprise of social-work education. 0 
As so often, a moment of crisis coincides with, or prompts, 
changes in personnel. In 1986, a new director was appointed to 
CCETSW. Quite clearly he was charged with putting matters straight 
and with mounting something of a last ditch attempt to show that 
CCETSW had a future. Central to this would have to be the delivery 
of an improved social-work training. It was an initiative that required 
various endorsements, although at that particular moment of supreme 
confidence within the Thatcher administration there was little inclin-
ation to be forthcoming except for the most hawkish of develop-
ments. The answer for CCETSW to this problem of providing 
sufficient robustness, and the key to government support, was the 
employer-led initiatives that were taking place in vocational educa-
tion more widely and which were (and still are) guided by the 
National Council for Vocational Qualifications. CCETSW promoted 
very actively employer involvement in the various designs for the 
new award that it laid out, principally on the grounds that education 
had become so deficient that the only way that universities and 
colleges could remedy these failings (for which they were repre-
sented as accountable) was at long last to heed the voice of the 
'consumer' . 
It was clear that 'collaboration' (or the rather more palatable 
'partnership') was to be the linchpin of the strategy to bring the 
colleges into line. Part of this was the concerted promotion of the 
Certificate of Social Service (CSS) as equivalent to professional 
education, something that it had never been designed to be. This 
award, which had been introduced in 1977 as an in-service route for 
. social services staff generally in residential settings, had always been 
set as a lower-level academic qualification to the CQSW, although 
there was a widespread view among employers that it produced 
competent workers. But its most significant distinguishing feature 
was the joint management arrangements that saw the mandatory 
involvement of social-work agencies in determining the nature and 
content of education and training. Without such involvement educa-
tional centres would not secure CCETSW's approval to operate the 
scheme. Despite all the evidence about the expense and the cumber-
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someness of the managerial structures of CSS, it emerged in effect 
as the model for the futur~ Diploma in Social Work, almost entirely 
be~aus~ of the part~ershlp .between colleges ~nd agencies upon 
whIch It rested. And mterestmgly, the CSS resonated with a strong 
anti-elitist sentiment in some quarters of the educational world, 
especially that in the further education sector which had been 
assiduously courted by CCETSW as it sought to build new strategic 
alliances that would cut across what would otherwise be an unhelpful 
educational unity. CSS was the Trojan horse welcomed by the 
academy (or at least some sections of it), from which spilled the 
proposals and plans for what was to become the Diploma in Social 
Work. CCETSW would bring the querulous secular clerics of a 
recalcitrant academy into line and at the same time offer a way to 
restructure the welfare workforce through a realignment of the 
training and education mix (Pinker, 1984). In this way CCETSW was 
an eager exemplar of social work's own post-Fordism of flexibility, 
decentralisation and market plurality. It 'appeared' to loosen its 
direct control over education, creating instead pseudo-autonomous 
programme providers operating as quasi-businesses founded on 
semi-contractual mutual partnerships in order to meet the 'speci-
fications' set by the Council. 
These moves are aspects of recent shifts in the relative weighting 
given to education and training within social work, and in particular 
the emergent emphasis on the specifying of tasks to be done rather 
than knowledge to be gleaned. The movement is from the depth 
exolanations of modernism's concern with transcendent truth to 
.. 
postmodernity and its multiplicities of surface performance. But 
postmodernity is not an epoch which is beyond control: rather, it 
offers a vision of other modes by which control is exercised. Thus 
the performance of tasks or competencies is in the public domain, so 
these are capable of being owned, set and controlled to a high degree 
by others. They are observable and therefore verifiable and predict-
able. Knowledge, on the other hand, tends towards being more 
private, less open to the specification of what it should encompass. 
It is less calculable and more idiosyncratic: it smacks of abstraction 
and unreliability - you cannot know what someone is thinking, but 
you can see what they do. Because the regulatory discourse that 
CCETSW has embraced must perforce operate with certainties and 
the measurable, the pedagogic consequences within socia~-work 
education have followed accordingly, with the consequenuaI de-
centring of the academy. 
182 David Webb 
Through this reconstruction the social-work academy has beco 
. I . f me 
a vlrtua extenslOn 0 the National Council for Vocational Qualifica-
tions (Jones, 1989). Geared to, and obsessed by, ,the prosaic achieve-
ment of competence (and only the English could erect policy around 
the humdrum of competence rather than the excitement of excel-
lence), the new approach to training produces superficially accomp-
lished performers able to demonstrate through appearance and 
exhibition their entitlement to certification. The dramaturgical 
connotation is significant, with identity in high modernity being more 
and more built around the 'face work' of bearing semblance 
(Giddens, 1991). 
Social-work education seems to have become firmly established 
as a surface-oriented activity: in fact the traditional Arnoldian idea 
of education sits ever uneasily within the enterprise as an 'old-
fashioned' diversion just as does the modernising project, which is 
about exposing the errors and limitations of pre-scientific, partial and 
superstitious thought. 'Education' for all its civility and comprom-
ises with the dominant culture, wrenches the heart out of the 
cherished and taken-for-granted as it inspects and interrogates. 
Training, on the other hand, cannot be bothered with these questions 
of deep structure. It looks rather to the observationally verifiable. It 
suspends consideration of the existentially or epistemologically 
troubling. 'Training' takes to some sort of ultimate resolution the 
empiricism of English modernity because it deletes the radical and 
querulous refutationist elements that empiricism contained. Training 
leaves us with only the illusion of certainty because of what it 
otherwise suspends. 
Training for competence therefore yokes social workers to the 
requirements of those who purchase their labour as professional 
expertise becomes increasingly commodified through the breaking 
of any semblance of generic unity. Through functional analysis of 
the social worker's job (as CCETSW is currently doing) is generated 
a strategy for the control both of employees and of education since 
the contract for delivering these becomes capable of very high 
degrees of precision. The fragmentation of occupational activity by 
the more or less exact specification of skills lends rational measure-
ment of use value through the segmentation of those skills. Less tied 
to anyone particular job or post, these skills can now be tran~ferred 
from setting to setting, and across boundaries which were hlt~erto 
set by the restrictive practices of occupational and profeSSIOnal 
power. The initiatives in joint training between social workers and 
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community mental health nurses stand as an instance in which labour 
flexibility is being facilitated through the involvement of validating 
bodies - which in this case includes the national boards for nursing 
alongside CCETSW (Webb, 1992). Functional specialism has also 
enabled the Home Office to begin its long-planned move to withdraw 
probation officer training from generic education, on the ostensible 
grounds that separate and specific skills are needed which can no 
longer be provided through the Diploma in Social Work. There is 
little reason not to see this as a further instance of how differentiation 
of task leads to fragmentation of activity and an expansion in the 
subordination of welfare workers to very tightly specified employer 
concerns (see also Pinch, 1994). 
THE STYLE COUNCIL? 
Parallel with the regulatory character of the new award with its 
highly prescriptive stipulation of competencies was a wider set of 
injunctions within social-work education: as we have seen, judge-
ments of capability are increasingly set in terms of the superficial 
certainties that come from task specification and competencies. And 
this has generated an orthodoxy reflected in the new morality that is 
enunciated through CCETSW's declarations. This is not to enter into 
a foolhardy discussion about the rightness or wrongness of that 
discourse, but it is rather to see it as an expression of an emerging 
process of 'surface' competencies that must be demonstrated be-
haviourally. For good reason or not, the requirements that have been 
promulgated about anti-oppressive practice are part and parcel of the 
same training mentality that has pervaded the rest of the regulator'S 
view of social-work education. Superficially radical, this approach 
to values none the less exists within a performance-orientated 
discourse which has been set within a similarly behavioural/surface 
mode to the other competencies that are now required to be 
demonstrated by the tyro social worker. 
I have elsewhere offered what I called a speculation on the 'socio-
genesis' of this 'new moral discourse', something which is marked 
by righteousness, censoriousness and certitude as well as by the 
preparedness to implement the sanction of ban (Webb, 1991). I called 
this 'puritan', arguing that the momentum within social work was 
encouraged by earlier modifications to the law which 'progressive' 
forces in the 1960s and 1970s had applauded as successful inter-
ventions in civil society around the social divisions of gender, race 
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and childhood. But the cultural force~ at work are again contrapuntal. 
Although there are here advances m the protection of vulnerable 
citizens, these changes in social solidarity expressed through the law 
also entail permission to renounce an earlier ethic of forgiveness 
whi~h ~an now b~ replaced by one marked by the superficiality of 
retnbutIOn. The smner has no hope of experiencing the abstraction 
or tentativeness of redemption, or of receiving philanthropy under 
social auspices, but is instead cast out into the community, that 
modern equivalent of a wilderness. 
I did not in that earlier piece locate my speculations within a set 
of considerations that looked specifically at the features of social 
work in the modern age, though I think that by implication the 
discussion in 'Puritans and Paradigms' approached this question, for 
it remarked on the formal similarity between the rhetorical cer-
tainties of Thatcherism and those of the new paradigm. However, I 
have sought here to extend those ideas a little by taking another 
perspective towards this new moral discourse. CCETSW's value-talk 
around oppression issues is carried out within what Callinicos (1990) 
discusses as the abandonment of class and the de-politicising of 
resistance, substituting the realist categories of the social sciences 
with a list of oppressions jostling for attention and action. It is also 
divorced from any account of causation or of inter-relationships 
between social categories. As David Howe has noted, this expresses 
a postmodern preference for ontology over epistemology, where 
truth resides in the being of various status positions rather in 
elaborate systems of 'abstract' social categories such as, for ex-
ample, the less resiliently experiential one of class. Truth then 
becomes de-centred and localised (Howe, 1994). Certainly the 
enunciation of those differences which have not hitherto been 
represented within discourses of social division constitutes a lifting 
of amnesia within the humanities and social sciences. Yet fragmenta-
tion around a multitude of oppressions and the politicisation of 
. difference have a resonance with the seductive discourses of locality, 
community and empowerment that have figured within the rhetoric 
of neo-liberalism. It is difference rather than commonality that 
CCETSW has found itself endorsing. Ostensibly progressive, at the 
same time this sits within a set of cultural practices in a way which 
Machiavelli probably would have found commendable. 
None the less, there is inherent instability within the new discou~se 
that CCETSW has sought to establish within the value-talk of s~clal 
work, demonstrating that there remains a tension between vanous 
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domains of certainty and orthodoxy. As part of the most recent 
review of qualifying training CCETSW has been forced to withdraw 
the declaration about endemic racism in Britain that appears in annex 
5 to the original 1991 regulations for the Diploma in Social Work 
(CCETSW, 1994a). Not surprisingly, given its manifest clash with 
sentiments about the basically decent nature of Britain, the clause 
had caused consternation in ministerial circles: it was clear that a 
new chair of Council (appointed in the summer of 1993) was set as 
a high priority the task of seeing the offending passage removed. 
Ironically, what seems to have made this victory relatively easy lies 
with the way in which CCETSW had effectively excluded the very 
social sciences (and in effect the social scientists too) that could have 
been brought to bear on demonstrating empirically that racism (and 
any other oppression for that matter) is indeed structurally endemic. 
But because CCETSW has consistently failed to acknowledge the 
complexities in conceptualising oppression (and in particular the 
analytical problems of determining system and personal attributes), 
it has found itself manifestly unable to mount a defence of its 
position. Furthermore, since its approach to anti-discrimination has 
been framed around competencies to the almost total exclusion of 
analysis and 'knowledge', it remains epistemologically unstable. By 
this I mean that anti-discrimination becomes precarious and easily 
eroded, as undoubtedly it has been for CCETSW in its capitulation 
to those who would seek its removal from Paper 30. 
It is in this sense that CCETSW exemplifies certain features that 
could be regarded as quintessentially postmodern. There is the 
absence of a deep structure (about 'causes', for example) to the new 
moral discourse, which remains primarily framed within the super-
ficiality of rhetoric and competencies. There is the excising or 
obscuring of complexity and a reluctance to give much space to the 
interconnectedness between oppressions which instead become rend-
ered as competing, almost 'individualistic' characteristics (Graham, 
1992). There is the associated imagery of oppressions being some-
how choosable, arrayed almost as in a market for selection. Further-
more, CCETSW has in general given licence to a strong essentialist 
inclination of the kind that Robert Merton some time ago called 
'insiderist' (1972), whereby the possession of certain physical 
attributes (gender, 'race') become not only necessary but sufficient to 
guarantee that the'individual can convey an appropriate position on 
the matter at hand. As Roger Sibeon puts it after his very detailed 
consideration of the reductionist tendencies within the current value-
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talk of social work: 'essentialist theoretical categorisations that 
conflate ... complex empirical realities have inevitably produced an 
ineffectual politics of ... fragmentation and division' (1991). And 
this is precisely where CCETSW has ended up, unable to sustain a 
stance that it has so forcefully demanded of others. The consequences 
of all this for the social-work academy have not been insignificant 
either, as it has become caught up in the educational and moral re-
alignment that has been orchestrated by the validating body. 
NO DIRECTION KNOWN: DERACINATING THE 
ACADEMY 
The activity of social-work education has been noticeably reframed, 
culminating in the cluster of changes associated with the Council's 
Paper 30. There has been the supplanting of education by training; 
the sequestering of discourses of depth by those of surface; the 
setting aside of knowledge for skills, and the general triumph and 
solemnising of 'competencies' over the complexities of abstraction. 
This is about casting anew the definition of what passes for social 
work as a practical and conceptual activity. It is about synchronicity 
winning over the diachronic. 
CCETSW has established a range of regulations and requirements 
for the education and training of social workers, which, if the 
academy is to remain in the business, it has been obliged to accept. 
This new agenda has altered the balance of autonomy hitherto 
enjoyed by social-work education, and instead through 'programme 
partnerships' has brought it into a direct and subordinate client 
relationship if not with employers, then at least with the new 
manager cadres of the personal social services. CCETSW, for all its 
pronouncements about 'combating oppression' has effectively notar-
ised relationships of a kind that are fully consonant with those of 
conservative modernisation. Its structural position is set four-square 
within what were once called the ideological state apparatuses: 
'surface' exhortations to repudiate discrimination sit alongside what 
is in effect an endorsement of neo-liberalism. 
All this is in its widest sense about an alignment to two sets of 
moral obligations, both of which run through the enterprise of social-
work education. These concern the pursuit of truth, and its transcend-
ence of other loyalties, alongside the recognition that what Merton 
called 'group-influenced perspectives' about social divisions have 
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indeed contributed significantly to sensitising us to matters that 
rightly demand our intellectual attention (Merton, 1972: 44). Some-
how there needs to be a resolution of these increasingly conflicting 
demands if social work is to hold a place within the academy. With 
the 'new direction' taken by CCETSW pushing the venture in a 
particular way, then it may be timely to wonder whether the interests 
of social-work education might not be best served by rethinking, 
perhaps quite radically, the relationship between qualifying training 
and the social-work academy. 
IN OTHER WORDS .•• 
The new Diploma in Social Work did lots of things, all of them 
consistent with CCETSW's stated or covert objectives. First, and as 
living expression of an anti-intellectual 'component of the national 
culture' (Anderson, 1968), the organisation revenged itself on the 
universities, who had been seen as uppity, too clever by half and 
unwilling to bring the sociological 'radicals' within social-work 
education into line. From now on the universities would be unable 
to move without taking into account the 'sensible' concerns of 
welfare agencies, something which would be guaranteed to check the 
indulgences of the academy. Second, CCETSW was able to demon-
strate to government that it could deliver reliably within the prevail-
ing NVQ-driven and employer-led ethos of vocational training. It 
thereby acted as a 'relay' of government policy to secure a trust-
worthy and predictable labour force of welfare workers whose 
previous unpredictability, unreliability and autonomy were seen to 
be the source of the ills that they should be solving (Jessop, 1994). 
Third, it served as a vehicle for integrating new and sometimes 
querulous entrants to social work. By virtue of the changing 
demographic and ideological profile of both practitioners and, 
increasingly, members of the academy, there was a danger that 
training was on the verge of meeting its own particular 'legitimation 
crisis'. Fourth, CCETSW used the new award at least to try to repair 
the years of indifference that it had shown to probation training and 
therefore to the Home Office, because it had a means to demonstrate 
that the needs of all branches of social work were now fully 
encompassed by its flexible and competency-specific model. Fifth, 
and as accumulation of the other achievements, CCETSW was able 
to secure its own position as an increasingly reliable agent of 
government and ministerial and departmental concerns. 
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This chapter has been an attempt to understand the way in which 
social workers, as 'technicians of normalisation' are constituted as 
agents of a particular strategy of governance via the injunctions 
issued through the validating body which sets the training agenda. 
It considered the paradox of superficial radicalism occurrino within 
• 0 
the shell of a reactlOnary neo-liberal state and speculated about the 
degree to which what I have elsewhere called the new moral 
discourse of social work is an expression of 'life-style' adjustments 
to the postmodern world that social work has come to inhabit. Above 
all, the chapter considered the role of CCETSW as the instrument 
for securing the dirigiste restructuring of professional training 
through framing professional social work as a flexible, technically 
specific (and highly specified) enterprise in which skill-mix con-
siderations are put to work at the behest of employers. As part of 
this enterprise we saw that CCETSW has deleted the abstractions, 
scepticisms and meta-narratives of the social sciences in favour of 
surface renderings of complex social and moral dilemmas as 
predominantly technical difficulties. In one guise CCETSW has 
promulgated a set of moral axioms, while in another has contributed 
to the 'modernisation' of social care so that it can be contained 
within the framework of employer-led considerations. Seemingly 
progressive in the domain of surface representations around words 
and statements, the deeper structure of compliance and complicity 
with the neo-liberal state's agenda is only revealed when we suspend 
our infatuation with CCETSW as a disseminator of utterance but 
read it instead as 'an almost perfectly designed vehicle' for the 
implementation of the conservative modernisation of social work 
(Brewster, 1992). 
The theme that has been pursued here is of course about the 
regulation of social-work education. This reflects the widespread neo-
liberal practice of setting boundaries to the liberties and freedoms 
that have been promulgated through ideological rhetoric and organ-
isational deregulation. Variety and local conditions may appear to 
empower and legitimise local consortia which 'deliver' training, but 
in reality the regulatory framework and the specification of com-
petencies is doing no more than establish a national curriculum in 
social work. The creation of programme consortia into which have 
been inserted the interests if not of employers then of a new cadre 
of public-service managers has simply exemplified the cross-flo.\\-:ing 
features that are widespread throughout contemporary ~ohtIcal 
economy. This 'dissipates and splits into a plethora of locahsed and 
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partial policies pursued by local or partial interests' (Parton, 1994a: 
28). So CCETSW promotes decentralisation of programme delivery 
while simultaneously imposing a set of requirements, regulations 
and monitoring obligations that significantly expand the intrusive-
ness of the state into the determination of the social-work curric-
ulum. CCETSW, whatever its pronouncements about the value base 
of the profession, is part of the state apparatus, and to overlook this 
is to be seduced by the appeal of idealist postmodern utterances of 
limitless possibility. 
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A 'REVENGE' ON MODERN TIMES: NOTES ON 
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
DAVID WEBB 
Abstract Traumatic Brain Injury (TEl) results from cerebral damage caused by a 
blow to the head, for example in a road traffic accident. The frequency of TBl 
means that it has been characterised as the silent epidemic of modern times. The 
majority of those who are head-injured are young men. This paper argues that the 
social reaction to head injury is testament to the latent eugenicist and mentalist 
suppositions within modernity. The brain-damaged person cannot readily overcome 
disability with the assistance of the technological aids available to those whose 
handicapping condition is physical. The consequences that head injury has for the 
mind and for the 'self' entail the special sequestration of those who are head-injured 
from modernity's concerns with reflexivity and with the paramount cultural and 
material importance of the mind, whatever is said about the sociological significance 
of 'body matters'. Because TBI brings in its wake the liminality of being 'neither 
here nor there', of young men who become once again 'children', the implications 
for family dynamics are both distinctive and profound. The 'future', around which 
much of modernity revolves, is denied to those whose catastrophe arose from these 
same modern times. 
Keywords: Disability, mind, modernity, traumatic brain injury. 
But then we learn that we can do without appendix, gall bladder, parts of our 
stomach, without limbs, without eyes; that we can do without our own kidneys, 
and even without our own heart. All this teaches us that our bodies are, to a 
surprising and even shocking extent, expendable. And this teaches us that we 
cannot simply identify our personal selves with our bodies. 
(Popper and Eccles 1977:117) 
... This staff nurse just turned round and said, 'Oh you can f~rget the son tha~ 
you had. You'll have another one that will emerge. A totally different Stephe~. 
Just like that you see. And my husband cried on the way back to the car. He saId, 
'I loved the one I'd got. I don't want another one.' 
(Mother of a head injured son, in Higham et al. 1996: 173) 
The genesis of sociological enquiry is inevitably varied, and this pa~er is no 
exception. Something that began as a contribution to resear~h mto the 
. b··· d (H gham et al 
residential needs of people who are traumatlcally ram mJure..l . 
1996),1 became an engagement with several personal and soclOlo~lcal pw:z1es, 
even though for various biographical reasons neither the. ~ubstantlve ar.ea Itself 
nor the contingent theoretical ones were especially familIar to start WIth. But 
. . d etun· es to tears - by what was there was somethmg about bemg move - som 
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told to us by those in our study. Above all there was the fright . 
.. th . c enmg 
recognltlOn .at were It not l.o:- the good fortune of a hairbreadth judgement 
by another dnver, or the fortuItous curve of a particular road, then we could 
as well have been parent-respondents as social scientist 'investigators'. 'There 
but for the grace of God' might never feature in the catalogue of reasons for 
'doing sociology', but for good or ill this happens to be the sentiment which 
lies behind what follows. 
A 'Condition' -And Its Social Context 
A Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)2 arises from cerebral damage caused by a 
blow to the head, arising for example from a road traffic accident. TBI can be 
distinguished from Acquired Brain Injury brought about by medical or 
congenital conditions, such as Alzheimer's disease or cerebral palsy. In view of 
its contemporary prevalence head injury has been characterised as the silent 
epidemic of modern times (Brock et al. 1995); in Britain about fifteen people 
are taken to hospital every hour with a head injury and every two hours one of 
these will die. Estimates indicate that by the year 2000 there will be in the 
region of 135,000 people with TBI in the United Kingdom, with a severity 
that varies from total recovery, to mild impairment through to a completely 
vegetative state. Causes are primarily, though not exclusively, attributable to 
accidents involving motor vehicles, with motorcyclists forming a sizeable 
proportion of those affected. About a third of TBI incidents are the result of 
falls or assaults, with sports and playground injuries being other typical 
examples of how traumatic brain injury can happen. A majority - three 
quarters - of those who are traumatically brain injured are young men, usually 
aged between 16 and 25 (Higham et al. 1996). 
Over and above the rather obvious sociological and economic causes for an 
increase in head injury - prosperity, mobility and the (particularly mascu-
linist) cultural adulation of speed, cars and motorbikes - the principal reason 
for this increase in the prevalence of TBI is cruelly ironic. Medical inter-
vention in life expectancy as well as design improvements that give greater 
driver and passenger safety to motor vehicles mean that there is now a far 
greater chance of surviving those accidents which in the past would have 
resulted in death. As has been argued elsewhere (Higham et al. 1996), this 
illustrates something of the inconsistency between the ability of modernity to 
rescue life heroically through advanced medical technology and the high-
speed drama of emergency services, and its capacity (or willingness) to 
adequately provide 'mundane' or routine long-term care. The situation is in 
fact replete with the kind of paradox that neo-conservative commentators on 
modernity (like Illich, and perhaps the writer of this present ~iece too) 
seemingly delight in announcing as nemesis, which 'for the masses IS now the 
inescapable backlash of industrial progress' (Illich 1975: 154). Never slow to 
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expose our foolish hopes and pretensions, Illich employs some of his usual 
hyperbole when he says that 'the medicalisation of society has brought the 
epoch ~f ~atural death to an end' (1975: 149), but his gloomy thesis that 
moder~lty s arrogant conquest over death is followed by an appropriation of 
humanIty, captures with some insigh~ the social and psychological con-
sequences when that corporeal triumph leaves in its wake a traumatised brain 
and a sequestered mind. 
Head injury can have a variety of physiologically induced consequences so 
far as an individual's functioning is concerned. There are the obvious effects 
on motor performance and co-ordination, on cognition and on intellectual 
performance. To some commentators it is the frequent presence of quite 
dramatic changes in the individual's expression of affect through altered 
emotional, interpersonal and psycho-sexual behaviour that is more L.'1capaci-
tating than any straightfoIWard physical impairment (Kreutzer and Wehman 
1990), with these disturbances in conduct amongst the most disabling and 
most persistent in Traumatic Brain Injury. Aggression is a particularly 
frequent behavioural excess, although it would be sociologically naive to 
attribute this solely to organic causes. The interactive loop where primary 
brain damage causes irritability and impulsivity and is then amplified by 
secondary reactions of frustration, loss of confidence and depression shows 
the undoubtedly complex interrelationship between the physical materiality of 
the initial disabling injury and the subsequent handicapping symptoms. 
Rather reassuringly (at least for the purpose of our methodology), this 
sociological abstraction has graphic resonance in the everyday explanations of 
those who are themselves head injured, or are involved with TEl people. As a 
mother said of her son: 'The more pressure he i.s under the more anxiety he 
has, the more frustration, the worse he is. It's a mixture of frustration, anxiety, 
panic. The more, then he starts to break down.' (Higham et al. 1996: 176). 
And a head injured person summarised the amplificationary spiral that led 
him to becoming a drug addict. It was not, he said, 'so much the head injury 
itself as sort of second-order effects, no help available, no services available 
and I just got angry about that because as far as I was concerned I was just the 
victim of an accident. I did get put in a psychiatric hospital for a short period 
because I was misdiagnosed as a schizophrenic' (Higham et al.:185). 
The paradox of traumatic brain injury is that survival, or even seemingly 
full physical recovery (and 90 per cent of head injured people do in fact make 
reasonably good progress in this regard), can merely add to the nature of 
the catastrophe. The triumph of the body is po?r c~mpensation for. the 
sequestration of the mind, where memory loss, lffipalrment of attentlOn, 
slowness in processing information and reduced speed of thought are all 
common. Further difficulties often also occur in perceptual, language and 
reasoning skills and in the awareness of self and oth~rs (Higham et al. 
1996: 14), all of which lead to challenges in the effectIve management of 
intersubjectivity. 
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~e head injured pe~son n:ay well be apparently 'normal' with a post-
a~cldent recovery of therr bodlly appearance. In this case, disability cannot 
slffiply be read off from the conventional empirical markers of 'what i ' 
. . .. s seen. 
The dlfficulues of beIng Wlthout the dramatic announcement of disabilitv that 
comes with physical impairment - the stigmatising inscription on the' body 
(Fox 1993:32) - means that the person who is TBI may well dis-
advantageously pass for normal in their dealings with significant others 
(Shakespeare 1994). In fact, managing the invisibility of disability that is 
frequently associated with head injury is a theme in a number of the 
interviews with carers of TBI people (Higham et al. 1996), as they look for 
ways to ease the passage of the TBI person to a world that "might scale down 
its expectations. 'Passing for normal' is ironically no asset for those to whom 
the hidden nature of their disability is especially disabling, where prejudice 
against the 'mentally incompetent' and the vernacular disdains of everyday life 
reflect the wider structural and ideological eugenicist-cum-mentalist discourse 
of modernity. From the Enlightenment this thread is clearly discernible. It 
begins with the 'benign' neo-Malthusian social engineers of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century eugenics movement (Weeks 1981), is given a 
tyrannical twist through the mental hygienism of the holocaust (Bauman 
1991; Proctor 1988) and is rehabilitated by means of the technically precise, 
'scientifically' validated and meritocracy-justifying measurement of intelli-
gence (Ryan and Thomas 1987). The 'choice enhancing' prospects offered by 
genetic screening and the 'eugenic elimination of impairment' (Shakespeare 
1995:24; see also Pfeiffer 1994) are amongst the latest in a constitutive set of 
legitimations for the mental gradation of moral entitlement and the con-
sequential social or physical expulsion of those who 'fail the test'. 
Traumatic Brain Injury, with its typical sufferer being a young man injured 
in some way or another following a car or motor bike accident, stands 
quintessentially as a disabling condition (both in its causes and in its con-
sequences for carers) with which we are culturally ill equipped to deal. The 
individual who is incapacitated through brain injury is unable to overcome 
their difficulties with the mechanical aids and cybernetic micro-processors 
which announce the prowess of the technological fix for the person who is 
physically disabled (Stone 1995). This means that the technical augmentation 
that serves a triumphal restorative function for physical disability is less .li~e1y 
for the person whose brain is injured. Furthermore, in so far as head mJury 
has an impact on interpersonal relations - and essentially those between a n~w 
newly dependent child and a parent-carer - then we see a profound dl~­
location in a whole range of assumptions about reciprocity and exchange m 
the life course of the family (Oddy et al. 1978; Brooks 1984).. . 
The subject broadens out at this stage. In seeking to establish som~ pomt of 
conceptual departure for theorising the particular disability that anses from 
Traumatic Brain Injury,3 there may be some me~it, in turn.ing - at least 
initially - to the portmanteau utility of the interactiorust s favounte standby of 
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'social reaction'. It is an attractive entree, since it has some heuristic value as 
an explanatory key to understanding n:e control of deviancy or 'otherness', 
whether by censure, by care or by medIcal (or quasi-medical) 'treatment'. It 
hints at the importance of the social psychology of L'1terpersonal relations. as 
those con:ing in:o contact with p~ople who are 'out of the ordinary' stru~gle 
to cope WIth a dIslocated assumptlve world in which the taken-for-granted has 
to be suspended. It invites too an acknowledgement that those who are them-
selves outsiders have an identity that is recursively shaped by the controlling 
relations into which they are perforce obliged to enter by vinue of their 
subordinate status. This is the interactionist dynamic which sees personal 
change in adult life arising from the way in which 'the stigmatised person 
learns and incorporates the standpoint of the normal, acquiring thereby the 
identity and beliefs of the wider society' (Goffman 1973:45) .. 
But 'social reaction' also contains the germ of an analysis that is more to do 
with the discourses, or cultural representations, within which certain matters 
are framed at an institutional level. It says - or at least implies - something 
about what may still be called 'ideologies', those more or less systematic 
world-views that can be analytically located within a firmament of particular 
material interests. It is to do with uncovering the politics and economics 
behind the social distribution of applause and condemnation, and the agendas 
that deem certain behaviours righteous and others wayward. It is about the 
social topography of normality's high ground and the shadowed valleys of 
'abnormality' . 
This cluster of 'sensitising concepts' sits behind an account of Traumatic 
Brain Injury as a disability having its own particular social and psychological 
handicapping dynamics. The emphasis in this paper is principally with giving 
some consideration to mapping the constituent social reactions to Traumatic 
Brain Injury, from how it is constructed within the discourse of mentalist 
ideology, to the psychodynamics that typically characterise the family within 
which the head injured person is cared for. And all this is set within the 
context of how the mind and the body are sites for certain sorts of meanings 
within modernity. 
The Mind, the Brain and the Body 
Locating the origins of the socially constituted (and socially contingent) :elf 
has long featured in sociological enquiry, with the interplay. betwee~ the acnng 
individual and the 'structure' of society a persistent theme In the history of the 
discipline. Within one of these sometimes discrete 'two sociologies', the 
concern with consciousness - with the 'reality' of subjectivity and the con-
., d' h ld f 'al obJ'ectivity - has served as sequentIally vanable understan mgs e 0 SOCI . 
an important conceptual focus. It was within - and to some extent agamst-
this idealism that the sociology of the body emerged as an attempt to set out 
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the importance of the corporeal as a site of social control f 
" , a wav 0 
approaching matters to do Wlth the physical embodiment of the self' t-
. . . . In erms 
of Its organic matenahty. The accent is on the surface of the bod 
tho th . '1' d' A Y as some mg at IS Ive . s such, questions about the management of a 
particular physiology are of inevitable conceptual importance, since these 
often. reflect the negotiations .that mu~t be entered into (and repeatedly 
sustamed) by those whose bodies constitute some sort of socially contested 
domain. Not surprisingly then, manreuvres around the cultural representa-
tions of gendered body shapes or the manipulation of the censure of disability 
feature significantly in the more empirical excursions found in the sociological 
study of the body. . 
This general approach, with its strong emphasis on 'body maners', in fact 
depends on the capacity of a reflexively competent subjectivity to do the work 
in making sense of the body. The sociology of the body announces the 
complete sovereignty of the mind over the corporeal, and it assumes this more 
or less unproblematically. Without the competent mind there is no sociology 
of the body. There is too the much wider (and delicate) question about the 
relationship between subjectivity and our conceptions of 'being human', 
which run around (and are implicit within) both the sociology of the body and 
some facets of disability studies. Confronting sociologically the consequences 
of head injury therefore touches on our discipline's reliance on the brain-
mind-self propositional infrastructure. Others remind us of this: Popper and 
Eccles (1977) write about the importance of the brain as a means of actively 
and recursively affirming the self. They maintain that acting bodies - that is 
those that are not simply behavioural entities, but which are expressions of 
agency - are inspired through the capacity of the mind to be activated by the 
brain. Popper and Eccles' radical cerebralism would invite us to be cautious 
towards that which has issued from that 'corpus' of knowledge that is 
concerned with the body and society. Rather they claim that 'the present view 
may be formulated sharply and somewhat shockingly by the conjecture that 
the flawless transplantation of a brain, were it possible, would amount to a 
transference of the mind, of the self'. (popper and Eccles 1977:117). 
Although the perfection of the body constitutes an important narrative of 
high modernity, this is increasingly subject to a challenging deconstruction 
where the scope for plurality is introduced, in substantial part through ~e 
celebratory efforts of activists who reject the hegemony of able-bodled 
assumptions and practices. This may be increasingly f~asibl~ b~:ause of 
certain material pre-conditions to the overcoming of phYSIcal dlsabIh~, even 
though the social distribution of these enhancements needs to be consldere~. 
Compensatory intervention can come about most notably thro~gh the. apph-
cation of technology, so that (at least some) people who are physlcall? dIsabled 
can have a measure of functional parity with those who are able-bodled (Stone 
1995). But those whose physical disability is of the brain are not so well 
d· . . consequence of placed. In so far as impairment of motor co-or maUon IS a 
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head injury then it is likely that technology could offer someth' b 'th ~ 
h ' I " th ", mg, ut WI a p YSICa InJury at ImpaIrs the mmd, then the specifically t hn I ' 1 
I , d' b'l' . I ' ec 0 oglca reso utlo,n to Isa 1 I~ IS a most Impossible. Whilst modernity might have its 
cultural Icons of physIcal attractiveness, it is important to acknowledge 11 • 
th 1· lb' . equa ) e menta 1St ce e ratlon of mtellect, the triumph of even an almo t d' _ 
d · d ' , S IS embo Ie mmd over material impediment, such as in the case of Ste hen 
Hawkins. Within an emergent 'virtual world' physicality becomes of less 
importance than the transformative capacities of imagination and intellect. 
Turner points ~ut ~at who we are rests crucially on having a specific body 
(1992:37) - which IS true, but only to a point. At the same time who we are 
rests as much on having a specific mind, as Popper and Eccles repeatedly 
insist. Indeed the case here is that with a physiologically damaged brain comes 
the likelihood of a fractured mind, and that consequently this will have a 
bearing on the person's capacity to existentially 'live their body' - to reflexively 
experience it. When the brain is damaged, and where as a result this has an 
impact on the way in which the body is subjectively apprehended, then we 
need to consider the issues that arise about the 'lived body' and its possibi-
lities, or what Turner (1992) refers to as its 'phenomenological domains'. The 
existence of the head injured person is, to a greater or lesser extent primarily 
corporeal, their essential reflexivity thereby compromised or otherwise 
diminished. 
High Modernity and the Perfect Mind 
An analysis that focuses on physical disability is therefore unlikely to open up 
an account of the specific social constructions that are employed in the case of 
those who are traumatically brain injured. More or less implicit mentalist 
assumptions about the nature of disability as a generic category in effect 
neglect the specifics of disabling head injury and simply replicate the con-
vention that it is all simply a case of 'body matters'. Oliver (1990:85), who 
takes a radically constructionist stand on disability ('dependency is not an 
intrinsic feature of their impairment but is socially created by a disabling and 
disablist society'), barely mentions what might come under the generic 
heading of 'learning difficulties' in a book which - iro~cally in the ligh~ of ~e 
above - is titled The Politics of Disablement (1990). HIS approach to lIDpaU'-
ment is an exclusively embodied one, since it is defined as 'lacking part or all 
of a limb, having a defective limb, org~sm or ~echani~m ~~ th~ body'. ~o~­
sequently Oliver's concern with the SOCIal creatlon 0: di~abillty. IS analyncal y 
focused on a critique of a 'contemporary social orgarusatlon which takes no ~r 
little account of people who have physical impairments' (1990: 1 0, emphaSIS 
added). . th ill 
In a similar vein Frank writes that 'the disabled, and by extens~on all e , 
. ·thin th I' .. . osed by bodies experienced as faIlures of self. eXIst WI e mutatlons ImP 
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They live their. lives with a self-consciousness of experiencing a subset of what 
a healthy SOCIety de~es as a ~ll life' (Frank 1990: 142). However this 
assumes that for the dIsabled or III person there is the discursive capa .ty C 
bl . fl··· CI lor unpro ematlc re eXIV1ty or self-consclOusness in the first place, something 
that c?uld ~urely find the TB~ person r,,:efully observing: 'if only'. Although 
Frank s project was no doubt lffiportant m establishing the place of the bod 
in sociological enquiry, at the same time it seems to occupy a discourse whic~ 
is itself 'socially located' within high modernity, exhibiting as it does a 
conceptual emphasis on the management of appearance and with the reflexive 
performance of 'identity work' through the workings of a competent mind. 
Physical disability and overcoming of it is certainly. an instance of 
modernity's victory over the adversity of nature. Utility can be recaptured by 
harnessing technology to conquer or subdue the frailty or rectify the flaws of 
the human body. But the triumph of the will is no longer expressed through 
the perfection of the body alone, but in the transcendent potency of the mind 
to rise above the mundaneness of the corporeal. In high modernity the body 
has a diminishing productive significance, and it becomes increasingly a site 
more of recreational indulgence than labour power as such. In this context, it 
is catastrophic to be denied the opportunity to participate in the identity 
constituting reflexivity of late modernity (Giddens 1990). In so far as brain 
injury has as one of its sequelae the loss of memory - and very often it 
does - then being a competent social agent is further thwarted by the 
incapacity to generate a coherent personal narrative or biography. We certainly 
need to be cautioned against reductively explaining the mind in terms of 
neuroscience, and there are eminent neuroscientists to warn us about doing 
just this (Rose 1992). Nevertheless, because the reflexivity of the self is 
mediated through memory, there are clearly material links between the brain 
as an organ and the self that is socially constituted through biographical 
narrative. '\~e know who we are, and who other people are, in terms of 
memory. I....ose your memory and you, as you, cease to exist' (Rose 1992: 1). 
Brain injury, although the prospect of remission may be tantalisingly 
offered, often presents the TBI person and their carers with the termination of 
life projects. More than this particular ending of progress, it almost invariably 
leads to a reversal of attainments so far achieved. The mind and with it the 
chance to have command over the future may well have been permanently 
endangered. The everyday, taken-for-granted prospect - even if it is ne~er 
realised in practice - is that within the future-oriented cultur~ of modermty 
promise is always yet to be fulfilled, and head injury compromIses that oppor-
tunity. This is particularly significant for younger head injured people for 
whom the reflexivity of planning and the structuring of 'what is t~ be' has to 
be set aside. Despairing of this participation in the contemporary Importance 
of 'time to come' one of the head injured respondents in our study remarked: 
'life is now and I'see nothing there for me. This is what I have' (J:figha~ et al. 
1996:182). Another (ibid.:180) put it in a more concrete, less eXlstenual way: 
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'Well, I have no pressures now as such but if vou ll'k I ld l' 
• • 'J e wou Ike the 
pressures of haVIng a house, haVIng a wife, having a normal life if you like.' 
Brain Injury and Social Exclusion 
It is something .of a. refrain ~n thi~ discussion that high modernity revolves 
around a me~ltah~t dISC?urse In WhICh greater importance is given to the mind 
~an th.e soclOlogIC~1 talk of 'body matters' suggests. Whilst there may be an 
Increasmg celebratlon of the plurality of physiology as a contemporary 
counte.r-culture repu.diates particular norms of appearance or physic;l 
attractlveness, there IS no such tolerance of those whose waywardness is 
mental. Perhaps a little controversially (because it raises the divisiveness of a 
hierarchy of oppressions), the proposition here is that those who are head 
injured have a greater propensity to be socially excluded than do the poten-
tially more productive group of people who are physically disabled. In locating 
this differential 'expulsion' within the culture of high modernity where its 
influence is exerted over individuals through the mentalist domain of what 
Donzelot (1980) called the 'psy complex', we can note the social favouring of 
an intact mind over an intact body when it comes to Ll-}e gradual and reluctant 
admitting of outsiders to the fold of utility. 
The reliability and capacity of mind is accordingly imperative, but because 
this is not similarly amenable to electro-mechanical alleviation as is physical 
disability, those who are mind-impaired are consigned to the wastelands of 
social exclusion. This is not just a case of analytical excess inspired by 
Foucault. A telling empirical index of the subdued social acknowledgment of 
TBl emerges from a very brief excursion into the social distribution of health 
care. McMillan and Greenwood (1991) point out that head-injury rehabili-
tation is the poor relation of major surgical technology. In manifest contrast to 
the existence of a network of National Health Service centres for the rehabili-
tation of spinal injury patients, there is a more or less complete absence of 
comparable services for victims of TBl, even though the incidence of head 
injury to spinal injury is marked by a ratio of about ten to one. 
The horror of promise unfulfilled is much more poignant than that of a 
promise that was never present. The inhabitants of modernity can just about 
cope with the misfortune of congenital mental impairment or the visitation of 
mental illness since these natural contingencies can be rendered meaningful , .. . 
through secular commonsensical legitimations that refer (say) to the VICISSI-
tudes of nature, as opposed to the intervention of divine punishment. (see also 
Voysey 1975:ch. 7). Traumatic Brain Injury is, however, occaslOned by 
modernity itself the very culture in which so many have invested so much. 
Head injury is ;omehowa consequence of what we have done (and the 'we' 
here is because of our tacit subscription to the 'dysfunctions' as well as the 
virtues of·our society). In this way TBl becomes a particularly powerful source 
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of uneasy collective trauma and guilt. There is in short no I' b 
. . ' ,c anty a out the 
categonsanon of those who are head injured. The person bec ' 
, . . . . omes someone 
else, an everyday recognItIOn that It IS the mind (more than the b d) 'hi h 
"fi h" bOY\\ C slgm es w at It IS to e a person. If the mind itself is seriously un' 'd th 
, , . . paire en 
It ,IS no longer able to mobIlIse the body to create the physical capital which 
mIght compensate for the run on mental capital occasioned throu h h d 
injury (Shilling 1991): A~a~n parents ~ecognised the bankruptcy to ~den~;ty 
brought about by thIS lImInal state m which the biological condition. to 
existence is virtually exhausted: 'The only thing we thought', said a mother of 
her head-injured son, 'was that we were grateful he was still alive, But then 
we've sat back and thought, for what? What is his life? At times I feel so fed up 
I wish he hadn't lived' (Higham et al. 1996: 183). 
The Re-awakening of Childhood and the Psychodynamics of Care 
The profound adjustments that are necessary in the case of caring for head 
injured young adult sons and daughters - and young men especially - are 
particularly significant. In order to address the emotional 'deep structures' 
within the transactions between care-giver and the recipient of care, the 
interiority of the relational aspects of care deserve close attention. The 
feminist literature on 'care' of course broaches this because it explores the 
ways in which internalised role expectations (and more material 'ideological 
practices') sustain the social and psychological subordination of women. 
Illustrative of a long tradition of this approach, Hand and her colleagues 
(1994) discuss the ways in which families caring for a member with (what they 
call) an 'intellectual handicap' show highly gendered role performances. 
lYtothers have feelings of introjected guilt, whereas fathers cope with the 
situation through an instrumental disposition and benign and businesslike 
authoritarianism. These behavioural and rhetorical strategies doubtless reflect 
the social distribution of gendered scripts, but beyond the surface of these 
performances there is likely to be a deeper structure to the relationships - or 
the feeling states - of care. Arising from the psychodynamics that prevail in 
the giving and receiving of care, this is to be understood as a consequence of 
an adult reverting to being a 'child' following head injury. Independence, 
perhaps only reluctantly ceded by parents (and mothers especially), is 
catastrophically reversed. The resolution of the psychodynamic ambiguities 
that once surrounded the relinquishing of a particular filial autonomy have, to 
be revisited, with associated work needing to be done on constrUcnng 
revisions to self-conception and identity (Voysey 1975:217). As one ,of ~ur 
head-injured respondents said of his own experience of this infantab~anon 
process: 'it's like being a kid all over again. You know: when you teach kids to 
cross the road?' (Higham et ale 1996: 176). , 
In the aftermath of head injury there is likely to be a suspenSIOn of the 
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conventions around reciprocity and affiliation that ch . . 
. .. aractense the mter-
subJeCtlVIty between parents and children Shakespeare re~ thi 
. . J.ers to s rupture 
of habItual contact as the 'dynamics of otherness' and hi' 
. " , e exp ores \V1 L~ 
consIderable InsIght the psychology of the interpersonal relatl' hi b 
. . ons ps etween 
able-bodIed and dIsabled people (Shakespeare 1994) In tt . 
" . a emptmg to ~s~abhsh a theonsed, understar:dmg of the distinctively liminal domain of head 
mJury,. Shakespea~e s suggestIons about the ambivalences of emotion sur-
round:ng the socIal reaction to disability are imponant. He points to the 
troublmg co-presence of love and fear in these circumstances. Parents' 
'natural' expression of love for a child will be overlaid by a quasi-contractual 
duty, and running alongside all this will be the lingering fearfulness and guilt 
that arises from knowing that the future may see their 'child consigned to a 
'dustbin of dis~vowal', however benign this might be. Shakespeare suggests 
too that there IS an undercurrent of anger and resentment that arises in the 
transactions between these distinct yet related categories of person, with 
obligations serving as a constant reminder that the relationship is highly 
'morality-dependent' . 
The projection of feelings is of course a generic feature of all close 
relationships, but this deep emotionality takes on a particular form in the 
psychodynamics between TBl people and their carers. The assumption that 
there will be a progression in the unfolding relationships between the genera-
tions is suspended. The cognitive domain of potential and promise being 
unfulfilled will certainly shake the participants' confidence of modernity with 
its sense of the future being amenable to control. The survival of the body 
alongside the transmutation of the mind will throw into doubt everyday 
categorical assurances as to the very nature of being. Furthermore, the place 
of the mind in transcending the demise of the body calls forth worrying 
uncertainties in everyday thought about the dependency of the sacral 'soul' on 
the capacity of an alert mind (Mellor and Shilling 1993). The body may 
indeed share in the immortality of the soul, but what is to happen to the 
coherence of that transcendent spiritual existence if the crucial shaping force 
of the mind is flawed? 
Traumatic Brain Injury therefore disturbs our sense of time and order-
what was once going to happen will not now do so, and the various 
relationships that it was earlier presumed would unfold in a more or less 
predetermined fashion are also brought to a halt. Underlying this domain of 
the cognitive is the psychodynamic, where the complex emotional merging 
and detachlnent that mark the acquisition of adulthood are gradually 
revisited. Once the elation of physical survival is absorbed, signifying ~ereby 
the medical triumph of delivering a life, the newly dependent person ~th TBI 
calls forth from the psvche of their family carers memories of emonons that 
lay buried in the subc~nscious, memories that it was assumed could com-
. dul The :-~antilising of adults fortably be left there as the chIld became an a t. llll. 
with disabilities is a product not only of the physiological dependence they 
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have on their ~arent-carers (Hubert 1995), but it is also an expression of the 
return to earher dynamics within the deep psyche of family relationships _ 
what Fox (1993: 117) refers to as the 'oedipalisation of care'. 
. The ~mbivalences. that mark the tussle between labour and love as the 
ImperatIve to parentmg are reawakened with a vengeance as what was once 
seen to have been finished becomes a new and unexpected moral obligation. 
Another .mother's observations about the consequences of her son's injury 
reveal thiS complex set of obligations and emotions in which the past, the 
present and the future are collapsed in a radically revised assumptive world: 'it 
was like having a baby back in the house, but a baby that isn't going to grow 
up ... he's never going to be independent of me, he's always going to be 
dependent on someone looking after him ... I'm always going to be here as a 
carer ... you know for a fact that you are going to die before he is' (Higham 
et al. 1996: 185). 
Traumatic Brain Injury has a particular impact on those who play a care-
taking role, with family disturbance and emotional distress a feature not only 
of those affected by the injury, but of those who are responsible for providing 
the care (McMillan and Greenwood 1991; Crisp 1993). Many TBl people are 
discharged into the care of relatives, without these carers receiving advice on 
how to manage day-to-day situations, with the result that carers have to 
establish their own, often precarious, understandings of the new relationships 
into which they and the TBl person will have to enter. For example, the 
small-scale study by Hubert (1995) suggests that the head-injured person 
tends to take emotional control of the household, with carers ceding power in 
order to avoid painful confrontation in the early days of rehabilitation. These 
relationships then become sedimented into dysfunctional social and emotional 
routines as the consequences of the initial injury spiral outwards. This 
trajectory is understandable. The liminality that brain injury brings in its 
wake, and the 'suspended state' which characterises those who are TBl, 
generates profound confusions as the 'nomos' of negotiated interpersonal 
reality has to be re-constructed. People who are head injured are 'neither here 
nor there', reminding those close to them or caring for them of the existential 
presence of death. Something about a person has so obviously ended even 
though they are still physically proximate. There are, as well, emotional 
ambiguities around the triumph over mortality alongside the simultaneous 
sequestration of life, a temptation to withdraw from those inhabiting the 
penumbra of the 'almost dying'. A mother of a head-injured women talked to 
us about this Stygian state (Higham et aI. 1996:181). She explained that her 
daughter 'is just stuck in a room most of the time, nobody to talk to, nothing 
changes. It's just an existence for her at the moment ... she is 32. She could 
live another 50 years and just lying there in a bed, it must be terrible. I can 
understand her wish to die, I really can.' 
Not surprisingly, being left with an adult child who will nev~r gro~ up t~ 
lead a 'normal' independent life is exceptionally challengmg, smce It 
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introduces unanticipated demands on the management of the emotions _ of 
the carer and of the care-recipient. There are none of the readily available 
st?cks of kno~le.dge, or recipes which serve as reference points as happens 
With the routlnlsed care of children whose developmental sequence is 
'normal'. Neither can these children be ~omfortably regarded as inhabitina 
the twilight of their lives, as it might be existentially feasible to sustain in th~ 
case of a dependent parent with Alzheimer's for example. This domain of 
acceptance and adjustment exemplifies the aspect of care that is called 
'emotional labour' (Thomas 1993:663) - and it can be hard emotional labour 
at that. A mother explained to us that caring for her daughter 'breaks my 
heart. When I'm all right I can cope, but if I get run down then it gets to me 
and things upset me. Sometimes she will look at me and that look in her eyes 
goes straight in there. It is horrible because there is nothing you can do. She 
looks at me as if to say, why me? All I can do is keep a brave face and just keep 
doing the best I can' (Higham et al. 1995: 173). 
A Cautionary Tale 
It would be artful to present an ending which suggests a carefully reasoned 
culmination to what has gone before. Long before academic conventions gave 
shape to this paper, its various conclusions had already been mentally 
rehearsed. These have been subsequently interwoven with a collection of 
findings, conjectures and assorted disputations through which a semblance of 
scholastic custom has been lent to matters of some personal relevance. In fact, 
what has been written about here is something tragic within the lives of people 
who have been disabled through head injury. It is tragedy because the cultural 
saliency of the mind (or its sociological derivative, the reflexive self) makes it 
extremely difficult to render Traumatic Brain Injury in terms other than the 
sorrowfully dramatic. This gloominess is further prompted by the uneasy 
recognition that we are all to a greater or lesser extent caught up in 
modernity's endorsement of much that 'causes' head injury, something that is 
particularly true for those of us who, through a host of everyday practices, 
routinely and unrefiexively construct the iconic supremacy of fast cars and fast 
bikes. At the same time there is the lingering, and decidedly pre-modern, fear 
of being touched by some sort of awful retributive force, as hubris wreaks its 
corporeal violence as well as bringing irreversible mutations to the 
psychodynamics of our parent-child relations. 
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Notes 
1. The .s~dy was commissioned by Headway, the National Head Injuries 
Assoclauon, and was funded by the Tudor Trust. The brief for the research was to 
assess the long-term residential care needs of people with TEL The research was 
undertaken in three different settings of care - the generic residential care home 
the .reside~tial home d~~icated to those with' head injury, and the community car; 
setung. FIfteen head Injured people, their carers and their families were inter-
viewed, generating life history narratives as well as judgements about the 
appropriateness of various ways in which TBI people are supported (see Higham 
et al. 1996). There were thirteen men and two women with an age range of 
twenty-six to seventy. Interviewees consisted of head-injured people, their family 
and carers. In five of the fifteen cases the head-injured person was not interviewed. 
The interview transcripts generated data on life history; results and effects of the 
head injury; needs and quality of life; services received; services wanted; future 
hopes and fears. 
2. The technical term is Traumatic Brain Injury - known by its initials TEl, though 
often the more easily understood term 'head injury' is adopted in the literature. 
'Traumatic Brain Injury', 'TBl' and 'head injury' are all used interchangeably in 
this paper, with no variation in meaning. 
3. The focus of this paper is on general trends in the social and psychological 
contexts within which a preliminary theorising of the sociology of Traumatic Brain 
Injury might be set. It necessarily involves abstraction, typification and generalisa-
tion. Such an approach should not imply that what is said here will apply to all 
TBI people or to their carers and families, and it is not intended to cause distress 
by suggesting that this is the case. 
References 
BAUMAN, Z. 1991. Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity. 
BROCK, M. D., SCHODY, W. and COYNE, M. J. 1995. Living with Head Injury. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. . 
BROOKS, N. 1984. 'Head Injury and the Family', in N. Brooks (ed.) Closed Head Injury: 
Psychological Social and Family Consequences. New York: Oxford University Press. 
CRISP, R. 1993. 'Personal Responses to Traumatic Brain Injury: A Qualitative Study'. 
Disability, Handicap and Society 8:393-405. 
DONZELOT, J. 1980. The Policing of Families. London: Hutchinson. ., 
Fox, N. J. 1993. Postmodernism, Sociology and Health. Buckingham: Open UruversIty 
Press. 
FRANK, A. W. 1990. 'Bringing Bodies Back In: A Decade Review'. Theory Culture and 
Society 7:131-62. .., 
GIDDENS, A. 1990. Modernity and Self-Idennty. Cambndge: Polity. 
GOFFMAN, 1. 1973. Stigma. Harmondswortb: Penguin. 
HAND, J., TREWBY, M. and REID, P. 1994. 'When a Family Member has an Intellectual 
Handicap'. Disability and Society 9:167-85. 
HIGHAM, P., PHELPS, K., BOWPITT, G., WEBB, D., MANSFIELD, l, ~RIGGS., P .. and 
REGEL, S. 1996. Assessing the Long Term Needs of People with Traumanc Bram InJUry. 
Nottingham: York House Publications. 
HUBERT, J. 1995. Life After Head Injury. Londox:: ~vebury. . 
ILLICH, 1. 1975. Medical Nemesis: the Expropnatzon of Health. London. Calder and 
Bovars. II . 1i . 
KREL'TZER, l S. and WEHMfu"'1, P. 1990 Community Integration Fo owmg raumanc 
Brain Injury. Pennsylvania: Paul H. Brookes. 
A 'REVENGE' ON MODER.."l TI:VIES 555 
McMILL~"1, T. and GREEN'WOOD, R. 1991. Rehabilitation Programmes for the Bra' 
Injured Adult: Current Practice and Future Options in the UK. London: Department ~~ 
Health. 
MEliOR, P. and SHIliING, C. 1993. 'Modernity, Self Identity and the Sequestration of 
Death'. Sociology 27:411-31. . 
ODDY, M., HUMPHREY, M. and UTILEY, D. 1978. 'Stresses upon the Relatives of Head 
Injured Patients'. British Journal of Psychiatry. 133:507-13. 
OLNER, M. 1990. The Politics of Disablement. London: Macmillan. 
PFEIFFER, D. 1994. 'Eugenics and Disability Discrimination'. Disability and Society. 
9:481-501. 
POPPER, K. R. and ECCLES, J. C. 1977. The Self and its Brain: An Argument for 
Interactionism. Berlin: Springer. 
PROCTOR, R. N. 1988. Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis.. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
ROSE, S. 1992. The Making of Memory. London: Bantam. 
RYAN, J. with THOMAS, F. 1987. The Politics of lvIental Handicap. London: Free 
Association Books. 
SHAKESPEARE, T. 1994. 'Cultural Representation of Disabled people: Dustbins for 
Disavowal'. Disability and Society 9:283-301. 
SHAKESPEARE, T. 1995. 'Back to the Future? New Genetics and Disabled People.' 
Critical Social Policy 44/45:22-36. 
SHILLING, C. 1991. 'Educating the Body: Physical Capital and the Production of 
Social Inequalities'. Sociology 25:653-72. 
STONE, S. D. 1995. 'The Myth of Bodily Perfection'. Disability and Society 10:413-25. 
THOMAS, C. 1993. 'De-constructing Concepts of Care'. Sociology 27:649-69. 
TURNER, B. 1992. Regulating Bodies. London: Routledge. 
VOYSEY, M. 1975. A Constant Burden: The Reconstitution of Family Life. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
WEEKS, J. 1981. Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality since 1800. 
London: Longman. 
Biographical note: DAVID WEBB is Head of the Department of Socia.l Sciences and 
Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at Nottmgham Trent 
University. 
Address: Crime and Social Research Unit, Deparonent of Social Sciences, Nottingham 
Trent University, Burton Street, Nottingham NG 1 4BU. 
'A Balance of Possibilities: Some concluding notes on rights, risks and the 
mentally disordered offender', in David Webb and Robert Harris (eds), The 
Mentally Disordered Offender: Managing People Nobody Owns. London: 
Routledge, (1999) pp 156-157. 
Chapter 10 
A balance of possibilities 
Som.e concluding notes on rights, 
risks and the mentally disordered 
offender 
David Webb 
There is no one body of knowledge that holds a monopoly either of concern for, 
or explanatory authority towards, the mentally disordered offender. Contributors 
to this book have reflected that plurality, with elements drawn from both the 
administrative and the critical domains of criminology, from the interventive narra-
tives of probation practice and social work, and from socio-Iegal perspectives on 
the 'processing' of those who are both mentally ill and are offenders. 
This book began with a chapter written by an outsider, who, while familiar 
with the broad disciplines that bear in on the subject of the mentally disordered 
offender, professed no immediate familiarity with the substantive matter at hand. 
The same goes for this concluding piece, where some form of sociology guides 
how matters are to be approached. There is a definite connection, though, between 
the interests of the specialist and those of the academic outsider. Society's reaction 
to the complex amalgam made up of an individual status on which is inscribed 
both mental disorder, and a delinquency of conduct that announces criminality, 
says much about the wider culture of which the phenomenon is a part, and it is 
this which offers the entree for the generalist. Returning to the broad sweep, 
this concluding chapter draws on - and, we hope, draws out - some of the themes 
offered by our specialist contributors. Above all it focuses on one of the par-
ticularly enduring narratives within what is written on this subject, namely that we 
continue to find this fragment of human waywardness (requiring as it does an 
unstable mixture of care, control, punishment, medication, tolerance, watchful-
ness), so repeatedly perplexing that there remains the suspicion that the amount 
of talk is in inverse proportion to the securing of anything even remotely 
approaching a solution. Matters have not been helped by the fact that the area 
has become so ideologically contested, so wracked by debates that reach to the 
heart of contemporary western thinking that it is difficult sometimes to see a way 
out of these various positions. Higgins (somewhat despairingly) characterises the 
disputed territory that is occupied by our consideration of the mentally disordered 
offender as 
the disturbance of the settled, cosy and pragmatic relationship between 
psychiatrists, courts and the bureaucracy by the appearance of civil liberties 
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lawyers and criminologists raising issues such as' the rl' oht to b . h d 
. '. . e e pums e ; 
the nght not to be pumshed; the nght to be treated; the ri oht not to b tr d' h' . f' d . e e eate , 
t e Justice 0 III etenrunate sentences especially when associated with treat-
ments of debatable efficacy; and the poor predictability of dangerousness. 
(Higgins 1984: 11) 
With all t~is. stacked up against the topic of managing the mentally disordered 
offender, It IS perhaps surprising that any headway at all is made in movino 
constructively forward. Of course we hope that our contributors have indeed. 
effected some progress on these matters, in line with the hammering: out of 
advances in this perplexing field that has characterised the interventions ~ade by 
Herschel Prins himself over the years. 
Despite the occasionally labyrinthine disquisitions on the subject of the 
me~tally disordered offender, the topic has sometimes seemed deceptively 
straIghtforward, and we can do no better than be reminded once aoain of matters 
. e 
wIth an economical statement from Seymour Halleck: 
Mentally disordered offenders are formally identified on the basis of two 
general criteria. First, the evidence that they have committed a crime must be 
sufficient to lead to their arrest and arraingement. Second, an agency of the 
criminal justice system must suspect that they have a mental disorder of such 
proportion as to question the fairness and utility of subjecting them to the 
usual criminal justice process. 
(Halleck 1987: 1) 
The consequential principles of intervention are themselves more or less 
straightforward - again on the face of it. The administration of justice demands 
both equity and fairness - that concern for what Hudson notes as 'individuality, 
singularity, the precise match of remedy to situation' (1996: 156). This is so that 
there should be some form of relationship which is self-evident, and widely 
supported, between a particular infraction of the legal code and what society 
subsequently sanctions by way of the penalty that must be borne by the wrong-
doer. This of course, rests on the assumption that all individuals have the capacity 
to understand that their actions will indeed lead to certain outcomes, and that they 
grasp that they might at some future moment be held to account for the rightness 
or wrongness of their actions. But in so far as there are in fact differing capacities 
to control behaviour, so it follows - at least in the kinds of humane jurisdictions 
that Herschel Prins enjoins us to adhere to - that there should be differential 
treatment of that behaviour. As Halleck again rather nicely expresses it, 'the quest 
for fairness and beneficence limits the severity of retribution based on the notion 
of desert' (1987: 19). 
These are matters addressed through what might be called 'substantive justice' . 
This is less to do with the formal application of invariant rules, but rather a concern 
with the way in which those rules might be given appropriate interpretation in 
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specific instances. The resulting attention to the particularities of this 0 th 
. d' 'd 1 h·l r at 
m IVI ua case, w 1 e demanding flexibility, discretion and interpretation, means 
that the longer-tenn legitimacy of those rules is that much more secure. In his 
chapter Robert Harris talks about the way in which this is resolved in Britain 
through the blending of fonnal statute with common law, so that while sentencincr 
'by the book' generally occurs, it need not do so, if good sense SU22ests tha~ 
the characteristics of the offender demand otherwise. Due considerati~~ of indi-
vidual circumstances can thereby be introduced flexibly, and without disruption 
to the overall 'framework' of law. Those with demonstrably lower or lesser levels 
of competence, blameworthiness and responsibility thereby become exempt from 
the strict application of fonnal rules governing the administration of punishment. 
This, though, puts something of a functionalist gloss on the pragmatics of juris-
prudence: the way in which the medico-juridical 'system' operates towards 
mentally disordered offenders might indeed create the impression of humanity for 
those wrong-doers who are without reason. In his contribution, John Wood sug-
gests that a certain symbolism of attentiveness in reviewing the incarceration of 
the mentally ill (through the machinery of the ~lental Health Review Tribunals) is 
the thing that matters, almost irrespective of the infrequency of successful appeal. 
Likewise, Judith Pitchers' discussion of the operation of parole applications 
for mentally disordered offenders paints a picture which could be construed as a 
process driven more by the caution of professional and institutional interests than 
by the application of reasonably well-informed risk assessments. In short, the 
whole business of managing the mentally disordered offender is shot through with 
equivocation and hesitancy. It is for this reason that as a sub-title for this book we 
have taken - or rather adapted slightly - a telling phrase from one of Herschel 
Prins's papers: 'the people nobody owns' (Prins 1994), since this conveys if not 
the statelessness of these citizens, then their 'statuslessness' - internal refugees 
moving between administrative domains which only accept them with reluctance 
and on a temporary basis. 
A test of the civilising process I 
The mentally disordered offender presents a series of 'tests' to challenge the 
capacity of society to respond to its wayward citizens who are not only troubled 
in themselves, but who are also troublesome to others (Craft 1984; Shah 1993). 
Their disturbed psychological state sets them firmly within the social devianc~ of 
mental illness, and in transgressing the moral boundary between observmg 
the law and breaking it, they are also demonstrably 'cri~nal'. In. th~s way the 
mentally disordered offender has been subject to two parucularl.y slgmficant ~nd 
powerful social censures - mental illness as the judgement ove.r nghtness .of .mmd, 
and the imputation of deviance as a judgement about behaVIOural admisslon to 
civilised society, though in truth they are treated more on the basis of the former. 
(the status of what he or she is) than on the basis of their conduct ~what he or .she 
has done) (Duff and Garland 1995). We do not need much remindmg that soclety 
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is especially fearful o~ offe~ders who do~bly transgress: those who are not only 
law breakers, but who In theIr mental devIancy are outside the domains of rational 
cognition, carefully modulated affect and the sophisticated role-playing that are 
demanded by the complexities of modern times. 
These are people whose 'role performance' is severally compromised, and in 
their waywardness they fall under the tutelage of. two of modern society's most 
powerful professions - medicine and the law. The claim of these occupational 
groups to speak authoritatively on the subject is sometimes competitive: pre-
suming the rationality of human agency and of the willed nature of wrong-doing, 
legal concerns have had to acknowledge that incapacitated mental processes 
constrain the applicability - as well as the legitimacy - of what might be called 
'pure' legalism (Bus field 1996). But if the law has been held in check when it 
comes to the formal enforcement of retributive justice, this is not to say that there 
has been wholesale and successful diversion from the criminal justice system 
to more appropriate domains of social intervention. Far from it. More often than 
not, these people are caught between hospital and prison. Consequences of the 
reluctance (or at best the conditional willingness) to set the treatment of mentally 
disordered offenders within the domain of mental health, despite a long-standing 
policy commitment to doing just this, is a recurrent theme in Herschel Prins's 
work, and is echoed here in this collection. What are ostensibly rights granted 
to mentally disordered offenders under statute, such that they might be entitled to 
appropriate health care to meet their illness, become instead further limitations on 
their freedom if the machinery to implement that protection is either ill-designed 
or poorly maintained. Not surprisingly, there is a view - widely and respectably 
held - that those who are mentally disordered are too frequently managed within 
the criminal justice system, for no other reason that the capacity of psychiatric 
provision - whether institutional or community-based - is. simply unable, or un-
willing to add another risk to those that it would be carrying anyway. In so far 
as recourse to criminal justi~e reflects the inadequacy of mental health care, 
then there must be serious concerns about the rights of people who ought to be 
'patients'. As Judith Pitchers argues in the conclusion of her chapter, the tendency 
to play safe so far as mentally disordered offenders are concerned - the case with 
which she is concerned being that of parole - does indeed lead to injustices for 
particular individuals being accepted as unfortunate, if inevitable, expressions of 
that most enduring utilitarian maxim - the greatest good of the greatest number. 
Halleck refers to the alternating tendency to meddle and to ignore that marks 
the social reaction to people whose existence confronts our sometimes flawed 
capacity to address the philosophical complexities around mind, disor~er and 
crime. 'We are unwilling to leave them alone' , he writes, 'ye~ most agencies .seek 
to avoid responsibility for their care. We confine them to pnsons and ,to pnson-
like hospitals where they are sometimes treated worse than offenders (Halleck 
1987: 11). . 
Various professional domains ostensibly responsible for n:entally d~sordered 
offenders do not always sit easily together, and again the literature IS replete 
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with th~ complexities .arising from the almost ineluctable imperative of multi-
professIOnal collaboratIOn when faced with people whose problems ar . ·bl 
. . . . e lInpossi e 
to set wIth anyone disciphnary or professional discourse (see Prest -Sh . G . h· I ... on oot, 
rant, t IS vo ume). Agamst thIS partIcular logic which points to workin cr 
together, is another that leads in the opposite direction. The empirical and co ~ 
. I d . . . mmon 
sen SIca un erpmmngs of the law, easily· connecting with taken-for-crranted 
everyday ideas about wrong-doing, have to reach an accommodation witl~ some-
thing altogether more difficult and arcane. The business of assessing mental 
processes, while relying almost invariably on the observable behavio~r of the 
individual, is often suspected of deriving from something that is part witchcraft, 
part mumbo-jumbo. And of course, there is always the deeply held suspicion that 
anyone who would seek to account for the impact of mental incapacity on wron cr-
doing is simply trading in excuse-mongering, something which occasionally 
sees itself being played out in the very public gaze of celebrated criminal trials. So 
it was in the case of Peter Sutcliffe that the unseemly disputes between rival 
psychiatrists did nothing for the jury, who rejected entirely any idea that the 
defendant was mentally disturbed, but was instead simply culpable for his horrific 
actions. (See Prins 1983). 
Fathoming out the respective weights of madness and badness when explaining 
wayward behaviour is exemplified when thinking about 'criminals' who are also 
mentally ill. We might recognise that these people are incapable of meeting the 
tests of rationality, culpability and capability that underpin admission to judicial 
processing and sanction, and indeed the diverting of them from the criminal 
justice system is regarded - as it is by Paul Cavadino in this volume - as essential 
if we are to operate a humane approach to those offenders whose reasons for law-
breaking are unintelligible. But as the case of Sutcliffe reminds us, there is always 
the residual cultural sentiment that sees offenders who are mentally disordered 
as somehow escaping the criminal sanction if they receive medical treatment 
that smacks of 'therapy' (Hodgins, 1993). Sometimes this still shapes the social 
reaction to offenders who are mentally disordered, towards whom the residual 
cultural predilections of Bentharnite justice-grinding are directed (Peay, 1994). 
Seemingly, neither professionals, nor state agencies are exempt from this fixation 
with the almost exclusively corporeal, with for example McConville (1995: 284) 
pointing out that '(p)rison medical services, obsessed with malingering, have 
always been more at ease with bodily rather than mental illness'. The fact that 
so often mentally ill people (whose condition, even without the assessment of an 
'expert' would point them towards being self-evidently 'pati~nts') fi~d .them-
selves in prison, suggests that whether by occasional lapses mto preJudIc~ ~y 
those who are involved in the everyday workings of juridical-welfare admInIS-
tration or because of the kinds of 'structural' failings in the system that are 
described for example by Philip Bean in this book, we have ~et to r~solve certain 
of these ambiguities in the management of this particular SOCIal deViance. 
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Actuarial welfare and managing the mentally 
disordered offender 
The history of the way in which mentally disordered people have been 'mana£ed' 
is replete with the outrages that have been visited upon them - sometimes o~t of 
fear, sometimes out of ignorance and sometimes out of a misplaced sense of do' a 
. . me 
good (see for example, Donnelly 1983; Sedgewick 1982). Added to this is the 
ea:e with which bat:alions of cri:ics .have been able to 'deconstruct' the very 
eXIstence of mental dIsorder, showmg It to be the consequence of sociallabellina 
or arising from the iniquities of particular societies and their failings in, sa~: 
distributive justice. Not surprisingly, this legacy of anti-psychiatry and labellin£ 
theory rings hollow to those for whom mental illness has a powerful, limitin~ 
and materially constraining reality to it (Sedgewick 1982). And in c~ltures unde; 
the sway of rationalist, individualistic ways of thinking, mental disorder - with its 
connotations of behaviour driven not so much by human agency but by some sort 
of motivational corruption arising from an ill mind - has to compete with an 
inclination to regard human action as intended and as consequentially aware. 
The determination of mental illness more often than not entails a measure of 
judgement by the person making the assessment, and it is because of this that the 
various categories of mental disorder have been sometimes seen as being 'socially 
constructed'. By this is meant that diagnoses are less the reflection of secure 
scientific knowledge, and more the product of moral evaluations about various 
forms of socially unacceptable behaviour that vary and alter across time and 
space. There is also a view that the determination of what stands as 'dangerous' is 
indeed dependent on certain mores, with particular groups more likely than others 
to fall within this estimation of potential disruption. In his chapter Paul Cavadino 
suggests that it is precisely this that applies to black offenders, echoing a point 
that was made in the report into the death of Orville Blackwood chaired by 
Herschel Prins (Prins, 1993c). The assumptions and 'typifications' that are held 
about black people by those with front-line responsibilities for containment and 
care in the prison hospital have self-fulfilling consequences, not only for those 
who are being treated or contained (who may 'take on' the attributions to which 
they are subject through social labelling), but also for those charged with their 
supervision. 
These few observations -let alone those that have accumulated in the preceding 
paaes - serve as a reminder that to speak of 'managing' members of this social 
gr~up is to invite a measure of controversy. Might not there be something imper-
sonally 'technical' about this subject? To talk of 'management' perhaps shows 
that we are not really concerned with the care of our fellow citizens who have a 
disturbance in their mental functioning. Rather, we want to 'take charge' of them, 
and subject them to the surveillance and regulation to which we habitually subject 
the various deviants who disturb conventions of the moral order. Or does the 
reference to management echo the medical discourse within which troubles of.the 
mind have to be coaxed or driven to submission, in the same way that phYSICal 
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illness or disease is browzht under control? 'Manaoement' th all d" . . 
..... ;;; - e casu y ISIIl1SS1Ve 
may say - regards those who are mentally ill as obiects to who th"' d 
• •. • J m mgs are one. 
But there IS an alternauve mterpretatl?n, one which we believe reflects somethim: 
of the approach taken by Herschel Pnns (see Prins 1994). ~ 
.Management implies the coordination of resources and servO .. 
. .. Ice provIsIOn 
and the shapmg of pollcy m order to meet desired objectives, and much of this 
book has referred to how this might be done. It need not necessaril f 
d
.. . . .. y re er to 
Irect mvolvement wIth mdlvldual offenders, but with a wider reach of concerns. 
We?ster and Menzies convey with some feeling this idea of management as 
havI~g '~yst~m-wi~e' properties when they set down proposals to address the 
de~clencles l,n servIces for mentally disordered offenders that they identified in 
theIr study of a large North American city: . 
The challenge must be one of sitting with administrators and planners 
from various government ministries, including housing authorities, in the 
hope that we can create a 'hybrid' scheme that will reduce the imposition 
of actually unnecessary sentences. lower criminal recidivism and at the same 
time improve the mental, physical and social well-being of such unfortunate 
people so evidently in need. 
(Webster and Menzies 1993: 36) 
The term 'management' conveys, not entirely inappropriately, the ascendency 
of the actuarial over earlier narratives that spoke of individualised medical or 
welfare 'treatment'. This line of arguing maintains that rather than the reformist 
goal of what Pearson (1975) refers to as the restoration of the deviant to 'utility' 
(so that they might come to share in the values of the community), the new 
actuarial regime looks to the careful calculation· of risk and the efficient 
deployment of resources at those for whom predictive indications suggest that 
they pose the greatest threat (Hudson 1996: 154). The goal of welfare actuarialism 
is to warn in advance of human behaviour taking place - to engage in the 
corporate manager's equivalent of 'future proofing' by anticipating the con-
sequences that will flow from a careful uncovering of the 'signs' that are all 
around us, yet to which so many are oblivious. The 'reading' of an individual's 
biography in order to reveal their code of abnormality, and the assigning of this to 
a particular category within a taxonomy of ideal-typical waywardness, is a way 
of generatino security of knowledoe in a world that otherwise would be marked 
... 0 0 
by randomly bizarre behaviour. 
As it happens, an insistence on fact garnering for the purposes of prediction had 
earlier seen its place in Prins's recommendations to practitioners (Prins 1975), 
though the writer of the present chapter took some exception to this, arguing ~at 
we only tend to know why facts are pertinent once we re-construct precedm.g 
salience with the benefit of retrospective interpretation (Webb 1976). It IS 
something that Jill Peay refers to in her contribution as the exag~eration with 
hindsight of what we could have predicted with foresight. In fact. If we were to 
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identify not so much thematic continuity in Herschel Prins's work a t1 
1. . Id' sagen e rea Ignment, It wou pomt to a movement from the pursuit of positivist cert' d 
b . d' 'd al hI' Itu e a out m IVl u psyc 0 ~glCal m~ncti?ning, to a probabilistic and contingency-
slanted approach. In this, the mteractlOns between individual offenders and 
the apparatus of the criminal justice system figure more prominently in 'creatin ' 
a symptomatology which is more to do with what·Busfield (1996) calls the 'rore 
performance' of the mentally disordered than with a reductionist psycho-
physiology. 
In any event, there seems to be a wide recognition that predictive diagnoses of 
dan,gero~sn~ss are often inaccurate, leading to obvious concerns about punishing, 
or treatmg people not so much for something they have done, but for what 
they might do - or perhaps more importantly, what they might not do (Duff and 
Garland: 1995). This of course echoes what we have already said about the 
'category confusion' that dogs almost everything about the mentally disordered 
offender - between, on the one hand, the status of who they are, and, on the other, 
the conduct in which they have engaged. The tendency - in the administration of 
risk taking - is to play safe, as several of our contributors have shown. 
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that incapacitating the potential 
wrong-doer might well protect the community, even if this limits the rights of 
individuals about whom we are merely suspicious rather than certain. This 
does depend, though, on minimising the errors of false positives such that the 
abrogation of contract between citizenry and state is not jeopardised without 
legitimate warrant. The careful balance demanded by this set of simultaneous 
imperatives makes the business of risk assessment that much more important. 
Morris argues that the most robust basis for predictive intervention, and what he 
calls 'risk shifting', is indeed the actuarial. In this, the evidence is assembled to 
show that people who are like the particular offender before us, situated within the 
same conditions as is 'our' offender, have behaved in a certain way in the past. 
Given the similarity between the individual and the generality, the inference can 
be drawn (with varying degrees of confidence) that the person in question will 
behave in the future as others in the same position behaved in the past (Morris 
1995). Theoretically at least, this approach might point towards a mechanism for 
limiting the uncertainty in the management of the mentally disordered offender, 
such that some sort of equilibrium is reached between the right of the community 
to be protected, and the right of the individual not to be incapacitated without 
warrant. 
It is something of a recurrent theme in this collection that there is a speci~ 
significance when the mentally disordered person is also an offender, fO.r ~s 
points to an accumulation of jeopardy in the face of social control which IS 
invoked to meet the multi-dimensionality of moral transgression (see also Shah 
1993). The fact of mental disorder and the unpredictabilities in conduct that arise 
from disturbances in mental functioning are indeed socially troublesome. How-
ever, recognising that society itself has a responsibility to those of its membe.rs 
who are rendered vulnerable through their own misfortunes may have some ment: 
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'a danger to themselves or to others' remains the basis for the so . 11 . 
. CIa v sanctIOned 
restramt of those who are mentally disordered and within this 't . . 'bl 
. . . ' 1 IS POSSI e to 
dIscern the germ of a pnnciple that recognises, as Rotman (1995) cr f 
h b 'l' . '" areues, or re a I Itat~on as ~ Co~stItutlOnal ~~ht; a duty owed by the state to the imprisoned 
m~nt~l1y Ill. It IS thIS paternalistIc obligation which finds expression in the 
~nn~I.ple of parens patriae, where the state assumes to itself the care of those of 
ItS cItIzens who cannot care for themselves, offenders or not. 
Central to such an obligation is the accountability which must follow in the 
wake of any failure in discharging that appropriated duty with proper care. It "is 
this :vhich presumab~y lies be~ind Louis Blom-Cooper's staunch advocacy of 
publIc rather than pnvate heanngs when things have gone wrong, since these 
represent a greater good to the community than the harm that ffiight befall those 
who have to account for their actions within these open forums. Of course, the 
point at which responsibility rests when what Rotman calls 'a constitutional ricrht' o 
(or we might term 'natural justice') is abrogated is a moot point. When it comes 
to restoring the social contract between wronged citizens and those in whose 
charge they have been placed, both Blom-Cooper and Jill Peay touch on the 
difficulty of assigning culpability to individuals (through professional negligence, 
for example) as against an indictment of diffuse social arrangements, stlch as 
'racist cultures' in Special Hospitals, though our sense is that increasingly - and 
rather encouragingly - adverse 'social arrangements' are seen to be somebody's 
responsibility, and often this is someone occupying a position of some power. 
Embedded within the way in which we approach the management of the 
mentally disordered offender are those calculations concerned with the likely 
danger posed to the community by the disturbed law breaker. It is for precisely 
this reason that the detailed forensic understanding of these various disturbed 
states - and their likely behavioural sequelae - is ·of such importance. Once 
another utilitarian axiom, namely that of universal capability, is questioned, then 
the principle of automatic punishment for infractions can be that more easily set 
aside. If the mentally disordered offender is not judged to be dangerous either 
to themselves or to the community, then the objectives of management can be 
beneficent, whereas if dangerous, the case is made for specialised programmes 
which are principally concerned with social protection (see Halleck 1987). . . 
However - and fine principle notwithstanding - it is perhaps not surpnsmg 
that this area of work is sometimes marked by vacillation in both policy and in 
professional practice. It is more than an intellectual or cognitive matter. It is true 
that the co-presence of mind, disorder and crime - all of whic.h are themselves 
of enormous substantive, philosophical and moral compleXIty - ~akes the 
mentally disordered offender an especially challenging category to thmk about 
(Hollin and Howells 1993). But beyond this is something less amenable to s~ch 
a distancing narrative. Herschel Prins himself has pointed out that managmg 
the mentally disordered offender poses many challenge.s, o~ten ~f an existential 
nature, and that the subjective feelings of those working. m this . field need to 
be acknowledged. Coming to terms with revulsion at homfic or bIzarre acts, or 
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coping with disruptions. i~ thought proc~sses which are both profoundly irrational 
yet finnly held; reconcIlmg the com~etmg responsibilities towards the rights of 
the offen~er on the one ha.nd and the mterests ?f the public on the other; the high 
personal mvestme~t that .IS made once a partIcular therapeutic path is taken to 
address complex dIfficultIes - all make for difficulties in holding a particular line 
so far as people. who are 'unloved, unlovely and unloveable' are concerned (Prins 
1993b:. 54). ThIS acknowledgement of the hard facts about mentally disordered 
offendmg, and the preparedness not to shy away from it is important. Recognisincr 
- and naming the fact - that these individuals constitute a 'constantly shiftin: 
mad, bad and sad group' (Prins 1993a) is an important step in coming to term~ 
with the sheer multi-dimensional complexity of what has to be faced in the 
management of these individuals (Stone 1995; Grant, and Preston-Shoot, this 
volume). 
Offender, deviant or patient?2 
A reminder of the bases upon which we ought to approach these of our fellow 
citizens is surely important, given the difficulties that they pose to those who are 
charged with their 'management'. Jill Peay has elsewhere argued 'that the 
mentally disordered offender be treated as a person first, as an offender second, 
and as mentally disordered third' (Peay 1994: 1123). But this is not just a set of 
ethical imperatives, designed to rescue a measure of humanity from the frequently 
hard to love, or an injunction to remember that mentally disordered offenders 
are not a homogeneous group. The three-way separation of attributes also refers 
to the three professional domains that are of relevance here. Social work, law and 
medicine (the last of these - doubtless unfairly - having to serve as a portmanteau 
term that covers those professions associated with medicine, and in particular 
mental health nursing) are in their different ways primarily responsible for 
respectively understanding the person-in-situation, for assessing the substance 
and culpability of their legal infraction, and for determining the mental conditions 
which might have lessened a capacity for rationality. 
Inevitably, these domains are difficult to separate out, and while the con-
tributors to this collection write within one or other framework, they inevitably 
stray beyond the boundaries of their discipline of preference. Indeed, this 
eclecticism has long marked the approach that Herschel Prins has himself 
adopted, pragmatically calling upon this or that body of knowledge to further the 
scope of his enquiry. What they have in common, though, is an attempt to ensure 
that the bases upon which the mentally disordered offender are ~udged ou~h~ to 
be consistent with various principles of justice and humanIty. EclectICIsm 
_ sometimes derided for its lack of philosophical robustness - is warranted in an 
activity that draws its analytical blade across such altern~ting territo.ry. 
Countenancing the possibility of a crime being rationally cOmID1tted, ~lo~gside 
the equally feasible possibility of an incapacitated mind at w~rk, InVItes a 
merging of categorical certainties about those who are mentally dIsordered and 
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those who are not. There may indeed be shades of grey in the capacity behind all 
human motivation, suggesting that a measure of philosophical diffidence rather 
than the certitude of forensic science may - at least for some of the time - be the 
preferable way of approaching the waywardness of those who are mentally 
disordered. Hudson (1996: .156) draws on Levinas in offering an . approach to 
justice which to our mind connects so well with what Herschel Prins (and the 
contributors to this Festschrift) are looking to secure - a balance between over-
riding general principles and the particularities of individuals - that it can well 
stand as the final sentence to this collection: 
Justice is recognition of the Other, who is like myself in some ways, and 
unlike in others; justice involves recognition of the likeriess in the sense of 
shared humanness, but not insistence on reduction or elimination of 
difference, rather the respecting of differences. 
(Hudson 1996: 15) 
Notes 
1 The 'civilising process' is a phrase borrowed (in rather cavalier fashion and with what is 
almost certainly insufficient regard to the conceptual sophistications of its origins) from 
the work of the sociologist Norbert Elias (1897-90). His concern was with the ways in 
which the coercive restraints of pre-modem society are superseded- or not - by moral 
obligation and the increasing awareness of the consequences that our actions have not 
only on the material circumstances of others but on the subjectivities of their minds too. 
The extent to which our treatment of the mentally disordered - whether offenders or not 
- exemplifies the process that Elias sought to demonstrate in his historical sociology 
is, of course, the matter at hand in this book. For those who find ad hominem things 
interesting, Norbert Elias's visiting professorship in the sociology Department at 
Leicester University overlapped with Herschel Prins's time at the School of Social Work 
at the same university. As far as I am aware they had no professional contact, though a 
resilient optimism and a sorely tested belief in humanity could be taken as a shared 'meta 
narrative' to their work, reflecting certain biographical commonalities. 
2 This sub-heading is, of course, the same as that of one of Herschel Prins's books (Prins 
1995). It summarises neatly the various 'discourses' which have something to say about 
the mentally d\sordered offender, the various roles to which these people can be 
assigned, and the endless possibilities for confusion about which in its more impatient 
moments, this book has made great play. 
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'WHAT'S IN A NAME?' 
A CO:MMENTON'PURITANSANDPARADIGMS' 
LENA D011INELLI 
----------------~---------------
Would' a ros~ by any other name' smell as sweet as Shakespeare suggests in 
Romeo and Juliet or could a name cause offence? This question will be considered 
in relation to David Webb's article, 'Puritans and paradigms'. For me, the answer 
is affirmative, despite Webb's repeated claims to 'a strenuous commitment to 
detachment' and 'a decisive absence from the normative or the prescriptive'. 
Webb provides a stimulating analysis of the rise of anti-racist and anti-sexist 
perspectives in social work But, the paper is penneated with 'the inevitable whiff 
of semiological arrogance' he eschews. Its allegedly neutral tone thinly 
disguises the disapproving and subtle barbs launched at identified targets. 
Language is laden with value judgments and hidden power relations 
embedded in its social context (Spender, 1980) which we can ignore if we wish to 
reproduce collective myopia. The location of Webb' s article \\'ithin 'malestream' 
sociological thought is epitomised by his alleged personal and methodological 
detachment from the subject. The terminology and conceptualisation of the issues 
embody a scientific approach which is assumed beyond question for it relies on 
a methodology which is valued and male. Detaclunent also stands in opposition 
to 'involvement' \\Thich is deemed emotional, unscientific and female (see 
Garnamikov et al., 1983). Webb's choice of religious metaphors is unfortunate, 
draV\wg as these do on stereotypes which are immediately conjured up by 
readers and shape their interpretation of words. Additionally, the rn'ists encap-
sulated in some tenns are offensive. For example, the unequal relationship 
between 'guests' and 'host' implied in 'host society' is currently being massaged 
to signify the damage 'migrant' vvorkers impose on the 'host' whilst ignoring the 
'host's' exploitation of black people and women (Racearui Class, 1990); calling anti-
racist initiatives jihads is profaning religious sen51bilities in a climate rife with Anti-
Islamic sentiments. 
Webb describes the shift to the new moral order in social work a move 
from 'inclivid ualism' , 'self -detennina tion' , 'non-judgernentalism' ,and' ethical 
neutralism' to 'certitude and orthodoxy'. In reaching this sweeping conclusion, 
David Webb performs a logical somersault, vaulting over aitiques of social 
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work orthodoxy elaborated byvvomen and black people. These have exposed 
the sham on which social work's commitment to these self-evident virtues 
has traditionally rested (see for example, Ahmed et al., 1987; Brooke and 
Davis, 1985; Marchant and Wearing, 1986; Dorninelli and McLeod, 1989; 
Hanmer and Statham, 1989; Mama, 1989; Bryan et al., 1985; Ahmed, 1990). 
Their writings do not endorse Webb's projection of the Central Council for 
Education and Training in Social Work (CCET5W) as the 'key definer' - the 
I guide to the direction being sought for the future of social work', despite the 
incorporation of insights gleaned by feminists and black people into its 
rhetoric. Most developments in anti-racist and anti-sexist practice have 
occurred outside CCETSW's auspices. It leads when pushed from behind. 
Critiques of social work \vritten by feminists and black people have ques-
tioned the detachedness of liberal social work, also promoted by CCETSW and 
eAposed a hidden hegemonic ideology which allO\vs injustice to be perpetuated 
by ignoring its existence and decontextualising individuals' experience. Liberal 
orthodoxy has assumed that we are all the same regardless of the different 
baselines from \-vhich our life-course begins, whereas the personal and group 
realities manifest in work undertaken by feminists and black people have 
d~'11onstrated how our life chances vary according to class, gender, racial origins, 
age, and sexual orientation. Additionally, their critiques have identified the 
unequal weightings asaibed to an individual' s worth and contnbution to society. 
The dominant ideology penneating evaluation rates highly white heterosexual 
males' efforts, individually and collectively (Brittan and Maynard, 1984). Moreo-
ver, feminists and black people have highlighted the interdependent nature of 
politics and morality and demonstrated how a given political stance legitimates 
a particular morality. Arguing that taking no moral stance endorses the status quo 
and inequality, wehavesoughttoensurethatunderanewmoralorder,c1ientself-
detenninationbecomes more than paying lip-service to an empty ideal This aim 
is pursued through the active partiopation of users and workers in creating, 
developing and evaluating services \\'ithi..~ an egalitarian framework as an 
intrinsic feature of the delivery process. Process and outcome become equally 
h'11portant in our work (Cook and Kirk, 1983). Respect and dignity are integral to, 
and must permeate, both ends and means. 
. In pursuinCY his 'Puritans' and 'Paradigms' analogies, Webb seeks the 
unswervinCY defuutiveness of purpose evident in Cromwellian times. Whilst 
making in~esting copy, the analogy is fallacious. Neither the revolutionaxy 
situation prevailing then nor the political and military powers held b~ Cr~mwell 
andhissupportersareevidentinthepresentconjuncture.Today'santi-~ostsand 
feminists follov.,T a more modest project than the baulversement enVIsaged by 
Cromwell Standing £innly for social justice, they pay attention to the means 
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whereby social change is achieved; a sharp contrast to Cromwellian indifference 
to this. The certainty evident then is absent in both the CCETSVV papers on which 
Webb premises his discourse and the vvritings of those developing anti-racist and 
feminist perspectives in social work These perspectives are riddled with contro-
versy around the specifics of practice, offering primarily general guidelines, a 
critique of poor past practice and case materials reflecting their rurrent develop-
ments (see Aluned, 1990). Striving to provide sensitive and non-dornlatic 
responses to the injustice experienced by users, practitioners following f~t 
and black perspectives have not embarked on a search for the elusive paradigm 
which consumed the energies of radical social workers in the 19605 and 1970s (see 
Leonard, 1976). Nor have they prescribed blueprints for others to emulate. Even 
CCETSVv has failed to provide more than general guidelines for either academics 
or practitioners, leaving the development of specific provisions in the hands of 
individual programme providers. 
Feminist and black perspectives have a dialectical understanding of the 
world rooted in the complexity of social phenomena, their interdependent 
nature and people's capacity to act for themselves by interacting vvith their 
environment. Whether subjected to violent forms of social control or less 
coercive, consensual ones, individuals vvill adopt responses maximising their 
control over situations. 
By focusing on CCETSW, Webb simplifies the philosophical traditions he 
attacks. There is a marked lack of authors writing from black and feminist 
perspectives in his article. It also ignores the continuity beffireen feminists' 
and black people's views on good practice and ideals propounded earlier by 
giants in social work education such as Charlotte Towle (1967). Moreover, 
modern feminists' and black activists' interest in the morality and value base 
of social vvork has been expressed over a number of years (see for example, 
McLeod and Dorninelli, 1982; Ahmed, 1978). The point they emphasise is that 
social workers make their moral stance explicit throughout their practice 
ra ther than cloaking it in subterfuge or benign neglect. 
The Age of Aquarius has yet to come, but its dawning has questioned the 
cultural relativism characterising 'liberal' beliefs and norms. For these have 
enabled their adherents to judge others from the safety of their own comfortable 
corner. For the politically powerless, its 'tolerant relativism' is experienced as 
repressive tolerance. How can they applaud a tolerant state that s~ds by as 
its homeless wander the streets, elders freeze to death, and children are 
assaulted at home. Feminists' and black activists' challenge has undermined 
liberal confidence in the assumption that because 'anything goes', nothing 
matters. However, their challenge doesn't presuppose dogmatic absolutism 
as the only alternative to 'tolerant relativism'. The life of the white adult male 
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does not have to provide society's one and only benchmark. The denial of 
citizenship for those on the 'Wrong side of this social divide is no lono-er 
o 
acceptable to women and black people whose consciousness of other 
alternatives has been aroused. Their project has been to shatter the illusion 
that the post-war welfare state has been ideal. Moreover, they have queried 
the nature of the connection between civil society and the state, though the 
boundaries between them are often blurred. The convergence of military, 
fundamentalist religious and statist objectives have undermined diversity 
and the right of people to be physically and culturally different without 
sacrificing economic, political and social equality. This aspiration for an 
egalitarianism transcending equality of opportunity has been poorly 
accommodated vvithin the liberal democratic framework. 
The relative autonomy of the state does not occur in a vacuum. Nor 
should it be conceptualised in class terms which disregard other social 
divisions. Freedom of manoeuvre for women and black people is expressed 
in forms of social control which constrain rather than extend their choices and 
life chances, thereby reinforcing their subordinate status. The state's regula-
tion of their personal morality remains undiminished whether it's through 
women's. lack of reproductive rights, immigration control, or Clause 28. 
Feminists' and black people's concern vvith a range of social divisions has 
prompted them to ensure, albeit imperfectly, that tackling one does not 
hinder their dismantling others. 
Webb argues that the rise of anti-racist and anti-sexist social work has 
been facilitated by society's social context and identifies legislative impera-
tives as its key determinants. This interpretation of events can be challenged 
empirically. Equality legislation has not substantially altered women and 
black people's inferior position, but 1'd rather highlight another element 
i£11ored bv Webb: the role of women and black people in creating their own o J 
destiny. Organised pressure exerted on CCETSW as the regulator of social 
work education by the oppressed themselves has been crucial to CCETSW's 
decision to promote anti-discrirninatory principles as part of good social 
work practice in Paper 30. By drawing on the women's and black people's 
movements, the oppressed have ensured that progressive changes in social 
work education are underpinned by the broader struggles of people defining 
for themselves the constraints which impinge on their lives. CCETSW's 
response to this historic moment has been half-hearted and lacks t~e .clarity 
of vision and direction Webb's article assumes. The resources for trammg the 
educators and trainers are not in place. Neither are the alternative provisions 
which vvill enlaro-e people's rano-e of choices. Feminist and black people 
themselves have °developed the~ largely in a fragmented and unfinished 
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V.lay in an under-resourced voluntary sector. CCETSW has done no more 
than genuflect in non-oppressive directions. Thus, its response has not 
moved beyond rhetoric and tokenism, albeit its current stance lacks the 
flabbiness characterising earlier positions. 
In conclusion, the key tenns in Webb's discourse do not for me signify the 
complexity and enormity of the task feminists and black people have taken on 
board. Nor do they symbolise the sensitivity which feminist social workers and 
black people display in their practice. But they provide useful labels for point-
scoring in debates and debunking serious and difficult work. Names do 
matter, as Romeo and Juliet found out in a lesson thattook their lives. Let us hope 
we can learn from our mistakes in less fatal ways. Maybe we could focus on the 
language of birth and love rather than death and battle. What do you think? 
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